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Among those who work in the private press, newspaper reporters 
often are the only people who appear willing to go to jail to 
protect unpublished information, e.g., sources of documents and 
information. For more than one hundred years, many reporters 
have resisted subpoenas and court orders and have voiced a 
range of arguments in refusing to cooperate with fact-finding 
tribunals. Cases reaching the U.S. Supreme Court have failed 
to secure the necessary protection.
The purpose of the analysis is to explain this failure as a 
product of argumentative weaknesses in the historical debate.
Tne weakness of the right-to-know argument, advanced on behalf 
of the testimonial privilege since 1886, is examined. The anal­
ysis also attempts to reconcile elements of the press' divergent 
arguments in favor of the privilege. A coherent theory is pro­
posed based on a political right to anonymity held by authors 
and sources of information--potentially any member of the public.
The assembled record of debate contains documentary evidence 
and material from a variety of legal and general literature pub­
lished through the end of 1977. It includes a brief history of 
the use of anonymous political commentary in early America.
Also included is a distillation of the records of hearings in 
Congress between 1972 and 1975. There is a record of decisions 
of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee, led by the American News­
paper Publishers Association, as it attempted to present the 
press' argument in Congress.
The analysis suggests that, under existing conditions, it may 
be impossible for courts to recognize the overriding political 
value in the reporters' claims without being forced to make 
judgments inappropriate for the judicial branch. Hence a solu­
tion is recommended that would tend to increase pressure for a 
legislative resolution of the question. It would assign re­
sponsibility for unpublished information to the publishers who 
control it, not the reporters who collect it. The analysis 
concludes by questioning whether there are enough publishers 
with the will to force passage of a federal law prohibiting all 
governmental inquisition of the press through subpoena.
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PREFACE
This analysis grew out of a suggestion by Frank Adams, 
chief of the Great Falls (Mont.) Tribune Capitol Bureau in 
Helena. His use of confidential news sources was challenged 
by a subpoena from state prosecutors who were looking for 
evidence of an alleged assassination plot against the Montana 
attorney general. The attempt to co-opt Adams and the Tribune 
eventually was successful (a court ruled against them and they 
turned over the information), but it generated popular reac­
tion sufficient to encourage the legislature to strengthen 
Montana'a law protecting the press* unpublished information 
from governmental subpoena. For its part, resisting as long 
as it felt able, the Tribune in 1977 received the First 
Amendment Award of the society of professional journalists, 
Sigma Delta Chi, and so gained something in common with for­
mer U.S. Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas and other 
modern defenders of press freedom.
One implication of the arguments here is that a repor- : 
ter's right to hold unpublished information in confidence is 
merely an extension of his publisher’s more basic institu­
tional right to immunity from subpoenas. This seems but a 
small change in emphasis and interpretation in a problem 
that has been endlessly interpreted, but it could provoke
renewed political examination of press subpoenas and impor­
tant spiritual renewal in the press itself. I am pleased to 
contribute it to the literature of journalism.
In a sense, this study is an interpretation of edito­
rial rights as expressed in the philosophy of journalistic 
autonomy developed by John C. Merrill in his book The Imper­
ative of Freedom (1974). But Merrill’s conclusion on this 
subject, that truthful journalism must name sources always,
I reject as specious.
This study was supported in part by the financial and 
academic resources of the University of Montana School of 
Journalism, and was supervised by its Dean, Warren J. Brier. 
Robert C. McGiffert, professor of journalism, and James J. 
Lopach, professor of political science, also supervised.
Their suggestions for research and their critical revie\tf of 
the draft were invaluable.
Many fine librarians deserve credit for helping solve 
research problems. General credit at least much go to the 
University of Montana library, the library of the University 
of Montana Law School, Montana State Library, the Montana 
Supreme Court Law Library, the Lewis § Clark library, and 
their respective interlibrary loan departments. Generous 
staff assistance came from the Montana Legislative Council, 
particularly its Legal Services and Research Divisions; the 
office of Dorothy Bradley, Majority Whip of the Montana House 
of Representatives; the executive directorships of the Amer­
ican Newspaper Publishers Association and the Newspaper
v
Guild; the legal staff of the Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press, and the offices of Rep. Max Baucus and the late 
Sen. Lee Metcalf.
Thanks is due the reporters who commented on the ideas 
as they developed during the study: Steve Shirley, Dave Shors
Pat Murdo, Bill Skidmore, Paula Walker, Roger Clawson,, Mari­
anne Melton, Charles Johnson, Rick Foote and Joy Toppin.
Finally, thanks is extended to the nonacademic review­
ers (friends) who patiently waded through the draft and of­
fered thoughtful criticism: James Allard, Daniel Vichorek,
Katherine Brown, John Hollow and Steven J. Perlmutter.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Other momentous' events were unfolding in the world in 
late April 1975 on the day an obscure Congressional subcom­
mittee met to consider what freedom of the press in the 
United States might mean. South Vietnamese President Nguyen 
Van Thieu had resigned only days before. Ten army divisions 
under command of Thieu's Communist adversaries ringed Saigon. 
In response to the panic in Vietnam, U.S. officials pro­
posed relaxing immigration rules to admit 130,000 refugees, 
the first of whom already had arrived. Still, the New York 
Times retained its usual perspective, finding space amidst 
war news to report on the birth of quintuplets in Cincin­
nati and the death of a 107-year-old veteran of the Spanish 
American War nursing corps. Even the trend in soybean fu­
tures was awarded some analysis. But no word appeared that 
day in the Times about a bill in subcommittee whose ultimate 
acceptance or rejection would affect a significant part of 
what we mean when we say the press shall be free. What for 
most of two centuries had been a much-disputed legal question 
was being stripped to its political heart in the nation's 
largest political forum: shall the government be allowed to
annex the press as an investigative tool for use against the
2
citizenry? The possible answers were clear: "yes.," "no," or
"sometimes."
Members of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier's Subcommittee on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice 
were not yet asking themselves or their fellow representatives 
to vote on the question. Even after years of testimony and 
the involvement' of hundreds of members of Congress, they 
wanted to hear once again from the press itself on this del­
icate subject of "newmen's privilege," as Congress had come 
to call it. Kastenmeier explained that the bill at hand (H.R. 
215)
. . . involves the balancing of vital but sometimes con­
flicting principles. The first is the well-known rule 
that Government has the right to secure the testimony of 
its citizens. The second is the equally urgent proposi­
tion that the public should have the greatest possible 
access to the news and other information and that members 
of the press shall not be cut off from their sources. It 
is persuasively argued that this will happen if newsmen 
can be forced [subpoenaed] to reveal information given to 
them in confidence.!
The Congressman’s words were familiar to the lawyers on 
the subcommittee. This was the standard framework that had 
bound the issue since any of them could remember.: "The bal­
ancing of . . . conflicting principles." There seemed to be 
no question about what was involved. After all, had not the
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Newsmen's Privilege, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice 
on H.R. 215, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 6 (hereafter 
cited as 1^75 House Hearings). H.R. 215 [ibid., PP* 2-5) 
is reproduced in the Appendix as Exhibit B.
U.S. Supreme Court considered the same question in the same 
terms? Kastenmeier reminded the audience that the Court’s 
controversial Branzburg v. Hayes  ̂ decision in 1972 had ruled 
that the First Amendment does not give newsmen any special 
testimonial privileges. But Congress, said the Court, could 
create such a privilege "as narrow or broad a deemed neces­
sary to deal with the evil d i s c e r n e d . A l t h o u g h  it had a 
bill in hand to do this, the subcommittee was reopening 
hearings begun in 1972 mostly, said chairman Kastenmeier, 
to "observe where we are on this issue at this particular 
time in history."^
Actually, Congress was approaching the end of an era 
that began in 1929 when the first "newsmen's privilege" bill 
was introduced. Over the years, scores followed but none 
was successful in passage. Congressional concern appeared 
to peak in 1973 when the record of testimony for and against 
protecting reporters filled more than 1,500 pages.
But Kastenmeier's intention to find out "where we are 
on this issue" referred to more than the members of Congress. 
Thinking in the press itself, in fact, whether to do anything 
at all about the subpoena question, had vacillated over the 
years, even during the early 1970s when relations between the
^United States Supreme Court Reports, Book 408 (Wash­
ington, ~D7cT: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 
665-752 (hereafter cited in general as Supreme Court Re­
ports , with references identified by book and page).
3Ibid., p. 706.
^1975 House Hearings, p. 6.
press and government seemed at an all-time low. Official 
attacks on the institution of journalism seemed especially 
threatening at a time when, according to some, the institu­
tional integrity of the press was helping support the Con­
stitutional system against excesses of power by the Presi­
dent.
In the midst of that trauma, some organized journal­
ism groups sent spokesmen to Congress to argue for protec­
tion from governmental subpoenas for unpublished information. 
Not on their own behalf, they said, but on behalf of the 
public. The public had a right to know what government of­
ficials really were doing and what dissidents in and out of 
government were saying. Only a ban on subpoenas could en­
sure a flow of information sufficient for informed decisions 
by the citizenry, they said. Publishers represented by the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) had held- 
that view.
But the press, never monolithic despite those who like 
to see it that way, was fragmented in its opinion on the sub­
poena question. A few press spokesmen warned of the danger 
in any legislation affecting the First Amendment. Any legis­
lative supplement would be dangerous, they said. One or two 
spokesmen warned that the press could abuse the power inher­
ent in the power to protect sources of information. Many sug­
gested a compromise: a statute that would effect a limit on
the numbers of press subpoenas but concede the right of the 
government to use the press for enforcement of criminal and
5
civil law. For more than two years, Congressional subcom­
mittees heard theoretical arguments concerning various ap­
proaches to the problem.
In 1975 Congress apparently hoped that some opinions 
in the press had changed. At last a committee of Congress 
had drafted a bill that it thought would pass if the press 
could unite behind it. After nearly a half-century of spo­
radic debate in Congress, basic questions would be answered 
for the record: What stake did the press have in its news
film outtakes on cutting-room floors, the identities of its 
trusting informants, and the preservation of confidential 
documents it obtained from them? How much did the press 
believe in its constitutional independence from government?
In short, was compliance with the free-press guarantee in 
the First Amendment a matter of degree, in this case, or of 
principle? Answers to these questions would be implied in 
press reaction to this particular bill, because it would gen­
erally limit, but not eliminate, the press' vulnerability to 
subpoenas from the three branches of government. It was pro­
tection '‘qualified" by major exceptions.
Anyone expecting more of the policy expressed previously 
by the ANPA on these matters would have been surprised when 
the publishers' group announced it was "pleased" to support 
the committee's bill. A spokesman summarized:
We are pleased to support H.R. 215 as being what we 
believe to be an effective adjustment to the views ex­
pressed by many people over the past several years and 
as representative of a good piece of legislation which 
we all know will be subject to review in the courts to
6
see whether or not something further need be done. . . .
Of course we would prefer an "absolute" bill. We are 
trying to be realistic. We realize that that is almost 
impossible. And, after 2 years, we think that we had 
better get what we can get, if we can get that.5
In the face of Kastenmeier’s announced belief that "an 
absolute privilege absolutely cannot make it" through Con­
gress,^ ANPA’s position certainly was realistic. And it was 
supported by leaders of the Columbia Broadcasting System, the 
National Broadcasting Co., and other lesser figures. Yet one 
important press group obstinately clung to idealism and with­
held support from the bill. It would not be satisfied with 
getting what it could get. Among other reasons, the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press cited "the theoretical one 
that a qualified bill violates the first amendment to the ex­
tent that it does or could infringe on the information gath­
ering potential of j o u r n a l i s t s . I t s  spokeman summarized 
the position of his constituency, "the working press":
. . .  we believe that the Congress should pass an ab­
solute and preemptive privilege statute, protecting jour­
nalists from being ordered to disclose unpublished infor­
mation before any executive, legislative or judicial body 
of Federal, State or local government.
We strongly oppose any limitation on this privilege.8
Why should publishers and reporters have differed so 
strongly in their willingness to accede to the government’s 
demands for unpublished information? The ANPA spokesman de-
5Ibid., p. 106.
6Ibid., pp. 117-18.
^Ibid., p . 96.
8Ibid., p. 94.
nied that it had anything to do with differing "constitution­
al interests." "As a matter of fact," said the ANPA, "owners, 
publishers and editors have the same interest in preserving 
these first amendment rights as the reporters. They too can 
be sent to jail under the authority of the Branzburg case."9 
But, the ANPA indicated, "we also live in a real world" where 
compromise of principles seems necessary sometimes.^0 Its 
spokesman found himself forced into an embarrassing disagree­
ment when one incredulous member of the subcommittee ques­
tioned the ANPA’s moral position: "Who, if anyone, can
waive the right of the public to have media that cannot be 
made into a part of the law enforcement agencies of the Na­
tion?""^
Who indeed? The thesis here is that, by their support 
of qualified newsmen’s privilege legislation in Congress, the 
ANPA and other press groups in 1975 complaisantly attempted 
to waive a fundamental right of the free press in the United 
States. But more than that, these organized journalism groups 
jeopardized a basic political liberty of every citizen: the
right to comment on public affairs anonymously. Although 
there is support in Supreme Court decisions for that liberty, 
the Court has not recognized it in connection with press sub­
poenas. In fact, it is not a freedom commonly pointed out in
9Ibid. , pp. 106-7.
10Ibid. , p. 116
n ibid., p. 117.
free-press debate, although the use of pseudonyms for public 
commentary in America had a distinguished following in Thomas 
Paine, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison, John 
Adams, Samuel Adams, James Alexander, DeWitt Clinton and 
John Dickinson, among many others. However, it is a liberty 
threatened whenever the government can subpoena a publica­
tion to force disclosure of a source of information or to 
compel the testimony of a reporter. It is a liberty that can 
be protected best by publishers, although the history of de­
bate surrounding governmental subpoenas of the press is near­
ly devoid of remarks concerning the responsibilities of pub­
lishers .
Whether the freedom to comment on public affairs anony­
mously under the First Amendment is protected from govern­
mental subpoena power is a legal question not yet brought 
forward for resolution by the Supreme Court. Even as a gen­
eral issue it never has been presented properly for legisla­
tive resolution, despite the years of debate surrounding the 
subject of press subpoenas.
The purpose of this analysis is to encourage reexamina­
tion of the subpoena question in terms of two specific polit­
ical liberties: freedom from subpoena for publishers, and a
right to anonymous commentary for all of us. The intent is 
to help counter the considerable momentum of our government 
toward their destruction.
Resolving the subpoena question in favor of the press 
would relieve publishers (to say nothing of reporters) of an
oppressive burden, but that happy side effect would, be as a 
footnote in what should be a more general debate concerning 
political liberty. Let it begin here.
A review of the elements so far in the subpoena debate, 
a record of the judicial treatment of the relevant questions 
as they were presented, and a review of Congressional testi­
mony on the need to protect journalists in the public inter­
est, are the subjects of the remaining chapters. A conclu­
ding chapter proposes a theory and offers recommendations 
for action.
CHAPTER II
THE ANONYMOUS VOICE
Practically since Gutenberg, the history of publishing 
contains many examples of the use of legal force to pry un­
published information out of press hands. Early cases in­
volved tracts printed without governmental approval and writ­
ten by authors who wished to remain anonymous for fear of 
retaliation by those in power. If the published tract was 
in praise of what are now democratic traditions, and the le­
gal force against its printer and author was exercised on be­
half of autocratic rulers, the investigation and prosecution
can be labeled witch-hunting without fear of contradiction.
/
Today, of course, witch-hunting is highly disapproved of.
The tools of its practice today commonly are thought to be 
confined to political forums, such as committees of Congress.
But there was a time, not long before the end of li­
censing- and censorship in England, when printers were exe­
cuted for shielding anonymous authors. One of the first was 
John Twyn, who was indicted and tried in 1663 for "compassing" 
(imagining) the King’s death. The treasonable offense arose 
from his printing of A Treatise on the Execution of Justice, 
which held that rulers are "accountable to the people, and 
that the people may take up arms against a king and his fam-
10
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ily . . . if he refuses accountability."* At the time, this 
was a criminal notion. After he refused to say who wrote the 
treatise, Twyn was executed. Thirty years later, William 
Anderton was hanged for almost exactly the same crime after 
he refused to name the authors of treasonable books he had 
printed.2
In the eighteenth century, free at last from licensing, 
English journalism became a vital social and political force. 
The first half-century of this journalism was especially in­
fluential on the development of American colonial newspapers, 
which were in their infancy. Periodical essays began to ap­
pear, many written by great men of letters. At first, most 
of the discussion revolved around social, moral and literary 
topics, but gradually commentary became political. The master 
journalist of that century, Daniel Defoe, in his Mist1s Jour­
nal developed "letters introductory": expositions on popular 
topics signed with various pen names. These essays and let- - 
ters are considered to have been the prototypes of the modern 
editorial.4
As newspapers became the common medium of political dis­
*Harold L. Nelson and Dwight L. Teeter, Jr., Law of Mass 
Communications, 2nd ed. (Mineola, N.Y. : Foundation Press,
1973), pp. 20-21.
2Ibid.
3Willard Grosvenor Bleyer, Main Currents m  the History 
of American Journalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., The Riverside Press, 1927), pp. 15-18.
4Ibid., p. 22.
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cussion, many of the greatest political debates were carried
on by men who wrote pseudonymously. One famous series of
political letters was written by John Trenchard and Thomas
Gordon weekly between 17 20 and 17 23 and published first in
the London Journal and then in the British Journal. Signed
"Cato," the letters had popular impact both in England and in
America. An historian of journalism has observed:
The theories of liberty and of representative government 
set forth in Cato's Letters, as they were called when is­
sued in four volumes m  1724, met with so hearty an ap­
proval in the colonies that some of the letters were re­
printed and quoted in almost every colonial nextfspaper, 
beginning in 1721 with Franklin's New-England Courant.
They helped crystallize the political ideas that finally 
found expression in the Declaration of Independence.-
Although it is usually cited for its victory against re­
pressive seditious libel statutes, the case of John Peter Zen- 
ger, printer of the New York Weekly Journal, also involved 
anonymity. As in any libel prosecution, it was the printer 
who was on trial for publishing in 1734 attacks that labeled 
the colonial governor of New York a tyrant.^ Throughout his 
nine-month imprisonment and the trial, Zenger refused to name 
the individuals who wrote the critical articles for the Jour­
nal , though the governor had offered a substantial reward for 
their identity. The colonial government, focusing as it was 
on the alleged crime of seditious libel, did not need to exer­
5Ibid., p. 23.
^Nelson and Teeter, p. 23.
7Charles W. Whalen, Jr., Your Right to Know, with an 
Introduction by Walter Cronkite (New York: Vintage Books, 
1973), p. 12.
cise itself at trial to discover the author; jailing the prin 
ter would serve its purpose. Part of the defense counsel’s 
successful argument to the jury was that "[men] who injure 
and oppress the people under their administration [and] pro­
voke them to cry out and complain" should not be empowered 
to "make that very complaint the foundation for new oppres-
Osions and prosecutions." The words could have served as 
well to defend Zenger on the charge of contempt for failing 
to reveal who wrote the words he printed, but is was not to 
be.
About the time of the Zenger trial, young Benjamin
Franklin was assisting his brother James, publisher of the
New-England Courant. The Boston newspaper of religious and
political satire was said to have libeled the government.
When hauled before a committee of their colonial Assembly,
the two refused to name the source of the offending articles.
Benjamin Franklin later wrote:
One of the pieces in our newspaper on some political 
point, which I have now forgotten, gave offense to the 
Assembly. He [James] was taken up, censured, and im­
prisoned for a month by the speaker’s warrant, I suppose, 
because he would not discover the author. I too was 
taken up and examined before the council; but, though I 
did not give them any satisfaction, they contented them­
selves with admonishing me, and dismissed me, considering 
me, perhaps, as an apprentice, who was bound to keep his 
master’s secrets.^
The Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell’s St. Tr. 
675, 721-22 [1735), quoted by Justice Goldberg in New York 
Times v. Sullivan, Supreme Court Reports, Book 376, p. 301.
^Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin (H. Weld ed., 1848) 
p. 30, quoted in Sam J. Ervin, Jr., "In Pursuit of a Press 
Privilege," Harvard Journal on Legislation 11 [1974): 233-34.
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There is nothing that appears in the record of colonial 
free-press debate to contradict the notion that the use, 
propriety and advantages of pseudonymous and anonymous writing 
were taken for granted during the entire eighteenth century.
James Alexander, who could have been the mysterious
author in the Zenger case,., was. the., first American to develop
a philosophy of He^i3“‘ond o"F~the few -
early Americans to remark on anonymity as a right of free 
expression. In a 1734 essay ascribed to him, Alexander 
evinced great distaste for governmental "endeavors” to dis­
cover the authors:
I would be glad to know wherein this Liberty of Writing 
consists? If no Endeavours have been left untryed, either 
with Grand Juries, and even with one of the Branches of 
the Legislature to treat the Papers with the greatest 
Ignominy, and to discover the Authors--Even of Papers 
(as those of the Continuance of the Middletown Letter) 
which were purely argumentative upon political points, 
without the least Syllable of an indecent Reflection upon 
any Body, and the Reasons given for this Discovery was, 
that the Authors might meet with condign Punishment; with 
what Propriety of Speech can we be said to have the Liber­
ty of freely communicating our Sentiments upon any points, 
when so great Endeavours are used to prevent its being 
done? Have not the Authors all the Reason in the World 
to fear a Repetition of the Exorbitant Fines and sangui­
nary Cruelties that stain'd the Reigns preceeding the 
Revolution?-- Is it not a ridiculous Farce and an Affront 
to the common Sense of Mankind to talk of Liberty of the 
Press enjoyed with Impunity in this C a s e ? 1 0
Another author rejoiced in the anonymity of the typeface. 
William Livingston’s essay in 1753, "Of the Use, Abuse and 
Liberty of the Press," commented on the necessity for anony-
^ Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson, ed. and 
intro. Leonard W. levy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Co., Inc., 
1966), pp. 35-37.
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mity and the power of the press to preserve it:
Secrecy, is another Advantage, which an Author had not 
before the Art of Printing was discovered. As long as 
Power may be perverted, from the original Design of its 
being lodged with the Magistrate, for protecting the In­
nocent and punishment of the Guilty, so long it will be 
necessary to conceal the Author who remarks it, from the 
Malice of the Officer guilty of so pernicious a Perver­
sion; and by Means of this Art he may write undiscovered, 
as it is impossible to detect him by the Types of the 
Press.
The controversy over the Stamp Act in 1765 greatly 
, advanced colonial opposition to British policies. In this 
and subsequent controversies, American leaders--statesmen, 
lawyers, scholars and clergymen--who supported or opposed 
British colonial policies used the newspapers to amplify 
their points of view. The usual means adopted were letters, 
published singly or in series and addressed to the printer 
or ’’author" of the newspaper. Like the authors of Cato's 
Letters, they signed with pen names:
Samuel Adams was the most prolific and the most ef­
fective of the Patriot writers for newspapers. In sign­
ing his letters and articles he used some twenty-five 
different pen names. . . . Probably no single Patriot 
did more to bring about the rupture between England and 
her colonies than did Adams. 2
In turn, Loyalists used avowedly governmental newspapers to 
publish counterattacks. The attorney general of Massachu­
setts, Jonathan Sewall, wrote under the name of "Philanthrop" 
to engage in a protracted debate with Samuel Adams as "Vindex" 
over the outcome of the trial of British soldiers engaged in
^ I b i d . , p. 76. 
■^Bleyer, p. 82.
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the Boston Massacre.I3 Daniel Leonard, a Taunton, Mass., 
Loyalist lawyer, used the Massachusetts Gazette and Post 
Boy to publish attacks on the first Continental Congress.
He assumed the pen name, "Massachusettensis." Using the
v,
pseudonym "Novanglus," the Patriot John Adams rebutted
Loenard in a series1 of letters published in the Boston
Gazette:
The debate continued, week by week, until cut short 
by the temporary suspension of the Boston Gazette, which 
ceased publication for two months immediately after the 
battle of Lexington. These letters attracted much at­
tention, not only when they appeared . . . but when they 
were reprinted in pamphlet form both in the colonies and 
in England.
During the critical years in American colonial affairs,
1769 to 1772, the London Public Advertiser published the
famous letters by "Junius," who remains anonymous. These
letters brought to the colonists and the citizens of England
a clearer understanding of their . . . rights and a 
stronger determination to retain them. This method 
of carrying on political discussion in series of letters 
contributed to newspapers by political leaders, usually 
writing under the names of famous Romans, was very popu­
lar in both England and America.15
Another important pre-Revolutionary discussion was an outcome 
of Thomas Paine's pamphlet, "Common Sense," published in 1776. 
The Rev. William Smith, president of the University of Phila­
delphia, assumed the name "Cato" to answer Paine in a series 
of letters to the Perinsylvanla Gazette. To these Paine re-
•^Ibid., p. 83. 
"^Ibid. , p. 84. 
^Ibid. , pp. 23-24.
17
plied with a series of letters signed ’’Forester" and pub­
lished in the Pennsylvania Packet. The "Cato-Forester" de­
bate was one of the most significant public discussions of 
this crucial time in American affairs.
Significantly, the end of the threat of British pros­
ecution for sedition had no effect on the use of pseudony- 
mously published opinion in newTy independent America. 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, DeWitt Clinton 
and John Dickinson were among the distinguished political 
leaders who continued the tradition of anonymity in advancing 
points of view for public consideration. In discussing the 
proposed Constitution, they relied as usual on published let­
ters :
Unquestionably the greatest series of such letters 
was that known as The Federalist, written by Hamilton, 
Madison and Jay, under the name of "Publius," and ad­
dressed "To the People of the State of New York." They 
were first published in the semi-weekly New York Inde­
pendent Journal: or General Advertiser, beginning on 
October 27, 1787, and continuing into April, 1788. These 
letters explained in detail the various articles of the 
Constitution and urged its adoption. Jefferson wrote 
from Paris that they constituted "the best commentary on 
the principles of government which was ever written."
As fast as they appeared in the independent Journal, they 
were reprinted in other newspapers that favored the rat­
ification of the Constitution. . . . Hamilton, who had 
contributed essays and letters to newspapers from the be­
ginning of the Revolutionary War, was the author of two 
thirds of these letters. As an exposition of the funda­
mental principles of constitutional government, The Fed­
eralist is the most important contributipn to political 
science that has ever appeared in the American press. ^
■^•^Ibid. , p . 91.
l^Ibid., p. 102 (footnotes omitted).
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After the Constitution had been accepted and the gov­
ernment organized, supporters of the Federalist and Republi­
can theories of government continued their pitched battle for 
public support by founding their own newspapers. Hamilton, 
leader of the Federalists and secretary of the treasury, used 
the Gazette of the United States. In anonymously published
articles he attacKed- Repub 1 icans- in general and Jef ferson in 
18particular. Jefferson, leader of the Republicans and sec­
retary of state, and his friend, James Madison, founded the 
National Gazette for similar purposes. When President Wash­
ington asked if it was true that Jefferson was responsible 
for the vitriolic anti-administration attitude of the National 
Gazette, Jefferson felt compelled to deny contributing any­
thing anonymously to it. He told the President: "I never
did by myself or any other, directly or indirectly, write, 
dictate or procure any one sentence or sentiment to be in­
serted . . .  to which my name was not affixed or that of my 
office." In the same letter, Jefferson advised Washington 
with the now-famous remark, "No government ought to be without 
censors: § where the press is free, no one ever will."^9
Beginning in 1793, Noah Webster began editing the Fed­
eralist American Minerva. Its founding issue apparently was 
the first to declare a policy on anonymously published writ­
ings:
18Ibid., p. 107.
19Ibid., pp. 110-11.
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The Editor will endeavor to preserve this Paper 
chaste and impartial. Confidence, when secrecy is 
necessary or proper, will never be violated. Person­
alities, if possible, will be avoided; and should it 
ever be deemed proper to insert any remarks of a personal 
nature, it will be held an indispensable condition, that 
the name of the writer be previously left with the Edi­
tor.20
Webster wrote for his paper letters under various names, in­
cluding a series- of’ twelve■'"S'"i'giie'd”'l't'Cur’tiU'S.tf”-’-Part of another 
series written by Hamilton and Rufus King was published in 
'the Minerva under the name "Camillus." All concerned Jay’s 
treaty with England in 1795. Jefferson admired their ef­
fectiveness and thought they all were written by Hamilton.
In 1795, he wrote to Madison:
We have had only middling performances to oppose him.
In truth, when he comes forward, there is nobody but 
yourself who can meet him. His adversaries having begun 
the attack, he has the advantage of answering them, § re­
mains unanswered himself. . . .  For god's sake take up 
your pen, and give a fundamental reply to Curtius § Cam­
illus.21
The virulent bitterness of the ideological struggle
between the two sides plumbed deplorable depths during the
2 2last years of the century. Republican editorial abuse 
of the Federalists and their two figureheads, Washington 
and Adams, led directly to the country's first experiment 
with sedition laws. The leading Republican editors were 
English or Irish radicals who had fled England and were 
anxious to attack what they saw as pro-British attitudes
20 Ibid., p. 113 (emphasis his).
^ I b i d ., p . 114 .
22 For a good summary, see Bleyer, pp. 115-29.
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in foreign policies of the first two administrations.23 x0 
curb the published abuse, the Federalist majority in Congress 
in 1798 passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Alien Act 
permitted the President to deport or imprison aliens who 
were, in his judgment, "dangerous to the peace and safety of 
the United S t a t e s T h e  SediTioh^Act was'"himed at aliens too, 
but also at native American editors and writers who were vili­
fying the government. For three years, it was a felony to 
"write, print, utter, publish . . . or procure to be writ­
ten, printed, uttered or published, or . . .assist or aid in 
writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandal­
ous and malicious writing . . . against the government" with 
intent to defame it or with intent to excite resistance to
"any law . . .  or any act of the President.” Truth was an
24allowable defense under the Sedition Act.
Prosecutions under the Sedition Act included the arrest 
of about twenty-five persons, not all editors, and the convic­
tion of ten persons. Apparently, none of the legal maneuvers 
involved efforts to pierce veils of anonymity. Prosecution
apparently focused on those known to have written or assisted
2 ̂in the publishing of sedition as defined. D
Argus, Greenleaf's New Daily Advertiser was one of 
three leading Republican newspapers attacked through the Se~
23Ibid., p. 127.
24Ibid., p. 120.
25Ibid., pp. 121-23.
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dition Act. Hamilton himself was responsible for the pro­
secution, which convicted David Frothingham, a printer em­
ployed by the publisher. The article complained of had ap­
peared in several papers before being reprinted in the Argus.
In a letter to the attorney general of New York, Hamilton 
requested "immediate measures: -towards the prosecution of 
the persons who conduct the enclosed paper." This and 
other bits of evidence from the period indicate that the Fed­
eralists were mainly interested in stopping "publications 
and republications" of seditious libels and were not parti- 
cularly interested in the writers who remained anonymous.
The turn of the century did not end the partisan 
bitterness of the late 1700s. An "era of good feelings" had 
to await the end of the War of 1812 and the decline of British 
and French influences on American politics. But the year 1800 
does seem to represent a watershed in the use of anonymously 
published political commentary in the United States. Accord­
ing to the evidence, a major journalistic tradition disap­
peared virtually overnight. Perhaps this remarkable transi­
tion never will be explained fully.
Practically speaking, the change in favor of assuming 
credit for (or at least not denying association with) what 
was published must have been the result of a release from fear. 
No longer was there a threat of British prosecution for sedi­
tion. But there remains the curious continuation of the tradi-
26Ibid.
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tion of anonymity during the formative years of the United 
States. It was as if Revolutionary and counter-Revolutionary 
excesses had to fight for dynamic balance before the use of 
protective anonymity in published opinion could be abandoned 
for the "safety*' of the rule of law under a just (and amended) 
Constitution.
Regardless- of their reasons, the- fact is that the 
Founding Fathers of the United States fully demonstrated a 
belief in the appropriateness of anonymous commentary under 
our Constitution. Whether this fact helps justify constitu­
tional protection for a right to comment on public affairs 
anonymously is a matter of opinion.
This study discovered no evidence that the Founding 
Fathers formally defined their right to comment on public 
affairs anonymously. There is no evidence-whether they 
wished to see it protected as an indispensable political 
liberty. Apparently, they took it as given, used it when 
they thought necessary, and abandoned it without a word of 
appreciation for its service.
To introduce a legal analysis of the right to anonymity, 
we have Tunis Wortman’s Treatise Concerning Political Enquiry, 
and the Liberty of the Press. It was published in 1800 dur­
ing the peak of governmental agitation to restore the "integ­
rity" of a press widely considered to be totally licentious. 
Wortman tried to put matters in perspective:
It is of no consequence to enquire who writes a paper or 
a pamphlet, where principles and not individuals are the 
subjects of investigation. The only reasonable enquiry
23
is, are the principles contended for just? If they are 
let them have their due weight; if otherwise, they will 
meet with their merited contempt. In all cases, however, 
where specific or general charges are exhibited against 
an individual, or individuals, the person's name ought 
to be affixed to the publication. In this case, wilful 
calumny and abuse would never dare to make their appear­
ance. He who had been once convicted of publishing a 
malicious falsehood, would forever after be deprived of 
the means of giving currency to his calumnies. Let no
Government int-erfere-.— The laws of— socie-t-y--. ;. . are- fully
s u f f i c i e n t  tOL_.the_jp.ur.pase-.-??
Indeed, it has become a legal axiom that "major values
.underlying free speech and press are society’s need[s]."^
Because free speech and press in the United States receive
their protection from the First Amendment, ^  testimony about
what it meant at the time of its adoption is relevant:
First of all (if the amendment is analyzed by focusing on 
the phrase, "freedom of the press"), it was merely an as­
surance that Congress was powerless to authorize re­
straints in advance of publication. . . .  No other def­
inition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in 
America before 1798 has been d i s c o v e r e d . 30
The much broader First Amendment as we know it today is
^7Levy, p. 316.
? &Nelson and Teeter, p. 2.
29"Congress shall make no law respecting an establish­
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Constitu­
tion, amend. I (1791).
30Levy, p. lv. He adds:
"It now appears that the prohibition on Congress was moti­
vated far less by a desire to give immunity to political 
expression than by a solicitude for states' rights and the 
federal principle. The primary purpose of the First Amend­
ment was to reserve to the states an exclusive authority as 
far as legislation was concerned, in the field of speech 
and press" (ibid., p. lix).
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not nearly as old as the Constitution. "Having spent more 
than a century in largely hortatory limbo," said a 1971 Field 
Foundation study, "the first amendment has had a surprisingly 
brief career--just over fifty years--as a meaningful legal 
concept."31- According to that study, the earliest judicial 
decision awarding any meaningful protection to free speech
T Owas in 1917. Not-until 1931 did the Supreme Court reverse 
a state-court judgment explicitly on First Amendment g r o u n d s . ^3 
The first high-court decision striking down an act of Congress 
as repugnant to the First Amendment was in 1965.^
The 1931 decision, Near v. Minnesota, established among 
other things that liberty of speech and press guaranteed by 
the federal Constitution are "safeguarded by the due-process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state ac­
tion. Having thus established the federal power to enjoin
unconstitutional action by states, the decision went on to 
forbid most legal restraints in advance of publication, espe­
cially in discussions of public affairs. Significantly, the 
decision explicitly left open the door for previous restraint 
when the words to be published involved a threat to the nation
Tl Vince Blasi, "The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical 
Study," Michigan Law Review 70 (1971): 233.
^2Ibid., p. 233n. The decision was Judge Learned Hand's 
in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten.
33 Ibid., Near v. Minnesota.
•^Ibid., Lamont v. Postmaster General.
•^Nelson and Teeter, p. 44 (quoting Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes).
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in time of war, or were obscene, or were incitements to vio- 
lence or violent revolution. (It should be noted that cru­
cial legal battles involving subpoenas for unpublished infor­
mation occurred in the last century, long before the Supreme 
Court breathed life into the First Amendment in Near v. Min­
nesota. Practically speaking, defense under the federal 
Constitution against subpoenas by state officers was unavail­
able to newsmen then.)
Consistently, courts have confused freedom of the press 
with freedom of speech.37 The most important aspect of this 
confusion with regard to press subpoenas is the settled no­
tion that a witness’ freedom of speech does not include the
70freedom to remain silent in court. The traditional privi-
36Ibid., p. 45.
37James A. Guest and Alan L. Stanzler, "The Constitu­
tional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources,” North­
western University Law Review 64(1969): 39.
3^Ibid., p. 40. The justification for compulsory testi- 
money has its historical roots in England. Jeremy Bentham 
stated the rule dramatically:
"Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
and the Lord High Chancellor to be passing by in the same 
coach, while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in 
dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples and the chimney­
sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call 
upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, 
most certainly" (4 Works of Jeremy Bentham 320 [Bowring ed. 
1843], cited ibid., p. 24n).
The U.S. Supreme Court dictated a rule to conform to the 
tradition long ago:
"It is clearly recognized that the giving of testimony and 
the attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify 
are public duties which every person within the jurisdic­
tion of the Government is bound to perform upon being prop­
erly summoned, and for performance of.which he is entitled 
to no further compensation than that which the statutes 
provide. The personal sacrifice involved is a part of the
26
leges accorded some witnesses in protected relationships-- 
husband-wife, lawyer-client, priest-penitant, doctor-pa-' 
ient--have been based not on constitutional grounds of free­
dom of speech but rather on exceptions to the common-law pre-
39sumption in favor of testimony by all. On this point, one
analyst has remarked-:
The fact that the compulsory testimony principle is con­
sistent with freedom of speech, however, does not imply 
that it is consistent with other constitutional provi­
sions. For each provision, courts must make an indepen­
dent analysis. In the case of a criminal defendant, for 
example, regardless of freedom of speech, compulsory 
testimony violates the right of an accused to remain si­
lent. Similarly, regardless of freedom of speech, compul­
sory testimony may violate freedom of the press.40
Analysts also point to the strong legal presumption 
against testimonial privileges in explanation for legal re­
sistance to such a right for journalists. In all newsmen’s 
privilege cases where the issue was allowed to be framed as 
a common-law exception to a common-law rule, the courts fol­
lowed the traditional legal presumption against any exceptions 
but those long since found to outweigh the ’’public interest in 
the search for truth."4-*- As we see in a later chapter, press
necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of 
the public" (Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 
[1919], cited ibid., pT 25n j .
Established legal thought opposes privileges in deroga­
tion of the general rule, and favors the gradual elimination 
of the common-law privileges that have arisen (ibid, pp. 24- 
25).
•^Ibid. , p . 40 .
40Ibid.
41Ibid. The quotation is from United States v. Bryan 
(1950).
27
spokesmen clung to common-law,- rather than constitutional 
arguments, for about one hundred years.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to recognize in 
newsmen's privilege a special constitutional right of the 
press not accorded to the public in general. One explana­
tion given for is the G&ur4.fs -"tendency^ in the past to
view freedom of the press as a particularized form of freedom 
of speech.”42 Many cases involving the press have been de- 
'cided, in fact, on the grounds of a general "freedom of ex­
pression," citing neither the free-press nor the free-speech 
guarantee. 4~*
The nature of free-press rights, as distinguished from 
the rights of free speech or free expression, is unsettled 
in court opinions.44 Before the 1972 Branzburg decision, 
determinations of free-press rights were connected almost 
exclusively with balancing press rights in the publication 
and distribution aspects of publishing against society's in­
terests -- against libel, and restraint of trade, to name two.4** 
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court pointedly declined to suggest 
that "news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment pro­
tection; without some protection for seeking out the news,
^William S. Hurst, "Has Branzburg Buried the Under­
ground Press?", Harvard Civil-.'Rights-Civil Liberties Law Re­
view 8 (1973): 19T7
43 Ibid.
44Ibid, p. 184.
45Ibid., p. 191.
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f r e e d o m  of the p r e s s  c o u l d  b e  e v i s c e r a t e d . " ^
In decisions spanning thirty years, the Supreme 
Court recognized component parts of the free-press guaran­
tee as follows: The freedom to publish without government
approval (Near v. Minnesota, 1931) ; a right of circulation 
(Gros j ean v. Airieri&arr Press Co£ ̂  1936) ; freedom to distri­
bute literature (Marsh v. A1abama, 1946), and Martin v. City 
of Struthers, 1943); and the right to receive printed matter
A ' 7
freely (Lamont v. Postmaster General, 1965). Although it
acknowledged in Branzburg a right to gather news, the Court
promptly asserted that all relevant subpoenas for unpublished
information are instances of permissible restrictions on the
4 8news-gathering right. To support its conclusion, the Court 
majority relied on decisions supporting the view that the 
press may be constitutionally restrained by "enforcement of 
civil or criminal statutes of general applicability,"^ that 
it is "not free to publish with impunity everything and any­
thing it d e s i r e s , a n d  that there is no "unrestrained right 
to gather information"^ that can be allowed to interfere with
^ Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, p. 681.
^Listed in United States v. Liddy (Judge John Sirica), 
Federal Supplement, Book 354 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 
1973), p. 214.
4 8 Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, p. 681.
^ I b i d . , p . 682.
50Ibid., p. 683.
51Ibid., p. 684.
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52the execution of justice and the police power.
Detailed criticism of the Supreme Court’s views in 
Branzburg will be pursued later, but for now it is appro­
priate to relay the general observation that in its haste to 
support law and order, the Court may have misweighed the news- 
gathering right it acknowledged. As one commentator observed:
There is good reason to view freedom-of the press as co­
extensive with freedom of speech in publication-distribu- 
tion type cases and to measure the rights of the press to 
set forth its views by the rights of citizens in general 
to express their views on issued important to them. The 
free-speech guarantee’s purpose of providing an opportu­
nity ”to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed 
remedies"51 would be frustrated equally as much by inter­
ference with printed expression as with spoken expres­
sion.
When the Court turns to the news-gathering function, 
this identification of protected interests logically sug­
gests the rule based on a right of equal access which the 
Court apparently had in mind wrhen it recognized the news- 
gathering right in Branzburg. However, the concurrence of 
free-press and free-speech interests in the publication or 
distribution contexts does not necessarily carry over to 
news gathering. Although the availability of information 
is admittedly essential to any exercise of free speech, 
the press differs from the ordinary citizen in that it is 
engaged in the active pursuit of news. . . . the press 
has been constitutionally accorded the role in society of 
seeking out news on behalf of the public and keeping it in­
formed with facts and interpretive o p i n i o n . 53
51Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
Before moving to a general discussion of the press’ in­
stitutional role, it will be helpful to dispose of the objec­
tion to the privilege that relies on precedents approving gov­
ernment regulation of the press as a business.
52Ibid., pp. 684-85. 
^Hurst, p. 192.
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When the Supreme Court noted that the government may 
enforce against the press "civil or criminal statutes of 
general applicability," it was restating a view much maligned 
but apparently gradually accepted by the press since the ma­
jor cases were decided in the 1930s and r40s. In Associated 
Press v. NLRB ( the A P w a s  required' to~ c amp 1y with the 
National Labor Relations Act. A similar case in 1946 forced 
compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act.*^ Grosjean v. 
American Press Co. (1936), among other cases, affirmed that 
newspapers may be subjected to nondiscriminatory forms of 
general taxation.^ These "incidental burdening[s] of the 
press,” as the Supreme Court has referred to them,^ have be­
come accepted because their impact is not censorial. Clearly 
the business aspects of the press are the target, although 
their application indirectly affects the resources available 
for producing news. The remaining important case, Associated 
Press v. United States (1945) , seemed to involve a much more 
direct interference with the publishing of news. It deserves 
close scrutiny here because it seems to be a source of confu­
sion on the question of editorial control and what governmen­
tal actions constitute interference with it.
The case has been analyzed elsewhere.^ Briefly, by­
54Listed in Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, p. 683.
55Ibid.
56Ibid., p. 682.
^ S e e  Mary Pat Murphy, "The United States vs. the AP," 
Montana Journalism Review, no. 17 (1974), pp. 40-46.
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laws of the Associated Press were acting to restrain trade
and commerce in the news among the states and to monopolize
a part of that trade in violation of the Sherman antitrust
law, the government said.^ The bylaws prevented AP members
from selling news to non-members and from giving'it away in
59advance of publication. They also made membership diffi­
cult for publishers who wanted to join the AP and compete -in 
districts with established AP members.^ The Associated 
Press, the Chicago Tribune and many others argued that ap­
plication of antitrust laws in this case would abridge free­
dom of the press. "A free press requires that newspapers 
shall be free to collect and distribute the news and that 
they shall be free to choose their associates in so doing," 
the defendants replied. The AP's underlying assumption was 
that because its members each "owned" the news stories they 
generated, the AP as a cooperative should be allowed exclu­
sive control of their resale or t r a d e . ^2 xt is impossible 
to monopolize the trade in news, the AP said, because "the 
source of news lies in the event itself," which makes.it po­
tentially available to all who want to dig it out fox publi-
^^Nelson and Teeter, p. 600.
59Ibid., p. 601.
60Ibid.
^Murphy, p. 42.
^ I b i d . , pp. 42-43.
63Ibid., p. 42.
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cation.
In agreeing with lower-court rulings against the de­
fendants, the Supreme Court held that trade in news is akin 
to the sale of "food, steel, aluminum, or anything else people 
need dr want."^ This alone would permit nondiscriminatory 
regulation of its trade, said the Court, but there is more. 
Justice Hugo L. Black explained the reasoning of three of 
the five-Justice majority:
The First Amendment, far from providing an argument 
against application of the Sherman Act, here provides 
powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests 
on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination 
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is 
essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press 
is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that 
the government itself shall not impede the free flow of 
ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations . . . 
a refuge if they impose restraints on that constitution­
ally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom 
for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaran­
teed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep 
others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from 
governmental interference under the First Amendment does 
not sanction repression of that freedom by private inter­
ests. The First Amendment affords not the slightest sup­
port for the contention that a combination to restrain 
trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity. ^
As the Court’s dissenting voices noted at the time, it 
was the first time the government’s antitrust powers had been 
"used as a vehicle for affirmative intervention . . .  in the 
realm of dissemination of information."^ Voicing what press 
law books describe as part of a "traditional libertarian
^4Nelson and Teeter, p. 602.
^Ibid. , pp. 602-3.
^Ibid., pp. 603-4 (quoting Justices Owen J. Roberts 
and Frank Murphy).
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fi 7view,” Justice Frank Murphy issued a warning: ”We cannot
escape.the fact that governmental action aimed at the methods 
or conditions of such collection or distribution [of news 
stories] is an interference with the press, however differ­
ing in degree it may be from governmental restraints on writ­
ten or spoken articles themselves. ”68
There are two reasons why this so-called ’’traditional 
libertarian view” ought to be abandoned promptly. Both 
hinge on the observation that Justice Murphy's interpreta­
tion of the impact of Associated Press v. United States fails 
to distinguish any matter of principle that can be used in 
legal and political argument.
First, the Supreme Court has used the decision against 
the AP as part of its justification for governmental sub­
poenas of the p r e s s . T h e  Court’s idea seems to be that 
there is no distinguishable difference in principle between 
the "incidental burden” of the Sherman Act on the collective 
trade in news and the "incidental burden" of governmental 
subpoenas on individual publishers. If there is a difference 
in principle between the two kinds of interference, Justice 
Murphy’s over-anxious dissent does not help press libertarians 
when they are confronted with the fait accompli of the Court's 
1945 decision against the Associated Press.
67Ibid., p. 603.
68Ibid., p. 604.
69Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, p. 683.
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Second is the fact that publishers "overwhelmingly"
supported AP's position during the court tests leading to
7 0the Supreme Court's decision. u Presumably they agreed with 
and may still agree with the dissenting proposition in support 
of AP: that governmental regulation of the collective trade
in news is indistinguishable in principle from governmental 
restraints on individual publishers--on their freedom of 
press. However, that position is politically untenable be­
cause it does not enjoy even narrow popular sympathy or be­
lief. Quite the contrary: most Americans would agree with
Justice Black that upholding antitrust laws against the As­
sociated Press was a great victory for free expression.
It is ironic that publishers can point to the case of 
Associated Press v. United States and correctly claim that 
it was a blow against press freedom--but not the blow they 
imagined it was. Justice Roberts' dissent said he feared 
that the case would be "but a firststep in shackling of the 
press which will subvert the constitutional freedom to print
or withhold as and how one's reason or one's interest die- 
71tates." Used by the Supreme Court as a precedent to jus­
tify subpoenas for the press’ confidential information, the 
case clearly does assist in "shackling . . . the press" and 
subverting the freedom to "print or withhold"--disclose or 
retain--unpublished information. This institutional freedom
70Murphy, p. 42.
7^Ibid., p. 45.
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of publishers, of course, is the bulwark that can best safe­
guard the right to comment on public affairs anonymously.
The Court itself may have contributed to the mistaken 
idea that a publisher’s freedom was endangered by the anti­
trust action. It referred to the defendant Associated Press^
77as a "publisher” identical with "member publishers of AP.”
But Black’s Lax̂  Dictionary defines "publisher” as
One who by himself or his agent makes a thing publicly 
known. One whose business is the manufacture, promulga­
tion, and sale of books, pamphlets, magazines, news­
papers, or other literary productions. One who publishes, 
especially one who issues or causes to be issued, from the 
press, and offers for sale or circulation matter printed, 
engraved, or the l i k e . 74
Hence to publish in its complete definition is to "print an
edition" of a literary or journalistic product. Generally
speaking, the AP is in no such business, having no presses of
its own. It is mainly in the business of routing published
news stories to and fro and partly engaged in supplementing
member publishers’ news staffs.
It is true that individual publishers have been legally
7 Srestrained from discriminatory refusal of advertising, but 
commercial advertising is not "speech" under Supreme Court
77According to Murphy, when the Supreme Court heard the 
case, the AP was the only remaining defendant. The 35 member 
publishers and newspapers defending the original suit had 
dropped out.
^Nelson and Teeter, p. 602.
^ Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed. (1951), s.v. "Pub­
lisher."
7 5See Nelson and Teeter on Lorain Journal Co. v. United 
States (1951), pp. 604-7.
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definition.7  ̂ A leading case of governmental prosecution 
of a publisher, for antitrust violations in circulating 
news, rested on the jury's determination that the Kansas 
City Star and the Kansas City Times (although published by 
one company) were a "combination” of two newspapers, an ab­
straction, acting to restrain trade.77 Mergers have been
70 .treated similarly.
It is unfortunate that the case of Associated Press v. 
United States left a legacy of liberal sentiment against the 
publishers who fought to preserve the AP's overdrawn pre­
rogatives. The Nation, for example, objected that publishers
"have come to believe that the First Amendment is practically
79their private property." Because a publisher's freedom is 
so intimately involved in the preservation of the right to 
comment on public affairs anonymously, there is a danger that 
the sentiment will be inaccurately applied against the press 
when it seeks freedom from governmental subpoenas. In fact, 
this has happened over and over again in the course of the 
debate.
76Ibid., p. 588.
77Ibid., p. 613.
7^Ibid., pp. 614-635.
7^Keith Hutchison, "The Truth About the A.P.," Nation, 
Feb. 6, 1943, p. 191.
CHAPTER III
A BASIC CONSIDERATION OF POWER
Information is power. That the people, as the ultimate 
source of governmental power, should have sources of informa­
tion invulnerable to suppression by the government is the 
basic consideration of power supporting the right to comment 
on public affairs anonymously. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, this liberty to comment from a position of safety, 
if it exists, is an inextricable part of the liberty of the 
press.
During arguments whether the Constitution should be ex­
plicit in protecting freedom of the press there was a question 
whether press freedom ought to be protected by public opinion 
or whether public opinion ought to be protected by a free 
press. Hamilton felt that freedom of the press would be best 
safeguarded by "public opinion, and on the general spirit of 
the People and of the Government." Jefferson, on the other 
hand, felt that the best way to preserve political liberty and 
the integrity of public opinion was to write into the Consti­
tution an explicit prohibition on governmental suppression of 
the press and thus ensure freedom of the people and the 
press.* One of our debts to Jefferson, of course, is his rec-
^Bleyer, p. 103.
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ognition that public opinion cannot protect press freedom or 
any other political liberty unless .the press is free.
According to Jefferson,.the people must have an in-
?dependent "tribunal of public opinion" if an orderly society 
free from the plague of revolution is to be maintained:
The people are the only censors of their gover­
nors . . . .  The way to prevent these irregular inter­
positions of the people [revolutions] is to give them 
full information of their affairs thro* the channel of 
the public papers, § to contrive that those papers should 
penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of our 
government being the opinion of the people, the very 
first object should be to keep that right.*
Less than a century later, Karl Marx elaborated on
these concerns of Jefferson and brought into clearer focus
the institutional framework automatically implied by the
creation of an independent force in a governed society:
The administration and the administered both need a 
third element, which is political without being bureau­
cratic, an element that does not derive from bureau­
cratic presuppositions, that is, civic without being 
directly entangled in private interests and-their needs. 
This complementary element, composed of a political 
head and a civic heart, is a free press. In the realm 
of the press the administration and the administered can 
criticize each other’s principles and demands as equals, 
no longer in a subordinate relationship but with equal 
political worth, no longer as persons but as intellectual 
powers, with a basis of reason. The "free press," as it 
is the product of public opinion, also produces public 
opinion, and it alone has the power to make a special in­
terest into a general interest; it alone has the power 
to make the [special] distress . . . an object of general 
attention and general sympathy . . . it alone has the
^Alan Barth, "Freedom of the Press," University of 
California Extension, Courses by Newspaper, American Issues 
Forum I, the (Missoula, Mont.) Missoulian, Nov. 9, 1975, 
p . 35.
^Writings of Thomas Jefferson, P.L. Ford, ed., vol. v, 
p. 47, quoted in Bleyer, p. 103.
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power to alleviate the misery, if for no other reason 
than that it distributes the feeling of misery among 
all. . . .
. . . Finally, the free press carries the people's 
misery to the foot of the throne, not in a bureaucrati­
cally approved form, but in its own medium, before which 
the distinction between administration and administered 
disappears and which results in a more equally near­
standing and more equally far-standing citizenry.4
According to Alan Barth, the constitutional framers' 
clear political purpose for a free press led to its protec­
tion in law under the First Amendment as, "in a significant 
sense, the most privileged of American institutions^
There is much unsettled about the extent of protection 
the First Amendment affords this institutional role. At 
times, the Supreme Court has viewed the press as a collec­
tion of people without "constitutional rights superior to 
those enjoyed by ordinary c i t i z e n s . J u s t i c e  Lewis F. 
Powell has said:
The guarantees of the First Amendment broadly secure 
the rights of every citizen; they do not create special 
privileges for particular groups or individuals. For 
me, at least, it is clear that persons who become jour­
nalists acquire thereby no special immunity from gov­
ernmental regulation.?
Armed with the view that "no special privileges" accrue to
individuals in the press, the Supreme Court has affirmed the
Karl Marx on Freedom of the Press and Censorship, 
trans. and intro. Saul K. Padover, The Karl Marx Library, 
vol. IV (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974), pp. 76-77.
^Barth, p. 35.
^In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., Supreme Court Re­
ports , Book 417, p. 857.
7Ibid.
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government's power to bar newsmen (along with the general
Opublic) from the courtroom,0 prohibit special access to in­
formation not available to the general p u b l i c ,  ̂ and enforce 
contempt judgments against reporters who fail "to respond 
to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer 
questions relevant to an investigation into the commission 
of crime.
However, Justice Powell also is the source of arguments 
for the defense of the press’ institutional role. In 1974 
he dissented from a majority ruling which held that newsmen 
have no constitutional right of access to "information not 
available to the public generally":
What is at stake here is the societal function of the 
First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of 
governmental affairs. No aspect of that constitutional 
guarantee is more rightly treasured than its protection 
of the ability of our people through free and open debate 
to consider and resolve their destiny. . . . An informed 
public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the 
news media. No individual can obtain for himself the in­
formation needed for the intelligent discharge of his 
political responsibilities. For most citizens the pros­
pect of personal familiarity with newsworthy events is 
hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking out the news, the 
press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large.
It is the means by which the people receive that free 
flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent 
self-government. By enabling the public to assert meaning­
ful control over the political process, the press performs 
a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose of 
the First Amendment. . . .
This constitutionally established role of the nex̂ s
OUnited Press Association v. Valente (1954), cited in 
Guest and Stanzler, pp. 32-33.
^Zemel v. Rusk (1965), cited in Supreme Court Reports, 
Book 408, p. 684.
10Ibid., p. 682.
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media is directly implicated here. ... . The underlying 
right is the right of the public generally. The press 
is the necessary representative of the public's interest 
in this context and the instrumentality which effects 
the public's right.H
Justice Powell thus outlined the press' institutional status
as "an agent of the public at large," and "the necessary
representative . . . and the instrumentality which effects
the public's right" to meaningful self-government. Sen. Sam
J. Ervin Jr., a constitutional law scholar, put the same
thought in plainer English:
Thus, the press, while comprised of ordinary citizens 
with no special office, has an extraordinary function 
tied to the heart of the democratic process. And this 
particular obligation to the public reinforces the re­
porter's determination to resist commands of the govern­
ment which interfere with that o b l i g a t i o n .12
Justice Powell's concern for the institutional role of 
the press was, as he said, one of maintaining a special 
status for the press as the "agent . . . enabling the public 
to assert meaningful control over the political process." In 
this form, his argument serves as an excellent justification 
for the freedom from subpoenas necessary to preserve the 
right to comment anonymously. But as we shall see in the 
next chapter, some of those anxious to defend press freedom 
in these matters tend to ignore the essentials of Justice 
Powell's approach. In fact they pointedly ignore his plea 
for special press status and pass by the important reference 
to political liberty. Their focus is exclusively on the
^ Supreme Court Reports, Book 417, pp. 862-64.
^Ervin, pp. 234-35.
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extremely nebulous concept of maintaining a "free flow of 
information and ideas." Walter Cronkite, for example, made 
both of these mistakes when he introduced a paperback book 
on the subject of press subpoenas:
The truth is so apparent to a working journalist
that it beggars his understanding as to why others can­
not see. Why can’t the American people see that free­
dom of the press is not some privilege extended to a 
favored segment of the population but is purely and 
simply their own right to be told what their govern­
ment and its servants are doing in their name.13
The Supreme Court has found it easy to dismiss the
essentials of the Cronkite argument. In Branzburg v. Hayes
the Court majority said:
Despite the fact that news gathering may be ham­
pered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury 
proceedings, our own [Supreme Court] conferences, the 
meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive 
session, and the meetings of private organizations. 
Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the 
scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is 
excluded, and they may be prohibited from attending or 
publishing information about trials if such restrictions 
are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial.-*-4
Because the trustworthy status of the press as an in­
stitution is directly affected by governmental attempts to 
obtain unpublished information, it is helpful to detail some 
nuances of the trust between the press and its sources.
The case of Anthony Ripley, a New York Times correspon­
dent, often is cited as an example of how a compromised press
13Whalen, p. x.
•^Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, pp. 684-85.
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can lose its effectiveness. Ripley reported on a national 
convention of Students for a Democratic Society. Reporters 
were admitted to the meeting only if they promised not to 
quote directly any of the proceedings on the convention 
floor. When one of the radical leaders, Bernardine Dohrn, 
described herself as a "revolutionary Communist," Ripley 
broke the pledge. Several months later, Ripley was sub­
poenaed by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
He did not contest the summons. Law professor Vince Blasi 
has recounted how Ripley, after he testified before HUAC, 
was labeled as a "fink" and denounced by a subsequent SDS 
convention in these words:
. . . "Mr. Ripley, by cooperating with this commit­
tee, and the New York Times, by authorizing his appear­
ance there, have taken the side of the nation's most 
notorious witch-hunters. A reporter and a newspaper 
dedicated to the concept of 'objectivity' have plainly 
illustrated once again what 'objectivity’ means in fact." 
The SDS membership [Blasi continued] then debated 
whether to demand from all establishment reporters seek­
ing to cover the convention an affidavit promising not 
to "do a Ripley," and finally decided to bar all estab­
lishment reporters from the convention hall. . . . The 
incident is illustrative . . . of a very important as­
pect of the press subpoena controversy in its contempo­
rary form. The primary concern of reporters is not that 
they will lose their sources by being made to turn over 
highly sensitive and secret information--newsmen almost 
never are privy to such information. Rather, they worry 
is that their mere cooperation with fact-finding tri­
bunals will alienate sources who demand to know of the 
reporters "whose side are you on?" To these sources it 
may make no difference that the newsman's "cooperation" 
with the tribunal is involuntary, perfunctory, and un­
helpful. It is the principle that counts.15
Professor Blasi, who interviewed reporters and editors
■'■'’Blasi, pp. 262-64 (footnotes omitted).
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across the nation in the early 1970s, possibly was the first 
to examine reporters' methods in dealing with anxious sources:
Getting an interview is one thing; gaining an accurate 
and comprehensive understanding of a person, a group, or a 
news event is quite another matter. It is in this latter 
pursuit that some reporters succeed and many fail. Per­
sonal recommendations, inside information, and mutual ac­
quaintances can be very important in getting a source to 
relax and to speak expansively, or in persuading a group 
to allow its operations to be observed in an unstructured , 
fashion. . . . In covering some of the polarized elements 
in society--radicals, minority groups, police--it is vir­
tually impossible for the reporter to establish this feel­
ing of confidence unless the source is convinced that the 
reporter is actually "on his side." This attitude, char­
acterized by the slogan "if you are not for me, you are 
against me," is prevalent today among many news sources.
And other sources who do not put the matter in such either/ 
or terms demand at a minimum that the reporter maintain an 
independence and an autonomy that may require him to avoid 
any involvement whatsoever with "the other side."
. . . Regular confidential sources can also co-opt a 
reporter, particularly when the reporter's career is inter­
related with the source's career. The danger of co-opta­
tion is probably greatest in reporting on politicians, but 
it is not unknown in covering radicals and minority 
groups.
Reporters cope with this dilemma in different ways. 
Every newsman whom I questioned on the point said that he 
consciously strives to keep his role as a reporter clearly 
defined. According to these journalists, it is important 
for sources to realize that although a newsman's sympa­
thies may lie with his sources, his primary responsibility 
is to his readers. This role definition sometimes takes 
the form of a reluctance on the part of the reporter to 
offer information or advice to sources, although it is not 
uncommon for newsmen to counsel inexperienced sources on 
public relations tactics such as the timing of press re­
leases and investigative reporters sometimes plot strat­
egy with bureaucrats who have decided to "blow the whis­
tle."16
Whistle-blowing does not quite convey the importance of 
the anonymous voices shielded by the press' willingness to re­
sist their disclosure. Harvard government professor Richard
16Ibid., pp. 240-42.
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Neustadt has described that "class of confidential communica­
tions" commonly called a news leak:
A leak is, in essence, an appeal to public opinion.
Leaks generally do not occur in dictatorships, where 
public opinion is =not a force that those in power must 
take into account. In our country, leaks commonly occur 
when significant questions of public policy are being de­
cided in secret. A leak opens the decision to public 
scrutiny and evaluation, and brings into play the forces 
that act in the.public forum--congressional .and other . 
agencies of government, political party organizations, 
interest groups and other segments of society that have 
a stake in the decision. If the confidentiality of com­
munications to newsmen could not be assured, I am con­
vinced that the number of leaks would be greatly dimin­
ished, and that our political institutions would be less 
subject than they are to public monitoring and publiccontrol.17
Former Life magazine editor Thomas Griffith has dis-
18counted the importance of news leaks in "normal times," ac­
knowledging that most news leaks are mundane tattlings at 
best and self-serving ploys at worst. Yet there is at the 
heart of the question a basic consideration of power that 
becomes vitally important, as Neustadt noted, when the most 
significant questions of public policy are being decided. 
Griffith has said:
In Washington, D.C., where power is the leading in­
dustry, information is power. Information is valuable 
to own, valuable to withhold, valuable to discover.
And so a continuing war exists between those who would 
hide and those who seek. Leaks first began to take on 
critical importance in the days of Vietnam, that unde­
clared and unpopular war fought in a secrecy directed not 
only against the enemy but against the American public.
1 7Quoted in The Media and the Law, Howard Simons and 
Joseph A. Califano, eds. (New York: Holt, Rinehart § Win­
ston, Praeger Publications, 1976), p. 14 (emphasis mine).
■^Thomas Griffith, How True (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., Atlantic Monthly Press, 1974), p. 172.
46
Military men found themselves asked to fight fastidi­
ously against an enemy who wasn't similarly restricted, 
or else forced to conceal the methods they and their al­
lies were using, and fell into a self-righteous pattern 
of misleading, concealing and lying. Equally frustrated 
men who thought the Vietnamese war immoral and endless, 
pleaded a higher morality in confiding the secrets of 
the Pentagon Papers to journalists, and arrogated to 
themselves (as did editors) the decision that most of 
what was stamped secret was in any case of no current 
military value, wrhose exposure would only be inconvenient 
to the government.- . . . Faced with constant dissembling 
and deceiving by the White House, the press could only \ 
increase its efforts to discover the reality behind the 
public relations performance that was not to be trusted.
But what really brought everything into the open was a 
growing unease inside government itself at the enormity 
of the wrongdoing, and the degree to which ruthless men 
were entrenching themselves in power. . . . James Madison 
and Alexander Hamilton never foresaw that one of the cru­
cial checks and balances against too powerful an execu­
tive branch would be news leaks. ^
Griffith's mention of the Pentagon Papers case brings 
this chapter to the important question of balancing--whether 
a governmental power in an area of First Amendment concern 
can outweigh free-speech or free-press liberties as a mat­
ter of routine.
Prior restraint (pre-publication censorship) probably 
was the one thing the Founding Fathers did have in mind 
when they wrote the First Amendment. In the Pentagon Papers 
case the Supreme Court ruled that a governmental injunction 
against publication of the papers was improper because the 
the government had failed to demonstrate a danger of "direct,
20immediate or irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."
^Ibid. , pp. 173-74.
^Justice Potter Stewart in New York Times Co. v. U.S. 
(1971), quoted in Nelson and Teeter, p. 53.
In the law on prior restraint, the definition of "damage" 
and the size of the community that might have standing as 
"our . . . people" are subject to interpretation. But the 
general principle stands: freedom of publication is not
subject to the routine needs and conveniences of the govern­
ment'.^ "Prior restraint is hated for good reason," the 
press law books remind us. "If the government gains the
power to silence its critics before they can speak, it has
2 2the power to hide its errors forever."
Governmental subpoena power over unpublished informa­
tion also effects a prior restraint on published views, but 
one less noticeable than the complete blackout resulting 
from a governmental order to stop the presses. It is a 
"grayout" in that it affects the content of potential pub­
lications- -stories that could have, or might have been prin­
ted except for the lack of a willing author or source. The 
prior-restraint effect is even more pronounced when editors 
and publishers omit detail or restrict content to avoid pros 
ecutorial interest in the information not published. For ex 
ample:
A newspaperman might want to do a story on marijuana 
use among his town's youth; he knows that in order to do 
a proper job of research he must interview young mari­
juana users. But there is the . . . likelihood . . .  he 
will be subpoenaed to testify in secret to a grand jury.
21See discussion of prior restraint ibid., pp. 43-57.
22Ibid., p. 43.
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Does the reporter decide not to do the story?^
Today in the United States, according to the American Civil 
Liberties Union, "the decision not to do the story appears 
to be multiplying." It fears that "before long there ’will 
just not be very much interpretation of complex events and 
social movements. What will be left will be the relatively 
safe ’hard1 news of speeches and statements, and that can be 
easily manipulated."24
As we shall see in the next chapter, these censorial 
effects of governmental subpoenas, while undoubtedly true, 
are so indirect and unprovable that they offer practically 
no support for arguments against the subpoena power. But in 
their connection to principles of political liberty, prior 
restraint and governmental subpoenas for unpublished informa­
tion deserve to be considered as one. That is, the question 
must be asked whether the press* right to unpublished informa­
tion is a matter of principle that cannot be violated in the 
ordinary course of events (as with prior restraint), or is 
it a matter of degree, subject to the routine needs and con­
veniences of the government? Fortunately, guidance is avail­
able. Quoting various Supreme Court justices, political phil­
osopher Milton R. Konvitz has constructed a hypothetical argu­
ment appropriate to the judgment that must be made:
2^Fred Powledge, The Engineering of Restraint: The
Nixon Administration and the Press, Report of the American 
Civil Liberties Union (.Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs
Press, 1971), pp. 40-41.
24Ibid., p. 41.
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Here is a question of degree. "When you realize that 
you are dealing with a matter of degree you must real­
ize that reasonable men may differ widely as to the 
place where the line must f a l l .”8 But the measure is 
not part of a strategy to undermine the principle; it 
is merely an instance of the truth that "constitutional 
rights like others are matters of degree," and "must be 
allowed a certain latitude in the minor adjustments of 
l i f e . [Or shall we need to think, Konvitz continues:] 
Here it is not a question of degree; it is an attempt to 
undermine tlie principle. . This., measure .is an. .instance., of.. 
tyranny rather than liberty, though so small as to be 
almost palatable; but we must resist it; for "it is from 
petty tyrannies that large ones take root and grow.
This fact can be no more plain than when they are im­
posed on the most basic rights of all. Seedlings planted 
in that soil grow great and, growing, break down the 
foundations of liberty."-^ Reasonable minds will differ 
as to when either of these positions should be taken.25
OHolmes in Schlesinger et al. v. Wis., et al., 270 
U.S. 230 (1925)
^Holmes in Interstate Consolidated St. Ry. Co. v. 
Mass., 207 U.S. 79 (1907)
10Rutledge in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) 
There is thin but mildly promising support in law for 
the First Amendment right to anonymity.
One of the first Supreme Court test cases for the right 
to remain anonymous was considered under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment's guarantee of privacy in group associations. In New 
York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman (1928) the Court upheld a 
New York law requiring registration and disclosure of the 
names of all members of organizations that required an oath 
as a prerequisite for membership. The Ku Klux Klan had ob­
jected to the disclosure law, but the Court ruled that it
Milton R. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free 
People: Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly (Ithaca, N.Y. :
Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 25.
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must submit. The Court held that, in view of the violent 
and unlawful record of Klan activities, the state legisla-
7 f\ture had acted properly.
NAACP v. Alabama (1958) was the first decision in 
which the right to anonymity was upheld; again the case was 
argued under the Fourteenth Amendment. ^  ■ The Court reversed 
contempt judgments against the NAACP for its refusal to pro­
duce the names of Alabama members of the civil rights group. 
Bates v. Little Rock (1960) was a similar case; it involved 
the NAACP’s refusal to disclose the names of its members in 
the city of Little Rock. In both of these cases, the pro­
ponents of the right to anonymity argued that the exercise 
of free association was restrained because of specified
threats of economic and even physical reprisals in the re-
28spective communities.
The case of Talley V.- California (1960) extended the 
protection of anonymity from the field of association general­
ly to that of a specific utterance. S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  the 
Court departed from the case-by-case approach of previous
"Ordinance Prohibiting Distribution of Anonymous Hand­
bills Held Unconstitutional," St. John’s Law. Review 34 (1960): 
307.
2 7John A. Harvey, "Statute Prohibiting Distribution of 
Anonymous Handbills Void on Its Face," UCLA Law Review 7 
(1960): 787. ~
2 8"Anonymity: An Emerging Fundamental Right," Jack H. 
Rogers, ed., Indiana Law Journal 36 (1961): 308.
^Harvey, p. 787.
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anonymity cases which had balanced threats of retaliation 
against interests in disclosure as argued by the state.
The Los Angeles city ordinance voided by the decision said 
in part: "No person shall distribute any hand-bill in any
place under any circumstances which does not have printed on 
the cover . . . the name and address of . . .  the person who
*7 Iprinted, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same." The 
Court found that the prerequisite of disclosure of author­
ship was equivalent to a general prohibition on publication 
(prior restraint), a prohibition not justified by any as­
serted interest of the city of Los Angeles:
Counsel has urged that this ordinance is aimed at pro­
viding a way to identify those responsible for fraud, 
false advertising and libel. Yet the ordinance is in 
no manner so limited . . . .  Therefore we do not pass 
on the validity of an ordinance limited to prevent these 
or any other supposed evils. . . .
We have recently had occasion to hold . . . that 
there are times and circumstances when States may not 
compel members of groups engaged in the dissemination 
of ideas to be publicly identified. . . . The reason 
was that identification and fear of reprisal might deter 
perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of im­
portance. This broad Los Angeles ordinance [for the 
same reason] . . .  is void on its f a c e . 32
The Court struck down the ordinance and supported the 
First Amendment right to anonymity because of its importance 
to the conditions under which informants of all shades of 
opinion may make information available through the press to 
the public. It noted:
30Ibid.
31 Supreme Court Reports, Book 362, pp. 60-61. 
3^Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even 
books have played an important role in the progress of 
mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time 
throughout history have been able to criticize oppres­
sive practices and laws either anonymously or hot at all. 
The obnoxious press licensing law of England,~~which was 
also enforced on the Colonies was due in part to the 
knowledge that exposure of the names of printers, writers 
and distributors would lessen the circulation of litera­
ture critical of the government. The old seditious libel 
cases in England show the lengths to which government had 
to go to find out who was responsible for books that were 
obnoxious to the rulers. John Liburne was whipped, pil­
loried and fined for refusing to answer questions de­
signed to get evidence to convict him or someone else for 
the secret distribution of books in England. Two Puritan 
Ministers, John Penry and John Udal, were sentenced to 
death on charges that they were responsible for writing, 
printing or publishing books.6 Before the Revolutionary 
War colonial patriots frequently had to conceal their 
authorship or distribution of literature that easily 
could have brought down on them prosecutions by English- 
controlled courts. Along about that time the Letters of 
Junius were written and the identity of their author is 
unknown to this day.? Even the Federalist Papers, writ­
ten in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were 
published under fictitious names. It is plain that anony­
mity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.33
^ P e n r y  was executed and Udal died as a result of his 
confinement. 1 Hallam, the Constitutional History of 
England (1855), 205-206, 232.
^In one of the letters written May 28, 1770, the 
author asked the following question about the tea tax 
imposed on this country, a question which he could hardly 
have asked but for his anonymity: "What is it then, but
an odious, unprofitable exertion of a speculative right, 
and fixing a badge of slavery upon the Americans, without 
service to their masters?" 2 Letters of Junius (1821) 39.
Justices Tom Clark, Felix Frankfurter, and Charles 
Whittaker disagreed; their law-and-order approach disallow­
ing the recognition of anonymity was expressed by Justice
33 Ibid. (emphasis mine).
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Clark's dissent:
I stand second to none in supporting Talley’s right 
of free speech--but not his freedom of anonymity. The 
Constitution says nothing about freedom of anonymous 
speech. . . .
All that Los Angeles requires is that one who exer­
cises his right of free speech through writing or dis­
tributing handbills identify himself just as does one 
who speaks from the platform. The ordinance makes for 
the responsibility in writing that is present in publicutterance.24
Although some legal commentators say that the NAACP 
an<* Talley cases "point to the emergence of anonymity as 
essential to the exercise of rights under the first and 
fourteenth amendments,”25 others are more cautious because 
of the implied inconsistency of the ruling with earlier de­
cisions upholding disclosure requirements:
The strongest objections to the "void on its face" 
approach are based on its seeming inconsistency with 
earlier related decisions upholding disclosure statutes 
in limited areas, such as registration of publications 
using the m a i l s , 9 and registration of lobbying activi­
ties. 10 There is also a problem in the existence of 
various statutes requiring disclosure of authorship or 
sponsorship of election campaign literature.^ In all 
of these cases the right to speak anonymously in a cer­
tain manner, or on a certain subject, or to a certain 
audience has been denied. It is possible to distinguish 
these cases as involving statutes drafted in a sufficient­
ly narrow and certain manner so as to limit their opera­
tion to the area of the peculiar state interest involved. 
Yet this distinction is in a sense artificial in that the 
threat of retaliation does not disappear during election 
campaigns, or when using the mails, or when presenting 
a viewpoint to Congress. Although there is a strong 
state interest in disclosure as conducive to responsibil­
ity in each case, there is also a forceful argument that 
in the area of national politics, more than anywhere else, 
free speech in all of its manifestations should receive 
its maximum constitutional p r o t e c t i o n s . 26
^•'"Anonymity Emerging," p. 306. 
■^Harvey, pp. 788-89.
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^Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913), 
upholding Sec. 2 of the Post Office Appropriation Act,of 
1912, 37 Stat. 533 (1912), 39 U.S.C. Sec. 233 (1958), 
which requires any newspaper using the second class mails 
to publish the names of its editor, publisher, owner, and 
stockholders.
10United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), up­
holding Sec. 308 of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying 
Act, 60 Stat. 841 (1946), 2 U.S.C. Sec. 267 (1958), which 
requires persons engaged in lobbying to divulge their 
identities. In this case even the dissent of Justices 
Black and Douglas stated that Congress had sufficient in­
terest in the subject matter to constitutionally require 
disclosure.
^^Thirty-six states have statutes prohibiting the 
anonymous distribution of materials relating to elections. 
E.g., Cal. Elec. Code Sec. 5005, which states: "Every
person is guilty of a misdemeanor who writes, or causes 
to be written, printed, posted, or distributed, any cir­
cular, pamphlet, letter, or poster which is designed to 
injure or defeat any candidate for nomination or election 
to any public office by reflecting upon his personal char­
acter or political action, unless there appears upon the 
circular, pamphlet, letter, or poster, in a conspicuous 
place, the name and address of the printer, and either:
(a) The name and address of the chairman or secretary or 
the names and addresses of two officers at least of the 
political or other organization issuing it. (b) the name 
and residence, with street and number thereof, if any, of 
some voter in this State, who is responsible therefor."
See also Cal. Elec. Code Sec. 5005.7, which imposes simi­
lar requirements on circulars, pamphlets and posters pro­
moting passage or defeat of a measure appearing on the 
ballot.
These statutes have always been assumed valid. See 
the dissent by Justices Black, Douglas, and Warren in 
United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 598 n.2 
(1956), wherein these three members of the Talley major­
ity state "in expressing their views on the issues and 
candidates, [at elections] labor unions can be required 
to acknowledge their authorship and support of these ex­
pressions."
The Court majority in Talley denounced governmental ef­
forts to pierce veils of anonymity, as revealed in history, 
even when established authority needed to "get evidence to
convict" someone of a crime. On the other hand, the Court 
majority in Branzburg v. Hayes approved of the same power 
when it took the form of a subpoena for unpublished informa­
tion. In Branzburg, the government's authority and interest 
in prosecuting crime was pitted against a generalized so­
cietal interest in the "free flow of information." It was 
not a close fight. When Congress heard the press' case for 
freedom from subpoenas, the press lost again, for much the 
same reason. (More on this in subsequent chapters.) Iron­
ically, a central point in the press' argument in Court and 
in Congress has been that forced disclosure of unpublished 
information hurts society's interest in prosecuting crime.^7 
It could be said that either the government does not believe 
that the fear of reprisal will hinder discussion of public 
affairs, or it believes that no societal interest in the 
free discussion of public affairs is worth the chance that
Abe Mellinkoff, city editor of the San Francisco 
Chronicle, informed Congress in 197 3:
"Who does ask for anonymity when talking to news­
papers? A prominent businessman gave me the first lead 
that led to the imprisonment of a city assessor. The 
businessman was afraid to have his name used for fear 
his own taxes would go up if the assessor beat the rap. 
Exposure of illegal expenditure of Golden Gate Bridge 
funds was uncovered with the help of a timid bookkeeper.
A Federal Home Loan Bank office was sloppy in checking on 
practices of a lending institution. An employee at the 
bank led us to the story and eventually we believe to bet 
ter procedures by the bank. Even our science reporter 
talked with still unnamed violators of drug laws to learn 
better of abuses in drug treatment centers" (cited in U.S 
Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Newsmen's 
Privilege, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitu­
tional Rights on S. 36 et al., 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 
1973, p. 369," hereafter cited as 197 3 Senate Hearings) ..
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a criminal action--however difficult that may be to define-- 
will go unpursued. The Court already has dismissed the 
former option. In 'Lamont v. Postmaster General, the jus­
tices were solicitous of the impact of even slight govern­
mental interference with a right to anonymity: the right
receive information anonymously. Writing for the major­
ity, Justice William 0. Douglas said'the fear that govern­
ment officials could find out the subject matter of their 
mail would intimidate many people,
especially as respects those who have sensitive positions. 
Their livelihood may be dependent on a security clear­
ance. Public officials, like school teachers who have no 
tenure, might think they would invite disaster if they 
read what the Federal Government says contains the seeds 
of treason. Apart from that, any addressee is likely to 
feel some inhibition in sending for literature which the 
federal officials have condemned as;"communist political 
propaganda.” The regime of this Act [at issue here] is 
at war with the "uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate 
and dissent that are contemplated by the First Amendment." 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270. °
Subsequent chapters will show what arguments were ad­
vanced against the government’s single-minded interest in 
law and order. It is sufficient to say here that at no time 
did the press argue that freedom from forced disclosure of un­
published information is essential to freedom of the press, or 
that the basis of the freedom from disclosure must be the 
right to anonymity. It seems appropriate therefore to pre­
sent, as a kind of foreword to the chapter on the "right to 
know," the thoughts of Karl Marx on the connection between 
anonymity and freedom of the press:
•^Supreme Court Reports, Book 381, p. 307.
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. . .  I follow the conviction that anonymity belongs 
to the essence of the press, which transforms a news­
paper from a collection point of many individual opinions 
into an organ of a single mind. A name separates an ar­
ticle from other articles as firmly as the body of a per­
son separates him from other individuals, thus thoroughly 
doing away with the article’s intention to be only a sup­
plementary member. Finally, anonymity makes not only the 
speaker himself but also the public more unbiased and more 
free, in that it does not look at the man who speaks but 
at the subject he discusses, shifting its yardstick of un­
disturbed judgment from the empirical person to the intel­
lectual personality.39
^Karl Marx on Freedom, p. 70.
CHAPTER IV
THE RIGHT TO KNOW
In a 1973 study of press coverage of government for 
the National Press Club, American University researchers 
introduced the chapter on "journalists’ protection of news 
sources" with this view of its history:
Courts’ seeking information from journalists is not 
a new phenomenon; in fact, 1974 will mark the centennial 
of the first such recorded case in America.
Through the 99 years since, prosecutors, politicians 
and others have found that news people’s probings and 
confidences that they glean are a tempting source of 
legal material. In many cases reporters, seeing them­
selves as good citizens, have supplied such information. 
But at other times journalists have claimed a right--in­
deed, a responsibility--not to reveal the source of sen­
sitive social and political stories, basing their stand 
on the First Amendment guarantee of the press's indepen­
dence.-^
The statement that journalists in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries based refusal to comply with demands for 
unpublished information on the "First Amendment guarantee of 
the press' independence" is quite misleading. When the Amer-
l"The Press Covers Government: The Nixon Years from
1969 to Watergate," study by the Department of Communication, 
American University, Washington, D.C., for the National Press 
Club, June 13, 1973, Congressional Record 119: 19,467. The 
1874 case alluded to probably was People- ex rel Phelps v. 
Fancher, cited as 2 Hun. 226, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 18 74) in 
Ervin, p. 235n. An editor refused to name the author of a 
story, claiming the disclosure would violate the newspaper’s 
own regulations. The court rejected that reason, suggesting 
that the newspaper regulations were too ephemeral to notice.
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ican University study was published in the Congressional 
Record in 1973, the press' constitutional argument for pro­
tecting unpublished information was a mere fifteen years old, 
having first appeared in 1958 in the famous Garland v. Torre 
case. As a history of the debate for the one hundred years 
previous to that case shows, the press exhausted every other 
possible argument before resorting to the Constitution.
We can start in 1857, for example, when New York Times 
reporter James Simonton revealed that some Congressmen were 
taking $1,000 bribes in exchange for votes. The Times then 
editorialized that "a corrupt organization of Members of Con­
gress and certain lobby agents . . . holds the balance of 
power . . . sufficient, in most cases, to kill or carry any 
measure pending in the H o u s e . A  select investigating com­
mittee summoned Simonton, and asked him to reveal his sources 
of information, but he declined with these words: "I do not
see how I can answer . . . without a dishonorable breach of 
confidence. Although a member of Congress decried Simonton*s 
"perverse principle of honor," he and his colleagues were un­
able to break him. He spent nineteen days in custody for con­
tempt of Congress. Meanwhile, the House determined that the 
Times charge was true and forced the resignation of three of
^Garland v. Torre, cited as 259 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 358' U.S. 910 (1958), in Whalen, p. 51.
^Ibid., pp. 17-18.
^Ibid., p. 19.
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its members.’
The Simonton case caused Congress to show its colors 
and enact the first * legislation supplementing the existing 
implied power of Congress to compel witnesses to appear and 
answer. With the new law the Congress permitted itself the 
power to turn over contemptuous witnesses to the judicial 
branch for further punishment at the end of a Congressional 
session.8
In claiming the right to unpublished information as an 
expression of personal duty (and causing considerable dis­
turbance in Congress), Simonton set an early precedent that 
seemed to color many such conflicts in the nineteenth cen­
tury. In 1870, for example, a New York Evening Post reporter 
asserted that it would be a "violation of good faith to make 
public the source [of] . . . documents" when questioned by 
the House of Representatives.*^ A year later, the Senate 
queried New-York Tribune reporters on a similar matter. The 
reporters tried to excuse themselves "on account of . . . pro­
fessional honor,"8 but they too were jailed.
A breach of grand jury secrecy revealed to John T. 
Morris, Baltimore Sun police reporter in the 1880s, probably
5Ibid., pp. 19-21.
^Bowie K. Kuhn, "The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from 
Divulging the Sources of His Information," Virginia Law 
Review 36 (1950): 76-77.
^Whalen, p. 21.
8Ibid., p. 22.
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set the greatest number of precedents among all nineteenth 
century cases in which unpublished information was an issue. 
After the appearance of Morris' story revealing pending grand 
jury action against a sheriff, the panel's successful attempt 
to have Morris cited for contempt achieved considerable noto­
riety in Maryland and was folloived closely by the New York 
Times.  ̂ The passage in Maryland ten years later of the 
nation's first statute protecting the source of published 
information is attributed partly to the Morris case, which 
stimulated similar legislative action in other states too.-*-®
On the day Morris appeared in court to explain himself, the 
Times reported that "Morris is very popular in Baltimore,
and there is a disposition to settle the matter so as not to
1 1send him to jail.” According to the Sun, Morris told Judge
Edward Duffy that "he had promised his informant not to reveal
his name and that he considered himself bound by that prom- 
1 ?ise." The Times quoted more directly, from a letter of ex-
^The Morris case is examined in detail in David Gordon, 
"The 1S96 Maryland Shield Law: The American Roots of Eviden­
tiary Privilege for Newsmen," Journalism Monographs, no. 22 
(February 1972),
-^According to Gordon:
"Maryland’s 1896 newsman’s shield law was at least in part 
a result of Morris's jailing [in 1886]. But that statute 
was not the only attempt in 1896 to secure evidentiary 
privilege for newsmen, nor was it even the first attempt 
on record. Almost simultaneously, the first legislature 
of the new state of Utah was considering and finally re­
jecting a proposal to grant journalists an evidentiary 
privilege. Six years earlier, a privilege bill was pro­
posed in the Iowa State Senate" (Ibid., p. 1).
■^Ibid. , p . 13.
12Ibid., p. 12.
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planation Morris wrote. A reporter, he said, "must as a 
member of an honorable profession refuse to violate the con­
fidence reposed in him by making known the source of his in- 
13formation." Morris also pleaded that a kind of right to 
know and an even larger societal good justified his intran­
sigence :
The public assuredly has a deep concern in all occur­
rences affecting the integrity of public officers, and 
recent trials in the city of New York have shown that 
publicity given to details in a far more specific form 
than in the article complained of is an important aid 
to the administration of justice. ^
In all that, Judge Duffy (like most judges to follow 
him) saw nothing more than the possibility of bad precedent 
and a threat to the orderly administration of justice in his 
courtroom. Before sending Morris to jail, the judge gave a 
speech worth quoting for its revelation of the extent the 
reporter's "personal defense" had clouded the issue as early 
as 1886:
We see here a tribunal, part of this court, the highest 
tribunal in the state, to which we are all amenable, com­
plaining that there has been made public, not only the 
fact that a presentment had been made, but it is also set 
forth what part certain members took on one side or the 
other of that case. If the proceedings of the grand jury 
should be kept secret, can you conceive of anything more 
calculated to break down the grand jury than such a publi­
cation? It tends to break down the independence of the 
members of the grand jury. It is a complaint proper to 
make. We cannot but suppose that the information came 
from some member of the grand jury. They undertook to 
find out who it is that has thus violated every idea of 
propriety, and, far above that, the oath that he has taken 
in this court. In undertaking that, they send for the
■^Ibid. , p. 13.
^ I b i d .  , p . 14 .
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gentleman who furnished the information to the newspaper 
for publication. Are they not doing right? The grand 
jury in thus undertaking to find this thing out is 
stopped by the witness, who says he cannot give the 
author of the information because he has given his word
not to do so. . . . This is a case of the greatest moment
to the public good. . . .  If this position were sus­
tained it would go to the destruction of courts of jus­
tice. If the witness will not throw the responsibility
on the court, but prefers to act on his own responsibil­
ity, he must be punished. !  ̂ ] If he is right, every 
other witness Can do the same thing.
Editorially, the Sun decried the judge's decision,
and it justified Morris' silence as proper "simply and
solely because he would violate his honor" if he talked.^ •
"There is no honorable man, in or out of journalism, who
will not commend Mr. Morris' course," said the Sun, pre-
1 7sumably not including Judge Duffy. '
The perpetuation in public debate of what might be 
called the "personal defense" against reporters being forced 
to reveal unpublished information was only one of several 
harmful precedents set in the Morris case.^ For one thing, 
the focus seemed stuck on protecting the "source" of infor­
mation. Thereby a crucial question was left unsettled: What
right does a newspaper have to its unpublished documents, 
tapes, photographs and files? Secondly, newsmen reached not
1 ̂ Ibid., p. 18 (emphasis mine).
16Ibid., p. 21.
17Ibid., pp. 20-21.
18A half-century later, reporter Edward Milne refused 
to disclose the source of information to a Congressional sub­
committee. His reason: it would be a "dishonorable act"
that would bring down "the contempt" of his fellow correspon­
dents (Whalen, pp. 27-28).
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to the First Amendment but to statutory and common law 
for justification of their stands. Apparently without much 
thought, these precedents were carried nationwide by the 
International League of Press Clubs at the request of the 
Baltimore Journalists’ Club, which met in the winter of 1895 
to consider and pass a special resolution. It was drafted 
by Edgar Goodman, a prospective lawyer and a telegraph editor
for the Baltimore American. He began:
Whereas, the judiciary throughout the country is not 
yet educated to an understanding of the necessity of con­
fidential relations between newspaper men and those for 
whom they rely on for information;
And whereas, it is at least as much in the public in­
terest as their own that they be protected in preserving 
these confidences as Counsel, pastors, clerks and others 
are protected against being compelled to disclose con­
fidential information . . . .
The resolution went on to call for passage in Maryland of
"such legislation as will amply protect newspaper men in the
preservation of all confidences as are reposed in them as
such," and recommended "the adoption of similar legislation
by the legislatures of all the states of the Union and by
the Congress of the United States.
By declaring that "it is at least as much in the 
public’s interest as their own" to be shielded from govern­
mental inquisition, members of the Baltimore Journalists*
Club were, of course, seeking popular support. But their 
appeal left unspoken much that could have been marshaled in 
defense. There was no claim that the press should be inde-
■^Gordon, pp. 24-25.
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pendent from government; there was no serious regard for 
the rights of sources. Even the reason for appeal to the 
masses for support was left largely to the imagination and 
a common sense. The people had an interest in treating news­
paper reporters with the same deference paid to "Counsel, 
pastors, clerks and others." Gradually, the argument moved 
even farther from specifics and in a basic sense became self­
destructive. Walter Cronkite's explanation almost one 
hundred years later embodied these trends. He said freedom 
from forced disclosure by reporters "is not some privilege 
extended to a favored segment of the population but is purely 
and simply their own right to be told." The appeal to what 
came to be called the public's "right to know" had serious 
legal weaknesses too, the primary one being the face-off of 
two generalized public interests: the "right to know" and
the prosecution of justice. Besides being an invitation to 
judicial compromise, the comparison of generalized public in­
terests had other harmful legal impacts, to which we shall 
turn presently.
The greatest weakness of the right-to-know argument is 
not a legal one. It is its obvious logical fallacy: if the
public has a "right to know," why doesn't it have a right to 
know sources and other unpublished information?^ However
^^John C. Merrill criticizes those who want to protect 
reporters who "keep the people from knowing" sources of news 
(The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic
Autonomy [New York: Hastings House, Communications Arts 
Books, 1974], p. lOOn).
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much press spokesmen may explain that it is an overall 
"right to know" or a "free flow of information" that is 
jeopardized by governmental power over unpublished infor­
mation, the logical fallacy remains unresolved. Even with 
its potential for self-destructiveness in political forums, 
the "right to know" argument still is the most popular among 
those who seek protection for reporters. What is its strong 
appeal? Journalism professor John C. Merrill offers a 
reasonable explanation:
Although many press people in America still believe in 
the older concept of their rights as representatives of 
"the press," they realize that by the simple semantic 
trick of bringing "the people" and their supposed rights 
into the picture, they tend to dissipate some criticism 
from intellectuals that the press has only selfish moti­
vations in its continual quest for f r e e d o m . 21
Of course, as we have seen in the discussion of the 
right to anonymity, the press in resisting disclosure of 
sources iŝ  protecting a right of the people. The question 
is, what right? If it is said to be their right to know, 
the argumentative road leads to a compelling contradiction: 
In the twentieth-century political debates over this issue, 
journalist Fred W. Friendly argued that the government's 
subpoena power "can,. . . be a liberating force" in breaking 
down "irresponsible" decisions of editors and publishers.^
21Ibid., p. 102.
7? Fred W. Friendly, "Beyond the 'Caldwell’ Decision: 
Justice White and Reporter Caldwell: Finding a Common
Ground," Columbia Journalism Review, September-October 1972, 
reprinted in 1973 Senate Hearings, pp. 600-605.
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Friendly called for a "precisely drawn" statutory shield for 
j ournalists:
It should provide protection from the prosecutors and 
others bent on fishing expeditions but at the same time 
be limited enough not to produce all-purpose immunity 
for journalists. The shield law and the guidelines by 
which journalists work must be structured in such a way 
as to provide protection for the public's need to know, 
but not a sanctuary for those who because of fear, special 
interests, or just plain irresponsibility are seeking a 
privileged place to hide.
"There may be instances," Friendly concludes, "when a sub­
poena combines the common interests of good law and good 
journalism." He defined the latter as forced access to the 
unpublished information of publishers who other publishers 
think have acted "irresponsibly" by holding their information 
in confidence. Can the press be free under conditions of 
such wars between publishers? This is the contradiction.
In his book The Imperative of Freedom (1974) Merrill 
was adamant that the press' only legal responsibility is to 
remain free. "Journalists,” he said, "should dedicate them­
selves to keeping the system as 'pure1 as possible by keep­
ing control of their own journalistic decisions and by 
thwarting as vigorously as possible any outside power or con-
7 Ttrol." Press freedom, Merrill insisted,
is the press’ freedom; it belongs to the press . . . . 
when we think of the press being free we really mean 
that persons connected with the press are free; therefore, 
we can talk of press freedom belonging to the people--to 
some people in the institution of journalism . . .. These 
are the people who determine what to print or not to 
print; they are the determiners of editorial content; 
they are the "news managers;" they are the ones who de-
^Merrill, pp. 11-12.
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velop their own journalistic ethics and make editorial 
decisions. All this "freedom" or decision-making is by 
press people independent of other "people" who are out­
side the the press.24
The "right to know," Merrill said, "if it existed, would im­
pose an obligation on the press to let the people know; this
would thereby conflict with the freedom of the press to de-
25termine its own editorial actions."
The Baltimore Journalists’ Club compared the claim of 
Morris to the confidential relationships authorized in stat­
ute and common law on behalf of "Counsel, pastors, clerks 
and others . . . protected against being compelled to dis­
close confidential information." In so doing, Baltimore led 
all journalists into a legal swamp that has complicated press 
claims for autonomy in handling unpublished information.
As we have seen in the Simonton and Morris cases, nexvs- 
men have concealed sources to avoid violating personal or
*7 f\professional ethical codes. The English courts by 1776
2^Ibid. , pp. 64-65.
25Ibid., p. 14.
^Section 5 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the 1934 
convention of the American Newspaper Guild (n°w the News­
paper Guild) is reprinted widely in legal literature and is 
often thought to be the original condification of the "news­
man’s code" of confidentiality. It reads: "Nextfspaper men
shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of 
confidential information in court or before other judicial 
or investigating bodies; and . . . the newspaper man’s duty 
to keep confidences shall include those he shared with one 
employer even after he has changed his employment."
The codifications of the principle go further back.
As early as 1922, journalism students of Ohio State Univer­
sity suggested a code with this command:
"Journalists should keep sacred all information given 
them in confidence. Such information should not be pub-
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denied validity of the defense of honor in resisting com­
pulsory testimony, and American courts never have accepted 
it. 27 xhe common law emphasizes that "every citizen owes 
an affirmative duty to testify to facts of his personal 
knowledge which are relevant and competent in connection
with a legitimate judicial, legislative, or administrative 
28inquiry.” It scarcely matters that sources of power to
lished nor used without the consent of the informant, but 
care should be exercised not to accept confidences that 
will embarrass the writer or the newspaper” ("The Journal­
istic Code of Ethics,” comp. Joseph S. Myers, Ohio State 
University Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1922, p. 35).
' Journalism organizations, which have had written ethn­
ical codes since at least 1923, long ignored the question of 
honoring pledges of confidentiality. As late as 1975, an ob­
server complained: "A prospective news source who consults
journalistic codes of ethics could conclude that protecting 
the confidentiality of news sources is almost a nonexistent 
value among journalists” (Gilbert Cranberg, "The Press Must 
Erect Its Own Shield," American Society of Newspaper Editors 
Bulletin, September 1975, p. 14). Cranberg added:
"The most absolute privilege established by law or 
court ruling could not induce a source to disclose con­
fidential information if the journalists’ willingness to 
respect the confidence is suspect.
"It becomes important, therefore, to impress upon po­
tential news sources and the public generally the high 
value the press places on honoring the confidential re­
lationship between newspersons and sources" (ibid.).
Cranberg noted that among "major journalism organiza­
tion^]" only Sigma Delta Chi had recognized the obligation. 
Its code adopted in 1973 states rather enigmatically: "Jour­
nalists acknowledge the newsman's ethic of protecting con­
fidential sources of information." Apparently the ASNE was 
enough embarrassed by the criticism to write a new rule in 
its Code of Ethics: "Pledges of confidentiality to news
sources must be honored at all costs, and therefore should 
not be given lightly" (Editor g Publisher, Dec. 13, 1975,
p. 6).
2 7Guest and Stanzler, p. 29.
28James E. Beaver, "The Newsman's Code, the Claim of 
Privilege and Everyman’s Right to Evidence," Oregon Law 
Review 47 (1968): 246.
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compel testimony vary among the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches; when a situation arises of legitimate 
power being exercised, in an official forum, testimony may 
be compelled unless excused--privileged--by common law or by 
statute. Law scholarship is extremely hostile to most such 
privileges:
The only professional privilege recognized by the 
common law, apart from statute, is that covering confi­
dential communications between attorney and client for 
a lawful purpose. All manner of other confidential com­
munications have had their advocates for privilege: e.g., 
partners, businessmen and others and their clerks, secre­
taries and assistants; trustees and their fiduciaries; 
bankers and borrowers or depositors; brokers and inves­
tors, sureties and their principals; accountants and 
their clients; social workers and relief recipients; and 
possibly sorority house mothers, among others. But since 
the late seventeenth century, the common law has recog­
nized none of them. No oath of secrecy or pledge of pri­
vacy can avail in a court of justice against the demand 
for truth except when the public policy demanding secrecy 
has been found to be extremely important. To mention the 
most important instances, the attorney-client relation is 
privileged because the client supposedly cannot be repre­
sented unless the attorney knows the truth and the client 
will not talk if the attorney's lips are not sealed. The 
nonprofessional privilege for confidential marital commu­
nications is sacrosanct because of the notion that secre­
cy will promote marital harmony. Government officials 
are bound to silence as to treaty negotiations and mili­
tary secrets for obvious reasons. Generally speaking, 
only when legislatures are persuaded to act by organized 
lobbyists or special interests do other relations secure 
"special treatment," thus further hampering the search 
for truth.29
A massive American Bar Association committee--virtually 
a convention with eighty-five lawyers and judges and fifteen 
law professors--made much objection in 1938 to "certain novel 
privileges of secrecy" being authorized by state legislatures
29Ibid., pp. 245-46.
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30for accountants, social workers, and journalists.
Despite the law profession's hostility, the federal 
government is not hesitant to provide or propose special 
privileges, though not often for broad groups. Congress has 
made many particular exceptions to compulsory testimony to 
provide for secrecy in government census information, reports 
of nuclear accidents, railroad mishaps, and airplane
71crashes. The administrative arm of the federal judiciary, 
the Judicial Conference of the United States, could provide 
testimonial immunity for journalists facing grand jury inqui­
sition, but it has refused.. What is has done, though, is 
continue the government's privilege to withhold the identi­
ties of its informants and propose in 1973 a new testimonial 
privilege for government officials, "to refuse to give evi­
dence upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of danger that 
the evidence will disclose a secret of state or official in-
? 7formation."
The unsatisfactory legal results of the analogy between 
reporters and other testimonially privileged persons arise 
from the limitations long accepted as part of traditional 
privileges, Most traditional privileges belong to a known 
informant, who alone can waive it.33 "Generally speaking,"
30Ibid., p. 247.
3-*"Noted in Federal Rules Decisions 56: 230-34.
3^Nancy Federman Kaplan, "Beyond Branzburg: The Con­
tinuing Quest for Reporter's Privilege," Syracuse Law Review
24 (1973): 767-68.
33Beaver, p. 2 54.
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noted one law scholar, "only in the case of the police- 
informant privilege is the identity of the communicator 
the very thing rendered immune from testimonial compul­
sion."3  ̂ All the other privileges, even the police- 
informant one, depend on a judge's supervision of their 
use in case, based on a determination of the issues,- ap­
plication of rules of evidence, and other factors.33 
Furthermore, the comparison between reporters and others 
with testimonial privileges invites consideration of li­
censing for journalists, because many professionally priv­
ileged witnesses--lawyers, doctors, experts--are licensed 
by the state or closely supervised by its agencies.
Lacking common-law standing or protection of a 
statute, most reporters following Simonton's or Morris' 
course found themselves stigmatized as was reporter Thomas 
Hamilton of the Augusta (Ga.) Herald. In 1911, Hamilton 
refused to tell a board of police commissioners who among 
the police had given him information about a murder.3^ He 
argued that "should he breach the journalistic code by an­
swering t he would lose his job and be prevented from prac­
ticing his profession in the future."3  ̂ The Georgia Supreme 
Court ruled that;
3^Ibid.? pp. 254-55.
35Ibid., p. 255.
3^Kuhn, p. 68.
3'7Ibid. p p p . 68-69 .
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The citizen or inhabitant owes to the State the duty 
of testifying, when lawfully called up to do so, in 
order that the truth may be ascertained and impartial 
and complete justice done. . . .  A promise not to tes­
tify when so required is substantially a promise not to 
obey the law.™
Between 1929 and 1935, five cases arose in which news­
men who based their silence on professional ethics were 
jailed or otherwise punished for c o n t e m p t . 39 According to 
one legal historian, "these cases, which caused wide national 
interest, gave great impetus to the cause of confidence leg­
islation" to protect r e p o r t e r s . T h u s  by 1937, seven more 
states had joined Maryland and passed laws to protect re­
porters.^^ A brief review of the cases that caused the up-
38Ibid., p. 69.
^^ibid., p. 71.
40Ibid.
4^Ibid., p. 61. They were New Jersey, 1933; Califor­
nia and Alabama, 1935; Arkansas and Kentucky, 1936; Pennsyl­
vania and Arizona, 1937. By 1972, only nine more states 
had joined the list, most of those probably the result of the 
notorious Marie Torre case in 1958. But by 1975, the total 
had jumped to twenty-six, reflecting political interest in 
governmental subpoena policies in general and celebrated 
cases in particular, especially that of New York Times re­
porter Earl Caldwell.
Of the twenty-six, only twelve grant an absolute im­
munity impervious to challenge once the newsperson meets cer­
tain criteria of eligibility. Fourteen state laws provide 
protection only against revealing the source of confidential, 
information. Ten extend the privilege to unpublished infor­
mation itself. Much has been written about the defects of 
state newsmen’s privilege statutes, but the chief difficulty 
seems to be the sometimes ludicrously strict interpretation 
courts read into them. Most have been interpreted for what 
they are--departures from the common-law rule of testimony, 
narrow and unique in the absence of a recognized Constitu­
tional connection. State courts have held, for example, that 
the privilege is available only for information received in
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roar illustrates the tone of the debate as it neared its
eightieth year in America.
In 1929, three Washington Times reporters refused to
tell a District of Columbia grand jury any more than they
had published about speakeasies in Washington. "If we gave
the names and addresses of the men who sold us the liquor we
would be placed in the position of prohibition agents, stool
4 2pigeons and snoopers," they said. Their jailings for con­
tempt prompted the first of many unsuccessful proposals in
Congress to create a reporter’s privilege in federal proceed- 
43m g s .
In 1931, a judge in Hopewell, Virginia, was angered at 
criticism of the court published in an anonymous letter to 
the Hopewell News, so he had its editor J. W. Mapoles jailed 
for refusing to say who wrote the letter. The Virginia press 
was outraged. "The liberty of the press and the right of 
privileged communication is [sic] directly involved," said
confidence, regardless of what the statute might say. Hence 
radio stations have been forced to turn over tapes and let­
ters received from identified dissident groups. Other courts
have denied the privilege to reporters concerning events they 
witnessed because no pledge of confidentiality was demanded 
or tendered. Cases in many states have stripped the priv­
ilege by applying standard rules of evidence against it--hold­
ing that revealing part of the confidential information nul­
lified the privilege concerning the unpublished remainder (Ben 
Singetary, "Branzburg Revisited: The Continuing Search for a
Testimonial Privilege for Newsmen," Tulsa Law Journal 11
[1975]: 258-78). See also Peter J. Shurn and Jacqueline Y, 
Parker, "Reporter's Privilege," New England Law Review 11
(1976): 405-62. ~
^Whalen, p. 63.
^ K u h n ,  p. 71.
the Richmond Times-Dispatch.44 xhe Richmond News-Leader 
went further: "If the sources of information are not priv­
ileged, then freedom of the press is a fiction and political 
liberty soon will be."4^
In 1934, the Kentucky legislature also was angered by 
a letter to the editor. It was a satirical attack on legis­
lative corruption, published by the Louisville' Courier-Jour­
nal and signed by "a member of the House of Representatives." 
When technicalities prevented the punishment warranted by a 
legislative committee (jail), it ordered the editor to pay a 
fine. And by resolution, the Kentucky House voted to ask the 
President to recall Robert W. Bingham, owner of the Courier-
A 7Journal and then U.S. Ambassador to England.
Only four months later, the Kentucky legislature again
was angered. One of its members had been hanged in effigy
4 8for his vote in favor of a state sales tax. Two reporters 
summoned to name the culprits said, "we refuse to answer on 
the grounds of newspaper confidence." The presiding magis­
trate decided to judge and jail them for each repeated re­
fusal and commented, "if this is an endurance contest I can
44Whalen, p. 65.
45 Ibid.
46Ibid., p. 26.
4 ̂ Kuhn, p . 72.
4^Whalen, p. 65.
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stand i t . T h e  Lexington Leader observed, "it is a mis­
take for anyone to ask that newspapermen violate their own
universally accepted rule of action, which is in the interest
50of society as a whole," Editor  ̂ Publisher graciously 
cheered the reporters as "red-blooded young Americans" and 
"brave young spirits" who faced "judicial torture.
Reporting for the New York Journal-American in 1935, 
Martin Mooney investigated the numbers game and found it 
flourishing in spite of a grand jury clean-up. The embar­
rassed panel wanted to know more from Mooney, but he refused 
to answer. Facing a contempt charge, Mooney told the judge:
I cannot answer the questions put to me because I vio­
late a confidence [if I do], and if the day should come 
when it is imperative for me in order to earn my bread 
and butter to double cross people who give me informa­
tion, off the record, then that day, your Honor, I will 
deem it advisable to tear up this press card.'^
Later, a court of appeals affirmed the charge, jail sentence
and fine against Mooney. The court commented that if a
privilege were to be given reporters, "it should be done by
the Legislature which has thus far refused to enact such
legislation."^
Up to this point, the momentum against reporters'
testimonial privilege was based on the presumption against
^ I b i d . , p . 66.
S0T,.,Ibid.
5*Kuhn, p. 73n.
^Whalen, pp. 66-67.
‘’'’ibid., pp. 67-68.
77
a common-law exception to a common-law r u l e . 54 phe sporadic 
passage of protective statutes among the states was, if any­
thing, an affirmation of this presumption--in effect filling 
a gap in the common law. Gradually, what the Baltimore Jour­
nalists' Club called the "public's interest" in reporters' 
testimonial immunity emerged as a possible constitutional 
basis for argument. Later some would call it the public's 
"right to know;" others would describe the public's interest 
as protection of the "free flow of news." Whatever it was 
called, two things were to prejudice that constitutional 
argument and effect its defeat by the courts. The first, 
simply stated, was an accident of history. Having dealt 
with the repeated assertion of what they saw as a nonexis­
tent common-law right, the courts started with the common- 
law presumption against any reporters' privilege and viewed 
the constitutional argument as another exception that would 
have to justify i t s e l f . 55 Also working against recognition 
of a constitutional basis was the emphasis approved by the 
press itself on the public's interest in the free flow of 
news. We will return to this point in a moment.
The courts' general presumption against the constitu­
tional argument in the context of history may have been merely 
human, but it was unfair, according to some constitutional-law 
scholars:
54Guest and Stanzler, p. 40.
55Ibid, p. 28.
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The notion that common law criteria should not ap­
ply to the consideration of a constitutional interest 
is exemplified by the right of a witness not to testify 
on the grounds of self- i n c r i m i n a t i o n . T h i s  privilege 
or right is not an exception, justified on some indepen­
dent weighing of merits, to a general principle in favor 
of compulsory testimony. To be sure, the fifth amendment 
obstructs the efficient operation of the judicial system 
even more than do traditional p r i v i l e g e s , 5 2  ^ut i t  simply 
takes precedence over the principle of compulsory testi­
m o n y . "  a similar approach should be taken in consider­
ation of freedom of the p r e s s .
•^"No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself. . . .11 U.S. Const. 
Amend. V.
52Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow:. The Case 
for Constitutional Change, 37 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 671 (1968).
53 If a person can effectively be guaranteed immunity 
from prosecution, he cannot claim the fifth amendment. 
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896)', Mills v. Alabama,
360 U.S. 230 (1959).
We already have examined the chief political weak­
nesses of the "right to know": its logical fallacy and its 
self-destructiveness as a free-press principle. The press' 
stubborn insistence on it as a basis for a privilege for re-
Ibid. The Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantee, 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . .  to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses 
in his favor," has been used as part of the argument against 
granting testimonial immunity to reporters. While the argu­
ment that immunities interfere with the judicial process is 
inescapable, the conclusion that reporters' immunities would 
uniquely let the guilty go free, or worse, allow the innocent 
to suffer punishment, is misleading. The Sixth Amendment 
right to compulsory process was established merely to give the 
defendant the same rights the prosecution had by common law 
(see discussion in Nicholas G. Tinling, "Newsmen's Privilege:
A Survey of the Law in California," Pacific Law Journal 4 
[1973]: 899). Consequently, according to long-standing rules 
and precedents, the right to compel testimony does not over­
ride testimonial privileges recognized by common law or stat­
ute, in part because they stand equally against prosecution
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porters had no more strength in the judicial sphere. The 
reasons are many. First, judges and lawyers came to believe 
that "the sole asserted interest is free flow of news to the
c npublic." Focused as the issue was on reporters, the problem 
came to be viewed as one of deciding the extent their "news- 
gathering" activities should be allowed to interfere with the 
administration of justice. The next problem encountered was 
that news gathering as a reporter’s right has been much more 
severely abridged by courts than news dissemination, a pub­
lisher’s right. Aside from the doubts of many judges (and 
some journalists) whether freedom of the press even includes 
a "news-gathering" right, restrictions on that right have 
been held constitutional upon a "balancing' of interests.
Now, in general, the closer a restriction comes to 
interfering with the publishing of news and views, the greater 
the likelihood that the courts will presume it unconstitution­
al unless strongly justified.^ The tendency toward balancing 
news gathering against other interests appears to be governed 
by the same function: news-gathering activities once or more
removed from the fact of publishing are given less and less
and defense. If the source of exculpatory information is 
privileged, there can and probably would be a directed ac­
quittal, or prosecution can be dropped. If the source of 
indicting or convicting information is privileged, justice 
may be frustrated, but no more so (and no more regularly) 
than it is when evidence is excluded for violating the Fourth 
Amendment, or if testimony is silenced by the Fifth Amendment, 
or by accepted common-law privileges.
5 7Guest and Stanzler, p. 28.
58Ibid., p. 27.
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constitutional weight. These tendencies, combined with the 
traditional reluctance of courts to find exceptions in the 
general duty to testify, fully account for the reception 
given to the "right to know” advanced as the press* constitu­
tional argument.
Further, there appear to be both factual and psycho­
logical reasons for the defeat of the privilege in court.
The psychological one is extremely potent and is made ap­
parent by the answer to this question: is "newsmen's priv­
ilege" a personal right, belonging to reporters and other 
press employees, or is it an institutional right, asserted 
by publishers as representatives of the press as an institu­
tion? The answer stands weak or strong against the govern­
ment, which is, of course, asserting an institutional in­
terest:
From the point of view of society's right to our testi­
mony, it is to be remembered that the demand comes, not 
from any one person or set of persons, but from the com­
munity as a whole--from justice as an institution, and 
from law and order as indispensible [sic] elements ofcivilized life.
The factual basis of the "right to know" as a vehicle 
for carrying the public's interest in protecting reporters 
also is very weak. As some see it, the attack against the 
constitutional privilege mainly has focused on the lack of 
any perceptible impact on the free flow of news in those
59Wigmore, Evidence 8 (McNaughton rev. 1961), Sec.
2192, cited ibid., p. 37 (emphasis mine).
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states where there Is no statutory privilege for reporters. 
The difficulty in counterattacking that assertion long has 
been recognized:
In determining whether the lack of a privilege has 
impaired the flow of news it is meaningless to compare 
privilege-jurisdiction newspapers to non-privilege ju­
risdiction newspapers in terms of output--e.g., to say 
that despite the absence of a privilege the New York 
Times is a good newspaper so therefore there must be 
no impediment--because looking at output does not tell 
what might have been [published].
What impact does governmental subpoena power have 
on a life process as diversified as the "flow of news"?
Most news arises from on-the-record sources anyway. Beyond 
that, there is great variability in newsmen's use of in­
formants. A Field Foundation study by one lawyer documen­
ted
several factors such as type of media, experience of re­
porters, and type of assignment. . . . The average news­
man relies on confidential sources for between 27 and 34- 
percent of his stories. Approximately 12 percent of a 
newsman's stories come from first-time sources, which are 
often the most important, and approximately 22 percent 
are the result of information supplied by regular infor­
mants (a source who has supplied information more than 
twice). It is also noteworthy that of the various media, 
newsweeklies rely the heaviest on confidential sources-- 
by a factor of greater than 2 to 1 over local radio and 
television stations, the media which, use confidential 
sources the least.62
Newsmen use and rely on confidential sources. But no 
one can agree on factual evidence for proof that occasionally 
requiring newsmen to testify and reveal sources and informa-
60Ibid., p. 42.
61Ibid., p. 43.
^Tinling, p. 883.
tion will curtail the flow of news significantly.*^ The Su­
preme Court easily dismissed that argument when it considered 
newsmen’s privilege in Branzburg v. Hayes:
We are admonished that refusal to provide a First 
Amendment reporter’s privilege will undermine the free­
dom of the press to collect and disseminate news. But 
this is not the lesson history teaches us. As noted 
previously, the common law recognized no such privilege, 
and the constitutional argument was not even asserted 
until 1958. From the beginning of our country the press 
has operated without constitutional protection for press 
informants, and the press has flourished. The existing 
constitutional rules have not been a serious obstacle 
to either the development or retention of confidential 
news sources by the press.64
Press-supported studies back up much of the Court’s 
reasoning. The Field Foundation study concluded that "the 
most significant effects that subpoenas have on newsgathering 
are of a highly personal, and relatively unmeasurable, na­
ture. "65 when a group of journalists was surveyed, fewer 
than 10 percent thought that their news coverage had been 
affected adversely by the possibility of being subpoenaed 
and forced to reveal unpublished information.^^
Arguing the relative impact of subpoenas on the flow of 
news inevitably invites compromise. Law professor Vince Bias 
concluded his study on the subpoena question by proposing a 
neat solution. "From the available evidence," he said, "it 
seems that the press can operate [without diminished news pro 
duct] as long as the use of subpoenas remains within accept­
63Ibid., pp. 883-84.
^ Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, pp. 698-99.
^SBlasi, p. 265.
66 Tinling, p. 885.
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fi 7able limits.' Here is how he says it could work:
If the reporter's testimonial obligation were limited 
to those few instances in which he really does have 
important information that is not available through 
non-press sources, and if some provision were made to 
protect confidences in stories about victiinless crimes, 
the contingency of press involvement with official fact­
finding would be so remote as to have only a negligible 
impact on the flow of n e w s . ° 8
The professor calls this reducing the subpoena threat, but
it doubles nicely as a potent political weapon for those
opposed to absolute privilege for the press' unpublished
information.^
Other problems plague the "free flow of news" as the
sole constitutional support for protecting reporters. One
of the most outrageous has been the serious conclusion of
some legal scholars that "the most logical constitutional
fi 7 Ibid. (emphasis his).
^Blasi , p . 280.
^Ibid.j p. 284. A few years later in Congress Profes­
sor Blasi was still talking about reducing the subpoena 
threat:
"What will protect the flow of information most of all 
is not an absolute privilege or carefully drawn quali­
fied privilege; what will protect the flow of informa­
tion most of all is if people quit paying so damn much 
attention to the subpoena issue. The press has been 
committing hara-kari. If I were worried about protec­
ting the information flow, I would try to bury the issue. 
The more people are aware of the threat, the more it is 
in the minds of sources.
"I think what you should be trying to achieve by a 
privilege is to greatly reduce the number of subpoenas 
and the indiscriminateness with which they are thrown 
around, the extent to which they are used in situations 
in which there is very little evidentiary gain to be had" 
(U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, News - 
men's Privilege, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 on 
H.R. 717 and Belated Measures, 93rd Cong., 1st sess.,
1973, p. 129 [hereafter cited as 1975 House Hearings]).
basis for a federal shield law would be the commerce clause,”
referring to Congress’ power under Article I to "regulate com
7 0merce . . . among the several States."7u This is not the 
place to criticize their views, except to say that acceptance 
of that conclusion would expand the government's misue of the 
Associated Press v. United States decision.
Another result of the "free flow of news" argument is 
that it leads to issues essentially extraneous to the claims 
of publishers and reporters (on behalf of news sources).
Hence "newsmen’s privilege" has been lumped with issues of 
freedom of association, secrecy in personnel records, the 
right of lawyers to evaluate themselves anonymously, the gen­
eral integrity of library and banking records, and other "rep 
resentative problems of confidentiality."'7-̂-
With the narrow focus of "the flow of news," publishers
institutionally based claim can be bypassed:
In terms of practical effect on the flow of news it prob­
ably makes little difference whether the privilege is 
mandatory or discretionary. . . . Perhaps . . . more in­
formants would reveal more matters to more newsmen if the 
informants knew that the newsmen were forbidden to reveal 
their identity. Such a law also should satisfy the cri­
tics who seem to have a latent distrust of newsmen and do 
not want to give them any discretion and the critics who 
object to the privilege because they think that newsmen 
are simply seeking prestige.^2
The manifold weaknesses of the "right to know" as a con.
^Robert m . O'Neil, "Shield Laws: Partial Solution to 
a Pervasive Problem," New York Law Forum 20 (1975): 519.
^ I b i d . , p. 532.
7 77iGuest and Stanzler, p. 45.
85
stitutional support for the press' right to unpublished in­
formation became apparent the first time it reached a court.
By another accident of history, the test case, Garland v. 
Torre, grew out of New York Herald Tribune column written by 
Marie Torre. Singer Judy Garland and the CBS television net­
work could not agree on a contract for a television spectac­
ular. In 1957 , Torre used her contact in CBS and published 
his version of the reason for the Garland-CBS trouble: "I
don't know, but I wouldn't be surprised if it's because she 
thinks she's terribly fat."73 The source remained unnamed.
Out of the trivial remark sprang a $1.4 million "libel" 
suit, not against the Herald Tribune but against CBS, which 
Garland also sued for breach of contract.7  ̂ In the face of 
denials by likely CBS officials, Garland needed proof and 
Torre could provide it. The columnist was cited and con­
victed for contempt when she refused to betray her source. 
Judge--now Mr. Justice--Potter Stewart in the appeals court
affirmed the conviction, holding that Torre's evidence "went
7 Sto the heart of the plaintiff's claim." Because her evi­
dence was relevant, Stewart said, any abridgement of press 
freedom that might be involved "must give place under the Con­
stitution to a paramount public interest in the fair adminis-
73Whalen, p. 50.
74 . .Marie Torre, "Did I Go to Jail for Notning?" Look,
May 26, 1959, p. 62.
7^Ervin, p. 238.
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t r a t i o n  of j u s t i c e . " 7 ^
Torre and her publisher, Ogden R. Reid, appealed to 
the Supreme Court. They argued that the press needs to as­
sure sources of anonymity to maintain the flow of news.
"The extent that any rule of law renders such assurance 
unavailable or precarious," they said, "to that extent the 
flow of news to the public is pinched off at the source
and . . . the public's right to know is diminished,1,77 The
7 8petition was denied without comment.
Marie Torre spent ten days in jail and received world­
wide attention, by her o\m account. "The letters and news 
paper, radio and television editorials were about 90 percent 
in my favor, and that's a conservative estimate," she s a i d .
The Wall Street Journal was among the 10 percent opposed.
"The hue and cry of some of our colleagues about press free­
dom is misplaced,” it said:
Miss Torre was asked to name the person who had made the 
remarks, and she refused to say, pleading that a compul­
sory disclosure of a confidential source would affect 
freedom of the press. That, plainly, is nonsense. Free­
dom of the press guarantees only a right to print matter; 
it is no guarantee that one may not have to answer for 
what is printed. ^
The controversy spurred the introduction of "Marie Torre
7 6 I b i d . , p. 237.
77 Beaver, p. 250.
7 8Supreme Court Reports, Book 358 „ p. 910.
79 Torre, p. 62.
^Ibid. , p. 69.
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O ' !Bills” in nine statehouses and one in Congress, her name 
had become temporarily synonymous with the usual flurry of 
shield legislation that accompanied jailing of reporters 
anywhere.
The American Civil Liberties Union was so moved by
Torre's incarceration that it spent fifteen months reviewing
"the conflict between the public's right to knoxv and the due
82process of law." The ACLU saw the threat this way: "to
compel a reporter to disclose the identity of sources to 
whom he promised anonymity would weaken one of the principal 
tools which he employs . . .  to keep the public informed."83 
But granting reporters absolute control over unpublished 
information, said the ACLU, "is tantamount to saying that the 
public interest, under the First Amendment in the free flow 
of information, shall be paramount to the public interest in 
due process in all cases where the two come in conflict."84 
It also feared that consideration of the question in a polit­
ical forum could be dangerous to press freedom.
The same week in 1959, a group of editors decided that 
bills in the Connecticut legislature to protect reporters 
should be killed. A spokesman for the Connecticut Council for
81Ray Erwin, "Marie Torre Recalls Historic Jail Term," 
Editor § Publisher, Sept. 18, 1965, p. 50.
O O° "Civil Liberties Union Vetoes Reporter Bills,"
Editor 8 Publisher, March 21, 1959, p. 16.
83Ibid.
84Ibid.
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Freedom of Information said it "did not want special priv­
ileges and feared the bills might lead to regulation, even 
licensing of the press.
In Marie Torre’s hometown, three major state associa­
tions of publishers and editors convened en masse to discuss 
the Torre case and to decide whether to support shield legis­
lation in New York. Editor § Publisher devoted more than a 
full page to the event.
One of the speakers, Oxie Reichler, editor of the 
Yonkers Herald-Statesman, seemed to be responding to some 
snootiness among the publishers and editors present:
Whether Marie Torre is a reporter ox a columnist is 
not the issue. . . . Whether what she wrote about Judy 
Garland was or wasn’t trivial is of no consequence in 
this discussion. Whether she was or wasn't a martyr 
is a matter of personal opinion.
What is important is that her freedom was abridged 
and that she was punished (without suit against her or 
her paper) for refusing to betray her professionally 
given word, as a newswriter. . . . Our editors, pub­
lishers and staffs have been conducting a continuing 
fight for the people’s right to know. If we retreat on 
this one--if we surrender on the matter of reporter’s 
confidence or oppose such legal protection--then our 
freedom of information fight falls on its face and be­
comes meaningless.
Dr. Wesley G. Clark, dean of the Syracuse University 
journalism school, tried to clarify the issues by offering 
some "serious questions" about shield laws. "Can we find 
the mechanism to screen reporters and eliminate bad ones 
from under the umbrella?" he asked. "Has the world so
*^Ray Erwin, "3 New York State Groups Decline Immunity 
Support," Editor S Publisher, Feb. 7, 1959, p. 9.
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8 7changed that we have to have them [shield laws]?" But
it was William Fitzpatrick, Wall Street Journal associate
editor, who challenged the audience to reject a tempting
freedom. We must ask, he said,
how the nation’s press, the acknowledged champion of 
the,right of the public to know all where the public 
interest is involved, can at the same time champion for 
itself a privilege to remain silent on matters that may 
'well involve the public interest quite as deeply as its 
right to know. . . . We had best be careful about at­
tempts to broaden freedom of the press lest we be ac­
cused of seeking not just liberty to print, but license 
to print. We may believe that complete immunity will 
serve a responsible press, but others may well believe 
that it will lead to irresponsibility flowdng from ar­
rogant power to hold ourselves unaccountable for what we 
print. . . .
. . . Is it possible that we are so blind as to be­
lieve we can have it both ways--that we can demand full 
disclosure where all others are concerned but deny it 
where we are concerned? Or is it possible that, if we 
follow such a course, the public will someday wonder 
whose interests, ours or the public's is our real con­
cern.
"After prolonged debate," reported Editor § Publisher, 
"the editors group contented itself with a statement for-' 
mally expressing its concern over the Torre case, [and] re­
affirming its belief that reporters are traditionally immune 
from punishment for not revealing confidences." The editors 
also decided to "study" the many proposed immunity laws.
"The other two groups [publishers] took no action," said 
E § P.89
After a week’s reflection on these events, Editor § Pub­
87Ibid.
88Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
8^Ibid., p . 9.
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lisher decided to set the record straight. In an unsigned
editorial, it said that in seeking protection for reporters,
no one was advocating that reporters, least of all columnists,
be given a "license" to print anything. "The privilege to
protect a confidence does not carry a corresponding privilege
to commit libel at will," said E § P . "The libel laws serve
90as an effective restraint." Newspapers are, and should, be 
responsible under the libel laws for everything printed, it 
said. Then it turned to the central issue:
It is contended by some that freedom of the press is 
involved in this issue. Perhaps it is. People, including 
newspapermen, can still write what they please within cer­
tain legally defined limitations. There is no prior re­
straint on publication. But is seems to us there is a 
conflict when people (reporters) are punished for not re­
vealing who told them something even though the informa­
tion as reported is correct. . . . There are many times 
that the public interest requires publication of informa­
tion even though the source cannot be identified. It is 
for that reason only that they should be protected by con­
fidence laws, 9̂ -
90Editor § Publisher, Feb. 14, 1959, p. 6. 
91Ibid.
CHAPTER V
CALDWELL AND THE PANTHERS
A decade after Garland v, Torre, marijuana, bombs, 
riots, war and protest were becoming hallmarks of a disor­
dered U.S. society, but not much had changed in the rule of 
law against reporters. The constitutional argument for re­
porter’s privilege was unchanged, and still had no support 
in court decisions.-^
A disgruntled ex-employee of the Honolulu Civil Ser­
vice Commission sued it when reporter Alan Goodfader found 
out about her dismissal before she did. In 1961 the Hawaii 
Supreme Court found no serious constitutional problems with 
an order that Goodfader testify in the civil trial, although
the court conceded that there would be some "impairment of
2freedom of the press.”
In 1968, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed an order
that Annette Buchanan, University of Oregon student reporter,
release to a grand jury the real names of seven marijuana
3users she had interviewed for publication.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1970 conceded that a
^Kaplan, p. 738.
2Whalen, p. 70.
3Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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reporter has a constitutional right to refuse to disclose 
confidential information except when it conflicts with the 
"public's overriding need to know."^ In the case before it 
Wisconsin v. Knops, Milwaukee Kaleidoscope editor Mark Knop 
was therefore ordered to reveal the names of persons he in­
terviewed for a story on a murderous anti-war protest bomb­
ing at the University of Wisconsin. (He refused, and spent 
six months in jail.) The Wisconsin court said;
In a disorderly society such as we are currently ex­
periencing, it may well be appropriate to curtail in 
a very minor way the free flow of information, if such 
curtailment will serve the purpose of restoring an at­
mosphere in which all our fundamental freedoms can 
flourish.5
It took fourteen years, but the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1972 finally addressed the substance of the press’ con­
stitutional arguments first advanced in Garland v. Torre. 
Its opinion, entitled Branzburg v. Hayes,^ was ostensibly 
about the refusal of Louisville Courier-Journa1 reporter 
Paul Branzburg to reveal the identities of young hashish 
makers he observed at work and interviewed for a story on 
the Louisville drug scene. Some legal reviews later were 
to conclude that the five-justice majority focused almost 
entirely on Paul Branzburg and the fact that he had wit­
nessed a felony;
They personalized the quest for a reporter’s privilege
^Ibid. , p . 72.
5Ibid.
^Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, pp. 665-752,
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and found that the individual journalist’s claim for a 
first amendment shield did not outweigh the interest of 
the government in pursuing law enforcement goals through 
the grand jury system. To the meager extent that the 
Court focused on the relationships between the denial of 
privilege and the free flow of nevvs, it consistently 
underestimated the element of causation, demanded im- 
possible proof of first amendment injury, and conscious­
ly elevated short-term law enforcement goals over long- 
term first amendment interests. The impact of forced 
disclosure on whistle blowing and investigative journal - 
ism was totally ignored by the majority, who, piqued at 
the facts of the title case, treated the quest fox re­
porter's privilege as a simple matter of crime control.
There is good evidence to conclude that the Court in" Branz-
burg, like the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Knops, was saying 
more. Court fears of social disorder and a willingness to 
sacrifice "in a very minor way" to help government prosecu­
tors set things right permeated the Branzburg decision. For 
Branzburg was an opinion on three cases, and two of them 
dealt with something far more fearsome than hashish: the
political opposition of the Black Panther Party.
Earl Caldwell began reporting on riots in black com­
munities during forays across the country for the New York 
Times (and sixty other papers which subscribed to its news 
service) in the summer of 1967. He traveled with Rap Brown, 
moving from Roxbury in Boston, to Chicago’s South Side, and 
to Watts in Los Angeles. Later,- he was to recall: "I went
across the country with him, and I watched thousands of 
black folks who were fed up, who were so filled with rage 
that they, too, were about to explode. Out of all that came
7Kaplan, p. 770 (footnotes omitted).
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Othe Black Panther party.” Along the way, Earl Caldwell
found many blacks fed up with the system and angry and 
bitter about a press which they felt had a history of 
treating them unfairly. But despite those feelings and 
although they were reluctant, they were still willing to 
talk with reporters and to give them a chance to have an 
up-close look at things as they were. I was able to file 
many, many stories on the people and the life on the 
black side of those towns.*
After the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther, King Jr., 
Caldwell made several trips to the San Francisco area to re­
port on the Panthers. They began to trust him. During a 
September visit, something scary happened:
Late one night in San Francisco they yanked an old 
couch away from a wall in a cramped apartment, ex­
posing stacks of guns of every sort. I could tell my 
readers then to take these people seriously, and I 
did.10
The story about the weapons provoked the government’s in­
terest too; the FBI called, then visited, the city room of 
the Times in New York. They wanted more on the Panther arms 
cache than Caldwell had written. He refused. He had pub­
lished all he knew, he told the government agents.^ But 
they did not believe him. They wanted names and places.
By the spring of 1969, according to Caldwell, the 
Black Panthers organization had grown so large and influen­
tial among young blacks that the Times transferred Caldwell 
to its San Francisco bureau. Caldwell later said the as-
^Whalen, p. 85.
^1973 Senate Hearings, p. 87.
•^Whalen, p. 85.
111975 Senate Hearings, p. 87.
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signment was necessary because ’’suspicions and fears among
many segments of the black community were such that white
reporters were unable to gain access to . . . black militant
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . " ^  Soon, Caldwell was an insider--according
to him the only person close enough to the Panthers to tell
the real story:
I wrote of the breakfast program they were operating for 
black children and the politics that were involved, long 
before most other reporters even knew it existed. I 
wrote with some detail of weapons they owned and later 
how they were beginning to attract wide support in var­
ious sections of both the black and white, communities.
I wrote too of their ideas of what the society should 
be--not just shallow pieces taken from brief interviews, 
but in-depth stories that were drawn from hours and hours 
of sitting and watching and listening. Listening not 
from a distance, but from inside their private offices, 
offices where weapons stood in corners and where sandbags 
lined the walls and huge metal plates covered the win­
dows. 13
On November 15, 1969, David Hilliard, leader of the Pan­
thers, made a publicly televised speech in which he declared, 
"We will kill Richard N i x o n . T h e  threat was repeated in 
three issues of the party’s newspaper. In December, coinciden­
tally a time of numerous violent confrontations between the 
Panthers and police, Hilliard was indicted by a federal grand 
jury for uttering threats against the President. The charges 
eventually were dropped when the government refused to reveal
-^Ibid. , p . 86.
13Ibid., p. 87.
•^Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, p. 679.
96
wiretapping information in the c a s e . Also in December came 
Caldwell's major story on the aspirations of the Panther 
Party. "In their role as the vanguard in a revolutionary 
struggle," Caldwell wrote, "the Panthers have picked up 
guns." He quoted Hilliard: "We advocate the very direct
overthrow of the Government by way of force and violence.
By picking up guns and moving against it because we recog­
nize it as being oppressive and in recognizing that we know 
that the only solution to it is armed struggle [sic] ."1^
After the story appeared, the FBI began calling on 
Caldwell. The reporter began to worry that the Panthers 
would suspect him of collaborating. He had his calls 
screened; the FBI used women callers to pierce the screen 
to find Caldwell's whereabouts.-*-'7 The agents followed him 
to another city and tried to interview him there. Between
December 23, 1969, and January 12, 1970, FBI agents tried six
18times to interview Caldwell, but he refused. At the end of 
the month, "an agent told an employee at The Times San Fran­
cisco bureau to inform me that they were not going to fool 
around any longer, that if I did not cooperate with them, 
that I would be in court."-*-9 Meanwhile, the government had
15New York Times, June 4, 1972, p. 58, cited in Kap­
lan, p. 741n.
^ Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, p. 677.
^71973 Senate Hearings, p. 88.
^Whalen, p. 87. 
i Q1973 Senate Hearings, p. 88.
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convened a grand jury to conduct a broad investigation of the 
? 0Panthers, but in particular to investigate crimes by the 
Black Panther Party. Among the government's allegations: 
threats against the President, conspiracy to assassinate the 
President, and interstate travel to incite r i o t .21
The FBI carried out its threat against Caldwell only 
days after delivering it. On February 2, 197 0, he was sub­
poenaed to testify in secret before the grand jury. He was 
to bring all his notes and tape recordings "reflecting state­
ments made for publication" by the Panthers since January 1, 
1969--essentially files from a year’s w o r k . 22 it was the be­
ginning of a famous court case, but for Caldwell, the end of 
a career as an interpreter of black militancy. A few years 
later he recalled:
My reporting on the Black Panther Party ended the day the 
first subpoena was issued. It was not ended by the New 
York Times but rather, it was ended by the Justice Depart­
ment and solely, I believe, because I refused to meet 
secretly with agents of the FBI and discuss in private 
with them information that had come to me through my hard- 
earned sources.
Today as a reporter I keep no files. I no longer use 
a tape recorder but still I have found source after source 
suspicious that anything told to me, a journalist, will 
end up in the hands of some investigative agency. And I 
am not alone. Reporters across the country had told me 
that they are having similar e x p e r i e n c e s . 23
20New York Times, Jan. 14, 1970, p. 40, cited in Kaplan, 
p. 740n.
21Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, pp. 676-77, dis­
cussed in Kaplan, pp. 740-41. The government apparently 
chose not to prosecute the Panthers under the Smith Act 
(see Nelson and Teeter, p. 42).
^ Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, p. 675n.
^ 1973 Senate Hearings, p. 88.
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The subpoena against Caldwell was eight months old 
when a grand jury in Bristol County, Massachusetts, decided 
to subpoena television newsman Paul Pappas for his knowledge 
of the Panthers. Two months earlier Pappas had covered civil 
disorder in New Bedford and had been allowed into Panther 
headquarters there after promising to write nothing unless 
an expected police raid occurred. It did not, and Pappas 
went home empty-handed after about three hours. He wrote 
nothing and told no one what he had seen, but the grand jury 
found out he had been there, The state Supreme Judicial 
Court eventually ruled against Pappas’ claim for a First 
Amendment privilege. It noted that Massachusetts had no 
statutory privilege. In arguments later before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Pappas said he would concede the government's 
power to compel his testimony if the grand jury demonstrated 
a "compelling need" and an "overriding public necessity" for 
his information, but he insisted that the case involved not 
even a hint that a crime had been committed during Pappas' 
visit to the Black Panther headquarters. It was a classic 
case of a grand jury "fishing expedition," Pappas argued.24
Pappas' case soon was consolidated with Caldwell's, 
and Branzburg's as it arose from the Kentucky courts. Be­
fore reviewing the Supreme Court's decision against the 
three reporters, it will be helpful to investigate press 
reaction to the Caldwell case, which achieved considerable 
notoriety.
24Whalen, pp. 73-76.
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The government may have been encouraged to hound 
Caldwell into court by timid press compliance with other 
governmental subpoenas. In January 1970, for example, CBS 
broadcast an hour-long interview with Black Panther minis­
ter Eldridge Cleaver. Within forty-eight hours, CBS News 
faced, federal subpoenas demanding all correspondence, files 
and unused portions (outtakes) of film from the interview. 
The files dated to 1968.28 CBS protested, but it obeyed.
Several months before co-opting CBS, the government’s 
grand juries investigating Students for a Democratic Society 
subpoenaed (and apparently obtained) unedited files and un­
used pictures belonging to Time, Life and Newsweek maga- 
zines, and the Panther files of four Chicago newspapers,
,TFor several months,” reported one researcher, "federal 
prosecutors obtained film clips and news files from news­
papers, magazines, television stations and networks, some­
times through subpoenas and other times simply by placing an 
unofficial request for the i n f o r m a t i o n ."27 Editorialists
nowere slow to protest, and even when it became apparent 
that the Caldwell case was but a snowflake in a flurry of 
subpoenas arising from coverage of political dissidents,
^ New York Times, Jan. 26, 1970, p. 1; Feb, 1, p. 24;
and Feb. 4, p. 1, cited in Kaplan, p. 739n.
2^New York Times, Feb. 1, 1970, p. 1, cited in Ervin,
p .  245, '
27Kaplan, p. 739.
28Ibid.
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influential voices urged caution.29 Broadcasting reported 
that television network executives intended to cooperate 
with the government unless it appeared that a "really solid" 
First Amendment issue was involved. 39
The subpoenas continued. By mid-1971, NBC and CBS and 
their affiliates had been served with a total of 121 sub­
poenas, the majority involving network coverage of mili­
tants.^ Field Enterprises was served with thirty. The New 
York Times, which had a history of only five subpoenas (for 
unpublished information) between 1964 and 1968, faced three 
in 1968, six in 1969, and twelve in 1970.32
Reaction of reporters was predictable. Two days after 
the Caldwell subpoena, the New York Times reported that Wall 
Street Journal reporters had petitioned their editors to re­
sist press subpoenas.33 Seventy black writers advertised in 
the Times to protest the government’s attempts to co-opt 
Caldwell.34
Then-Federal Communications Commission member Nicholas 
Johnson warned Nieman Fellows in Washington that freedom and
29Ibid.
39Broadcasting, Feb. 2, 1970, p. 55, cited in Kaplan, 
p. 740n.
31Ervin, p. 245.
32Ibid.
33New York Times, Feb. 4, 1970, p. 1, cited in Kaplan, 
p. 740n.
34James Aronson, Deadline for the Media (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merril Co., Inc., 1972) , pp. 27-28.
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integrity of the press were in serious danger and that the 
owners and operators of the media were contributing to their 
own peril by not refusing absolutely to comply with the sub- 
poenas.55
The Times itself wrote with restraint about the gov­
ernment's demands and volunteered that "this newspaper and 
all the mass media have the same duties as other organiza­
tions or individuals to cooperate in the processes of jus­
tice .
It was not the use, but the "misuse" of the govern-' 
ment's subpoena power that was causing problems, said the 
Times. Government demands for "blanket access to press 
files" will create the impression that the press is an arm 
of government investigatory powers, it said. "That danger 
is not eliminated even when subpoenas--such as the one 
served on a reporter for The Times [Caldwell]--are limited 
to demands for notes or tapes 'reflecting statements made
7?for p u b l i c a t i o n . W h i l e  the Times failed to make clear 
what would be acceptable, it indicated that subpoenas for 
"notes, files, film and other material" jeopardized the 
"line of separation" between government and the press, a 
line it said must be kept "unmistakable."38
^Ibid. , p . 26.
56New York Times, Feb. 4, 1970, p. 40.
37 Ibid.
Ibid.
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The Times * ambivalence about government subpoena 
power was reflected in its on-again, off-again support for 
Caldwell during his case's lengthy journey to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The first battle seemed suspiciously easy. 
When Caldwell protested the breadth of the subpoena, it was 
withdrawn. It was announced that another subpoena would be 
issued, merely requiring Caldwell to appear. At that point, 
the lawyers the Times had provided Caldwell felt compelled 
to contact the government's counsel to see if the information 
sought was "at all relevant;" apparently the Times1 views had 
then advanced from objecting to opening files, to demanding 
that any testimony have relevance to legitimate law en­
forcement efforts. The government replied that the grand
jury's intentions were none of Caldwell's business.^
In early April, Federal District Judge Alfonso J. Zi'r- 
poli denied a motion by Caldwell and the Times to quash the 
new subpoena. They had polished up the unsuccessful argu­
ments used in the Torre, Goodfader and Buchanan cases'^ but 
it had not worked. They had argued that enforcing such a 
broad subpoena would drive "a wedge of distrust" between 
Caldwell and the Panthers. The court should not permit "so 
drastic an incursion upon First Amendment freedoms," they 
said, "in the absence of a compelling governmental interest--
^Whalen, p. 87.
^Kaplan, p. 741.
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not shown here--in requiring Mr. Caldwell’s appearance."4^
But Judge Zirpoli refused to change the general rule: 
"Every person . . .  is bound to testify," he recited. Never­
theless, the District Court seized the Times' cue and for the 
first time recognized a First Amendment connection. Caldwell 
would have to divulge whatever information he had been given 
for publication, Zirpoli ordered, but he had a First Amendment 
privilege to withhold confidential information unless the gov­
ernment could show "a compelling and overriding national in­
terest . . . which cannot be served by any alternative 
means."42 Because the grand jury’s term had expired, most of 
the legal motions were repeated on both sides. Zirpoli again 
ordered Caldwell to testify before a grand jury, and he again 
allowed the reporter some protection. The Times announced 
that it was fully satisfied with the d e c i s i o n . A p p a r e n t l y  
the prosecutors were satisfied too; they did not appeal the 
protective order. They would be satisfied with Caldwell's 
appearance in the grand jury chamber.
However, Earl Caldwell was not satisfied. Given Zir- 
poli’s protective conditions, there was no need to appear, he 
reasoned, especially because even a silent appearance in se­
cret before the inquisitors would destroy his credibility as 
a reporter. When he therefore refused to appear, he was con-
Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, p. 676.
42Ibid., p. 678.
A X
' New York Tiiries, April 7, 1970, p. 44, cited in Kaplan, 
p. 742n.
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victed of contempt. Caldwell then petitioned the Ninth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals. The New York Times paid Caldwell's 
legal fees for the appeal but did not join in it.44 Managing 
editor A. M. Rosenthal explained, "We are not joining the ap­
peal because we feel that when a reporter refuses to authen­
ticate his story* the Times must, in a formal sense, step 
aside. Otherwise, some doubt may be cast on the'integrity- 
of Times news stories." Later, Times lawyers said they 
"didn’t want to risk” loss of the concessions granted by 
Judge Zirpoli, which had "carried the privilege . . . many 
steps further" than any previous decision.4**
In mid-November, the Court of Appeals decision in 
Caldwell’s favor was thoroughly unprecedented, the first 
to acknowledge constitutional validity to the press’ claim 
of privilege.4f* The court agreed with Caldwell's reasons 
for refusing to appear under the circumstances. It explained 
that "it is not the scope of the interrogation to which he 
must submit that is here at issue; it is whether he need at­
tend at all."47
In analyzing how the appeals court reached its decision 
in Caldwell's favor, it is important to note that the court
44Ibid.
45 S  .William J. Small, Political Power and the Pre~ss (New
York; W. W. Norton 5 Co., Inc., 197 2), p . 214.
4^Ervin, p. 253.
4^Caldwell v. United States, 434 F. 2d 1081 (9th Cir.
1970], reprinted in 1973 Senate Hearings, pp. 498-505.
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was affirming the existence of a limited ne ws-gathering right,
in Caldwell’s case one so fragile as to merit special protec-
4 8tion not generally available to reporters. Second, the 
court approached the issue of subpoenas for unpublished in­
formation as being an example of "otherwise permissible gov­
ernmental action noX-.direcXed at the regulation of speech and 
press." No consideration was given to the possibility that 
governmental subpoenas for information have more than inciden- 
'tal impact on First Amendment rights. Here we have an obvious 
conflict between competing "public interests," said the court, 
and so it bound itself by a long-standing Supreme Court rule:
Where, as here, the alleged abridgement of First 
Amendment interests occurs as a by-product of otherwise 
permissible governmental action not directed at the reg­
ulation of speech or press, "resolution of the issue al­
ways involves a balancing by the court of the competing 
private and public interests at stake in the particular 
circumstances shown." Barenblatt v. United States, 360 
U.S. 109, 126 (1959).49
The appeals court then proceeded to balancing the in­
terests and first weighed those supporting Caldwell:
The Government's statement is that First Amendment in­
terests in this area are adequately safeguarded as long 
as potential news makers do not cease using the media as 
vehicles for their communication with the public. But 
the First Amendment means more than that. It exists to 
preserve an "untrammeled press as a vital source of public 
information." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233, 250 (1936). Its objective is the maximization of the 
"spectrum of available knowledge," Grisxiold v. Connect!-
4 8The court said: "It is not every news source that
is as sensitive as the Black Panther Party . . .  It is not 
every reporter who so uniquely enjoys the trust and confi­
dence of his sensitive news source" (ibid., p. 504).
49Ibid., p. 498n.
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cut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). Thus, it is not enough 
that Black Panther press releases and public addresses 
by Panther leaders may continue unabated in the wake of 
subpoenas such as the one here in question. It is not 
enough that the public's knowledge of groups such as the 
Black Panthers should be confined to their deliberate 
public pronouncements or distant news accounts of their 
occasional dramatic forays into the public view.
The need for an untrammeled press takes on special ^  
urgency in times,of widespread.protest and dissent . . »
On the other hand, the court said”, ’’the Grand Jury does
not know what it wants from this witness, Although the
•grand jury has extensive powers of investigation, it said,
the Supreme Court long has ruled that investigatory bodies
may be restrained when they imperil First Amendment freedoms.
"The [Supreme] Court," the appeals court noted, "has required
the sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms only where a compel-
ling need for the particular testimony in question is demon- 
52strated."
Two First Amendment freedoms would be in jeopardy if 
Caldwell were not supported, the court said. One is that 
compelling testimony from reporters would induce self-censor- 
ship, all the more heinous if done unnecessarily. But by pre­
vious Supreme Court decisions the First Amendment guards 
against governmental action that induces self-censorship. 
Second, the court issued a ringing defense of "a measure" of 
press autonomy:
If the Grand Jury may require appellant [Caldwell]
50Ibid., pp. 499-500.
51Ibid,, p. 500.
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to make available to it information obtained by him in 
his capacity as a news gatherer, then the Grand Jury and 
the Department of Justice have the power to appropriate 
appellant's investigative efforts to their own behalf-- 
to convert him after the fact into an investigative agent 
of the Government. The very concept of a free press re­
quires that the news media be accorded a measure of au­
tonomy; that they should be free to pursue their own in­
vestigations to their own ends without fear of govern­
mental interference; and that they should be able to pro­
tect their investigative processes. To convert news 
gatherers into Department of Justice investigators is to 
invade the autonomy of the press by imposing a govern­
mental function on them. To do so where the result is 
to diminish their future capacity as news gatherers is 
destructive of their public function.5 To accomplish 
this where it has not been shoim to be essential to the 
Grand Jury inquiry simply cannot be justified in the
public interest.53
*>It is a paradox of the Government’s position that, 
if groups like the Black Panthers cease taking reporters 
like appellant into their confidence, these journalists 
will, in the future, be unable to' serve a public function 
either as news gatherers or as prosecution witnesses.
The appeals court was not sure what would constitute 
a "compelling need" to justify forced testimony, but it 
noted that Caldwell's lawyers had suggested at least three 
conditions the Government should have to meet: 1) reasonable
grounds to believe the reporter has information; 2) proof 
that the information is relevant to an identified crime; 
and 3) presenting evidence exhausting alternative sources 
less destructive of First Amendment interests.34
The appeals court thus was willing to accept the idea 
(offered by the press) of a qualified privilege, one approving 
of the government's subpoenaing a reporter and forcing his
53Ibid., p. 501. 
54Ibid., pp. 503-4.
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testimony after demonstrating "compelling need." The an­
nouncement was received with equanimity, if not enthusiasm. 
Press spokesmen, surveyed for their opinions on pending leg­
islation in Congress to protect reporters, adopted a "wait 
and see" attitude because the government was appealing the
55Caldwell decision--even if it was to a Nixon Supreme Court.
Earlier, at a news conference in the spring of 1971, 
President Nixon had announced possessing "a very jaundiced 
view" of subpoenaing reporters' notes unless "there was a 
major crime that had been committed and where the sub­
poenaing of the notes had to do with information dealing 
directly with that c r i m e . " ^ 6
A Field Foundation survey during 1971 found that re­
porters' anxieties "have greatly subsided as a result of the 
strong stand taken by the journalism profession and the ten­
tative victories in court."5? The surveyor found that many 
newsmen "would be happy to accede to more qualifications 
and exceptions if the probability were thereby increased that
the Supreme Court would recognize the basic principle of a
5 8newsman’s privilege."
^Ervin, p. 253. ANPA President Stanford Smith told a 
Senate subcommittee: "We suggest that the extent to which
. , . legislation will be needed can only be determined after 
the U.S. Supreme Court renders its decisions" ("ANPA State­
ment to Ervin Subcommittee on Freedom of the Press," ANPA 
General Bulletin, no. 49 [Oct. 12, 1971], p. 249).
^Ervin, p. 254.
57 Blasi, p. 283.
58,, . .Ibid.
CHAPTER VI
BRANZBURG: FROM COURT TO CONGRESS
Following the Supreme Court’s decision to review the
-rcases o£ Caldwell, Pappas and Branzburg, spokesmen for or­
ganized journalism groups were divided on their advice to the 
Court. Some began to see that even the court of appeals de­
cision left room for governmental co-opting of. the press for 
law enforcement; they argued therefore for an absolute testi­
monial privilege for newsmen and their information. The ab­
solutists included the American Newspaper Publishers Associa­
tion, the Washington Post, Newsweek, the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors (ASNE), Dow Jones and Co., Inc., and the 
journalism society, Sigma Delta Chi.
The ANPA's arguments to the Court were straightforward:
Nothing short of an absolute privilege, under the 
First Amendment, vested in professional newsmen to re­
fuse to testify before any tribunal about any informa­
tion or source of information derived as a result of 
their reportorial functions will create the certainty 
needed to generate confidence in their promises, whether 
express or implied, to preserve either a source’s anony­
mity or privacy, and thus guarantee the right of the pub­
lic to be fully informed. Moreover, without such a priv­
ilege, the history of independence and disassociation
^Supreme Court Reports, Book 402, p. 942. 
^Ervin, p. 254n.
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from government enjoyed by the Press, the necessity for 
which is obvious, will be s a c r i f i c e d . 3
Although a reporter’s right to gather news may be lim­
ited, the ANPA said, the right to insulate informers and 
sources must be absolute:
This privilege to honor confidentiality must be ab­
solute if it is to possess any value at all to soci­
ety. . . .
Unlike the abstract right to gather news which may 
be subject to narrow limitations and qualificiations, 
the right to protect a reporter’s sources can have no 
limitation or qualification. Although the privilege of 
confidentiality protects the right of the people to be 
fully and completely informed, the right to invoke this 
privilege must necessarily be vested in the ne\vrsman for 
only he is in a position to weigh the need for confi­
dentiality . ̂
Subpoenas "pierce the wall traditionally separating 
the press and government,” the ANPA said, and reluctant in­
formers will not be reassured by half-way protections:
The privilege must be absolute for without that certain­
ty an informer would be reluctant to confide in a re­
porter who could not honestly guarantee, without the 
risk of suffering a contempt penalty, the confidence of 
the relationship. . . .
In no way can a government more effectively stifle 
a free press than by intimidation of news sources which 
desire to remain anonymous. Attempts at prior restraint 
are necessarily open, visible and, therefore, can be pre­
vented while compulsory process for appearance at a se­
cret grand jury proceeding is more subtle. We can con­
ceive of no easier road for a government bent on tyranny 
to travel than the intimidation of newsmen and their 
sources of information.^
Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Newspaper Publishers 
Association, United States v. Caldwell, Brarizburg v .vHayes, 
and In re Pappas, U.S. Supreme Court, October Term, 1971,' 
Nos. 70-57; 70-85; 70-94, p. 4.
^Ibid., p . 8.
'’ibid. , p . 10 .
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ANPA's passionate defense notwithstanding, the New York 
Times headed a great list of those friends of the court "happy 
to accede" in a qualified reporters’ privilege; they basi­
cally supported what the appeals court had ruled in the 
Caldwell case. The Times was joined by the television net­
works, ABC, NBC and CBS; and the Chicago Sun-Times, the 
Chicago Daily News, the Associated Press Managing Editors
Association, the Associated Press Broadcasters Association, 
and the Association of American Publishers.^
We already have explored elements of the Supreme Court’s 
decision against Caldwell, Pappas and Branzburg. Announced on 
June 29, 1972, the five-to-four decision was absolutely 
against protecting reporters from subpoenas, and it denied 
that reporters' news-gathering rights were affect unconstitu­
tionally.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice 
Byron R. White, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
and Justices Harry A, Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist. Jus­
tice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., filed a brief concurring opinion 
suggesting that the majority view was not an authority to 
harass the press. Justice Potter Stewart dissented, in an 
opinion in which Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thur- 
good Marshall joined, They advocated use of the press only 
for legitimate, pressing needs of law enforcement. Justice 
William 0, Douglas filed the lone dissent advocating absolute
^Ervin, p. 254n.
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First Amendment privilege for journalists.
The Court majority was firm: forcing reporters to tes-»
tify in secret before grand juries presented no question of
censorship, prior restraint, or inhibition of freedom of the
7press. Sen. Samual J. Ervin summarized the decision of the 
maj ority:
The Court ruled that the first amendment did not enti­
tle a reporter to refuse to reveal the identity of his 
confidential sources to a grand jury. There was no 
testimonial privilege recognized or even hinted at, not 
even a qualified one. In the absence of statutory pro­
tection, newsmen were left to the mercy of prosecuting 
and defense attorneys. The balance had shifted, and 
the issue dropped into the lap of Congress.**
Let us pass over the skimpy news coverage of the Su­
preme Court's landmark denial of privilege for reporters^ 
and check the editorial reaction, best characterized as 
lamentation. Arthur 0. Sulzberger, publisher of the Times, 
said the decision "now makes it imperative that Congress 
and those state legislatures that have not yet acted pass 
laws that would give the necessary protection . . . vital to 
a free press and the public."^ The Los Angeles Times said 
the Court had dealt "a heavy blow at the independence of the
7Kaplan, p. 749.
^Ervin, p. 255.
QA point covered in Norman E. Isaacs, "Beyond the Cald­
well Decision: There May Be Worse to Come from This Court," 
Columbia Journalism Review, September-October 1972, reprinted 
in 1973 Senate Hearings, pp. 618-622.
^ N e w  York Times, June 30, 1972, p. 1.
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press."11 The Washington Star said that Branzburg would 
’’automatically inhibit the whole process of newsgather- 
ing."12 Chicago Sun-Times said ’’the people's right to
a free press has been i m p a i r e d . t 0 the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors, Branzburg was ”a direct blow at the 
right of the people to be fully informed without hindrance 
by the government." Sigma Delta Chi expressed disappoint­
ment and apprehension.^
To NBC News president Richard C. Wald, the Branzburg 
decision was a bombshell. "I and many other newsmen assumed 
that the first amendment protected the press from compulsory 
testimony," Wald said later in Congress. "We were told that 
a developing trend of court decisions tended to uphold this 
protection. Then came the Caldwell decision.
To say nothing of Wald's understanding of the relevant
•^Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1972, p. E-2, cited in 
Ervin, p. 255n.
•^Washington Star, July 3, 1972, p. A-10, cited ibid.
13Chicago Sun-Times, July 2, 1972, p. 11, cited ibid.
•^"Branzburg, Caldwell § Pappas Cases," University of 
Missouri Freedom of Information Center Report, no. 321 (May
1974), p. 3.
•^1973 Senate Hearings, p. 294.
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h i s t o r y , s h o u l d  he have been surprised? What did Branzburg
v. Hayes decide?
It will be helpful to examine the disarming ease with
which the Court majority disposed of what it called "the
claimed invasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by
1 7the [forced] disclosure" of unpublished information.
First, according to the Court, the subpoena is another
instance of "incidental burdening" of the press when govern-
18ment enforces laws in the public interest. Second, the ham­
pering of news gathering is standard procedure in government; 
the press is "regularly excluded" from grand jury rooms, 
court chambers, executive sessions, private meetings, scenes 
of disaster and controversial trials.*9 Third, the public in­
terest in effective law enforcement easily outweighs the "con­
sequential, but uncertain" impact on news gathering effected 
by press subpoenas, said the Court, especially because "the 
vast bulk of confidential relations between reporters and 
their sources" are unaffected:20
*^Sigma Delta Chi president William C. Payette said in 
public in 1973:
"What we are talking about is getting back to what we 
had. We. talk about absolute shield versus qualified shield. 
For 200 years we have had an absolute shield. We have had 
absolute unabridged freedom of the press for 200 years. In 
the past few months [since Branzburg] this has been changed" 
(1973 Senate Hearings, p. 304).
^ Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, p. 680.
18Ibid., p. 682.
19Ibid., pp. 684-85.
^9Ibid., p. 691.
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Only where news sources themselves are implicated in 
crime or possess information relevant to the grand jury’s 
task need they or the reporter be concerned about grand 
jury subpoenas. . . .
The preference for anonymity of those confidential 
informants involved in actual criminal conduct is pre­
sumably a product of their desire to escape criminal pro­
secution, and this preference . . .  is hardly deserving 
of constitutional protection.21
Fourth, even \\rhen the source is "not engaged-in crim­
inal conduct but has information suggesting illegal conduct 
by others," said the Court, there is no demonstrable evidence
that the free flow of news would be deterred by giving the
7 ?government the power to unmask informers. Any group like
the Black Panthers relies on the press "to propagate its
views, publicize its aims and magnify its exposure to the
public;" therefore the threat of subpoena is unlikely to be
7 \ -a hindrance, the Court said. Good citizens put their trust
in the proper authorities anyway, said Justice White:
Law enforcement officers are themselves experienced in 
dealing with informers, and have their own methods for 
protecting them without interference with the effective 
administration of justice. There is little before us 
indicating that informants whose interest in avoiding 
exposure is that it may threaten job security, personal
21Ibid.
7 7Ibid., p. 693. In his dissent, Justice Douglas re­
marked how inconsistent Justice White was here:
"The majority need look no further than its holdings that 
prosecutors need not disclose informers’ names because 
disclosure would (a) terminate the usefulness of an ex­
posed informant inasmuch as others would no longer confide- 
in him, and (b) it would generally inhibit persons from be­
coming confidential informers. McCray v. Illinois, 386 
U.S. 300; Scher v. United States, 305 U. S."~25l; cT. Ro- 
viaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53" (ibid., p. 723nJT
23Ibid., pp. 694-95.
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safety, or peace of mind, would in fact be in a worse 
position, or would think they w^ould be, if they risked 
placing their trust in public officials as well as re­
porters. We doubt if the informer who prefers anony­
mity but is sincerely interested in furnishing evidence 
of crime will always or very often be deterred by the 
prospect of dealing with those public authorities char­
acteristically charged with the duty to protect the 
public interest as well as his.24
As for the remaining informers, those deterred "for v/hat-
2ever reason," the Court was willing not to hear from them.
Thus the Court found it easy to conclude that press 
subpoenas impinge on no legitimate First Amendment right, 
certainly not one that calls on the government to demon­
strate "compelling need" for the newsman's testimony be­
fore issuing the subpoena, as Caldwell would have accept- 
ed.26
But was the minority view, which sided with NBC's 
Richard Wald and the Sun-Times, New York Times and other 
of the.press' most influential voices, qualitatively dif­
ferent? Speaking for the dissenters, Justice Potter 
Stewart, who wrote the Garland v. Torre opinion, accused 
the majority of undermining the "historic independence of 
the press by attempting to annex the journalistic profes­
sion as an investigative arm of government."22 The free 
flow of information, an important public interest, implies
24Ibid., p. 695.
25Ibid.
26Ibid., p. 708.
27Ibid., p. 725.
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7 Ra right "of some dimensions" to gather news, Stewart said.
As in Talley v. California, he noted, "the First Amendment 
concern must not be with the motives of any particular news 
source, but rather with the conditions in which informants 
of all shades of the spectrum may make information avail­
able. "29 Sources made vulnerable through press subpoenas 
"can never be sure" they will not'be unmasked, and reporters 
will be hesitant to deal with controversial news.2*9 While 
the deterrent effect is not provable "with scientific pre­
cision," Stewart said, "we have never before demanded that 
First Amendment rights rest on elaborate empirical studies. 
Some deterrence is inevitable, he added. As the appeals court 
noted, First Amendment safeguards applied against other gov­
ernmental investigations are appropriate to the grand jury’s
32work too, Stewart said. The "unrestrained use of the grand
jury's subpoena power" is not acceptable, he concluded.
"This is not to say," Stevjart cautioned, "that a grand
33jury could not issue a subpoena." Subpoenas may issue 
against reporters for their information, he explained. Once
28Ibid., p. 728.
29Ibid. , p. 730.
30Ibid., p. 731.
31Ibid., p. 733.
32Ibid., p. 741.
33Ibid., p. 743.
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in the grand jury room, reporters should be privileged to 
retain "confidences" unless the government can show a clear 
need of them for solving any "specific, probable violation
of law.”34
In sum, Justice Stewart was not rejecting the majority’s 
decision to "annex-t^he" journral±si;fw pTTofession" as” an” investi­
gative arm;" he was rejecting its "simplistic and stultifying 
absolutism . . .  in denying any force to the First Amend­
m ent."^ Both the majority and the minority, and the influen­
tial press voices not supporting an absolute ban on subpoenas 
of the press, supported the notion that the press is a legit­
imate tool of government for investigative law enforcement. 
This always has been the government's position through his­
tory, even before Constitutional safeguards for our liberty 
were adopted.
No statement in Branzburg more clearly points to the 
necessity for a political solution to the problem of this 
abuse of liberty than the Court’s expression of reluctance 
to embroil itself in a test, suggested by Justice Stewart 
(and the New York Times), concerning the conditions neces­
sary to overcome First Amendment values and issue the sub­
poena:
. . . by considering whether enforcement of a parti­
cular law served a "compelling" governmental interest, 
the courts would be inextricably involved in distin­
guishing between the value of enforcing different crim-
34Ibid.
35Ibid., p. 746.
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inal laws. By requiring testimony from a reporter in 
investigations involving some crimes but not in others, 
they would be making a value judgment that a legislature 
had declined to make, since in each case the criminal 
law involved would represent a considered legislative 
judgment, not constitutionally suspect, of what conduct 
is liable to criminal prosecution. The task of judges, 
like other officials outside the legislative..branch, is 
not to make the law but to uphold it in accordance with 
their oaths.36
Even under these conditions, the Court could have justified 
excusing all reporters from forced testimony, but it shied 
.completely away from value judgments and approved such forced 
testimony in all grand-jury investigations, ’'compelling need" 
shown or not.
The approach of the entire Court (save Douglas) on the 
basic question of using the press for law enforcement is easy 
to characterize. Examine its reaction to the question asked 
by the United States when it petitioned the Supreme Court for 
reversal of Caldwell's appeals court "victory." According to 
the Court:
The petition presented a single question: "Whether a
newspaper reporter who has published articles about an or­
ganization can, under the First Amendment, properly re­
fuse to appear before a grand jury investigating possible 
crimes by members of that organization who have been quot­
ed in published articles."3?
The Branzburg majority, of course, answered "no." The Court 
minority (save Douglas) said "yes,” but only until the govern­
ment demonstrates some degree of necessity. The best that 
could be hoped for in any Supreme Court decision on the matter
36Ibid., p. 706.
37Ibid., p. 679n.
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would be an assurance that the government would not be per­
mitted to use the press as an investigatory tool except when 
it needed to, as the appeals court had ruled when it shielded 
Caldwell.
Branzburg, Pappas and Caldwell did not claim an abso­
lute privilege; only-briefs filed.by .friends, of- the_ court. did. 
so. The assertions of the eight Justices who sided in prin­
ciple with the New York Times and other influential press 
voices merely confirmed the view continuously held by the gov­
ernment since the beginning of the debate. Justice William 0. 
Douglas knew this when he alone, among the case's principals, 
pleaded for preservation of the press' "preferred position in 
our constitutional scheme."38 if he could understand the 
Court majority's viewpoint, he could not understand what the 
press' influential voices had done:
The New York Times, whose reporting functions are at is­
sue here, takes the amazing position that First Amend­
ment rights are to be balanced against the needs and 
conveniences of the government. My belief is that all 
of the "balancing" was done by those who wrote the Bill 
of Rights. By casting the First Amendment in absolute 
terms, they repudiated the timid, watered-down, emascu­
lated versions of the First Amendment which both the 
Government and the New York Times advanced in this case.
As Justice White said in the majority opinion, "only 
where news sources themselves are implicated in crime or pos­
sess information relevant to the grand jury's task need they 
or the reporter be concerned about grand jury subpoenas."
38Ibid., p. 721.
39Ibid., p. 713.
A substantial part of the majority opinion was devoted to 
exploring the implications of reporters’ knowledge of crimes. 
Justice White began the discussion by implying strongly that 
the subpoena, in issuing to a reporter with knowledge of a 
crime, is a restraint against "wrong-doing" by the report,er,4G 
presumably failure to report the crime to the police:
Thus, we cannot seriously entertain the notion that 
the First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to con­
ceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence 
thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about 
crime than to do something about it. Insofar as any re­
porter in these cases undertook not to reveal or testify 
about the crime he witnessed, his claim of privilege un­
der the First Amendment presents no substantial question. 
The crimes of news sources are no less reprehensible and 
threatening to the public interest when witnessed by a 
reporter than when they are not.41
" I t  is obvious," he went on, "that agreements to conceal
information relevant to the commission of a crime have very
little to recommend them from the standpoint of public pol- 
A?icy." According to common law, Justice White said, citizens 
have a duty to raise a "hue and cry" and report felonies to 
the a u t h o r i t i e s : 4 3  "Misprision of a felony--that is, t h e  
concealment of a felony 'which a man knows, but never assented 
to . . . [so as to become] either principal or accessory,' 4 
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *121, was often said to be a com-
4GIbid., p. 692.
42Ibid. , p. 696.
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mon-law crime.” In fact misprision of felony was declared 
a federal crime in the first Congress, and so he cited the 
statute to emphasize the point:
"Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission 
of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, 
conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the 
same to some judge or other person in civil or military
authority under~-t*hUrdrted~S t a t esy: s hai i ber~;[gurlty o~fr
m i s p r i s i o n ] I S  U. S-.-G~t- See.- 4—  . Such-'-conduct [he.
continued] deserves no encomium, and we decline now to 
afford it First Amendment protection by denigrating the 
duty of a citizen, whether reporter or informer, to re­
spond to grand jury subpoena and answer relevant ques­
tions put to him.44
Those reading the Branzburg opinion would do well to 
move carefully in this section so as not to miss a very im­
portant point about misprision of felony. In a footnote re­
garding that section . of the laxv, Justice White said: "This
statute has been construed, however, to require both know­
ledge of a crime and some affirmative act of concealment or 
participation."45
Clearly, then, a case could be constructed that a re­
porter witnessing a felony and writing about it commits no 
crime unless he actively participates in it. Even then, the 
Fifth Amendment may protect him.
Justice Douglas recognized the latter point when he 
dissented from the opinions of the other eight Justices:
It is my view that there is no "compelling need" that 
can be shown which qualifies the reporter's immunity from 
appearing or testifying before a grand jury, unless the 
reporter himself is implicated in a crime. His immunity
44ibid., pp. 696-97 (footnote omitted).
45Ibid., p. 696n.
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in my view is therefore quite complete, for, absent his 
involvement in a crime, the First Amendment protects him 
against an appearance before the grand jury and if he is 
involved in a crime, the Fifth Amendment stands as a bar­
rier. 6
The notion that the press should be granted its right 
to withhold information that the government could use against 
the ci ti z enry reminded'.' Justice. Whlte-.-o.f -. the— righ.t_. to. "pr int. . 
or withhold" claimed by the press in the Associated Press v. 
United States: "The right to withhold news is not equiv­
alent to a First Amendment exemption from the ordinary duty 
of all other citizens to furnish relevant information to a 
grand jury performing an important public function." As 
in the case against the AP, he said, "private restraints on 
the flow of information are not so favored by the First 
Amendment that they override all other public interests."4  ̂
Granting the claimed privilege would be a Court sanction 
for a conspiracy "beyond legislative or judicial control," 
an attempt to erect
a private system of informers operated by the press to 
report on criminal conduct, a system that would be un­
accountable to the public, would pose a threat to the 
citizen's justifiable expectations of privacy, and would 
equally protect well-intentioned informants and those 
who for pay or otherwise betray their trust to their em­
ployer or associates.48
Justice Douglas based his general conclusions in fa­
vor of absolute reporters' immunity on a variation of the 
personal-rights claim advanced by so many reporters, unsuc­
46Ibid., p. 712.
47Ibid., p. 697.
48Ibid.
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cessfully, since the mid-nineteenth century. If government 
is to remain subordinate to the people, he said, people must 
have absolute freedom and privacy in their individual opin­
ions and beliefs. An individual, therefore, "must also have 
privacy over whatever information he may generate in the 
course of testing his opinions and beliefs."49 In uphold­
ing this right to privacy, Justice Douglas said the fact 
that Caldwell was a reporter "is less relevant than is his 
status as a student who affirmatively pursued empirical re­
search to enlarge his own intellectual v i e w p o i n t Com­
bined with the notion that the people must have an "uncen­
sored floxv of opinion and reporting" for effective self-gov-
Meminent, the two principles lend a constitutionally pro­
tected status to Caldwell and all other reporters, Justice 
Douglas said.
Subpoenas to testify infringe not only on security of 
belief and ideology, he added, but also on the right of pri­
vacy of association. Court precedents doubtless prohibit 
bringing a person before a grand jury for "the sole purpose 
of exposing his political beliefs," said Justice Douglas, yet 
upholding the Caldwell subpoena "effectively permits that re­
sult under the guise of allowing an attempt to elicit from
49Ibid., p. 714.
^9Ibid., pp. 714-15.
51Ibid., p. 715.
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him 'factual information.'"32 Furthermore, rights of the
whole society are endangered when the inquisition is against
a reporter, who
is no better than his source of information. Unless he 
has a privilege to withhold the identity of his source, 
he will be the victim of governmental intrigue or ag­
gression. If he can be summoned to testify in secret be­
fore a grand jury, his sources will dry up and the at­
tempted exposure, the effort to enlighten 'the public, 
will be ended. If what the Court sanctions today becomes 
settled law, then the reporter's main function in Amer­
ican society will be to pass on to the public the press 
releases which the various departments of government is­
sue. 53
Justice Douglas was grim about the ultimate result of 
this "clog upon news gathering":
The intrusion of government into this domain is symp­
tomatic of the disease of this society. As the years 
pass the power of government becomes more and more per­
vasive. It is a power to suffocate both people and 
causes. Those in power, whatever their politics, want 
only to perpetuate it. Now that the fences of the law 
and the tradition that has protected the press are broken 
down, the people are the victims. The First Amendment, 
as I read it, was designed precisely to prevent that 
tragedy.34
52Ibid. , p. 719 
53Ibid., p. 722. 
54Ibid., pp. 724-25.
CHAPTER ¥11
IN CONGRESS: THE BRANZBURG EXCEPTION
The day after the Branzburg decision Sen. Alan Cran­
ston (formerly a wire-service correspondent) introduced a 
bill to provide absolute testimonial privilege for repor­
ters in all federal and state legal proceedings. It was the 
first of many reporters' privilege bills introduced in 1972 
during the last quarter of the Ninety-second Congress.^ 
Cranston's bill, and an identical one in the House spon­
sored by Rep. Jerome Waldie, was drafted to protect from sub­
poena "the source of any information procured for publication
7or broadcast." Soon, a group known in Washington as the 
Joint Media Committee, apparently after a.long period of inac-
3tion, revived itself to draft some legislation. Columbia 
Broadcasting System vice-president William J. Small then was 
chairman of the committee, which in one report was said to in­
clude representatives of the American Society of Newspaper Ed­
itors (ASNE), the Associated Press Managing Editors Associa-
■^Ervin, pp. 255-56.
2Arlie Schardt, "Press Freedom--A Turning Point," Civil 
Liberties, December 1972, p. 3.
■^Ervin, p. 256.
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tion, Sigma Delta Chi, and the National Press Photographers 
4Association, The group agreed to draft and support hills 
introduced by Sen. Walter Mondale on August 17 and Rep.
Charles Whalen on September 5. (This study failed to dis­
cover a record of the Joint Media Committee's deliberations.) 
The Mondale-Whalen bills were "qualified;" they established 
exclusive conditions under which reporters would be compelled 
by the government to reveal sources and information..
By August 18 in Washington, the American Newspaper Pub­
lishers Association (ANPA) had decided that the ostensible 
press support of a qualified privilege bill was intolerable. 
ANPA General Counsel Arthur B. Hanson arranged a conference 
of lawyers who had been involved or interested in the Caldwell, 
Branzburg and Pappas cases to find a consensus among what the 
ANPA politely called "divergent views" in the press.^ This 
new press group, the Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee, originally 
included the ASNE, Sigma Delta Chi, the National Association of 
Broadcasters, National Broadcasting Co. (NBC), Columbia Broad­
casting System (CBS), the Radio-Television News Directors As­
sociation, the Newspaper Guild labor union, the Association of 
American Publishers (book publishers), the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press,^ the American Civil Liberties Union,
4Ibid.
51973 House Hearings, p. 253.
^Describing itself as "the only legal research and de­
fense fund organization in the nation exclusively devoted to 
protecting the First Amendment and the freedom of information 
interests of the working press in all media," the Reporters
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and the organizations involved in the three cases consolidated 
in Branzburg. The group met at least a dozen times during 
the fall and surfaced after Christmas with a bill (which the 
ANPA specifically endorsed) to have introduced in both Houses
Oof the Ninety-third Congress.
Meanwhile, the lame-duck House, in a Judiciary subcom­
mittee headed by Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, held hearings in 
late September and early October on the twenty or so post- 
Branzburg bills still in contention, most of which would es­
tablish qualifications under which reporters would be com- '
9pelled to reveal sources. Whalen's bill, still supported by 
the Joint Media Committee, received most of the attention.
It would have provided broad immunity from disclosure but 
with two significant exceptions: disclosure of sources in a
libel suit when the source of the libel was in question; and 
disclosure of sources in any case where a hearing showed that 
the source probably had information about a specific crime,
Committee has headquarters in Washington, D.C. It was formed 
in an open meeting at Georgetown University in March 1970, in 
response to the burgeoning threat of subpoenas against news­
men by the U.S. Department of Justice (more than 150 subpoenas 
to print and broadcast media in eighteen months). With a 
yearly budget of $60,000 (1974 figure), the Reporters Commit­
tee publishes the Press Censorship Newsletter (circ. 4,000) 
twice a year (now The News § The Law eight times yearly) and 
furnishes legal and financial assistance to threatened repor­
ters (Martin Arnold, "Group Aids Defense of Reporters on Sub­
poena and 'Gag' Orders by Judges," New York Times, Dec. 18, 
1974, p. 19).
^1973 House Hearings, p. 253.
8Ibid.
9Ervin, p. 256n.
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that the information was unavailable elsewhere, and that 
there was a "compelling national interest in the informa­
tion."^-®
Richard W. Jencks, vice-president of CBS at its Wash­
ington Bureau, testified for the Joint Media Committee in 
favor of the Whalen bill. "We recognize that, in some extreme 
situations, a party should, by making a proper showing to a 
court, be able to compel the production of information or the 
source thereof" from the press, Jencks said.*"*'
Several witnesses opposed the Whalen bill. Sen Cran­
ston said qualified protection could "open the door to loop­
holes . . . governmental abuse and repressive restrictions.”-^ 
An ACLU spokesman said anything less than an unqualified priv­
ilege would insufficiently protect the public’s right to 
1 ̂know. Charles Perlik, Jr., president of the Newspaper 
Guild, said the right of reporters to protect unpublished in­
formation is absolute and should be recognized as such by Con­
gress. *4 Assistant Attorney General Roger Cramton opposed all 
privilege laws. He said only nine subpoenas had been issued 
to newsmen by federal prosecutors since the Justice Department
***Schardt, p. 3.
*^"Demand for Absolute Privilege Marks Final Hearings on 
News Protection," Criminal Law Reporter 12 (Nov. 8, 1972): 
2126.
12Ibid., p. 2127.
13Ibid.
14Ibid., p. 2128.
130
had drafted guidelines in 1970 to limit subpoenas of repor­
ters.^ Said Cramton, as an internal policy of the Attorney 
General's office, the guidelines furnished adequate protec-
Attorney General John N. Mitchell announced the guide­
lines on Feb. 5, 1970, a few days after the Caldwell subpoena. 
Henceforth, he said at the time, "no subpoenas -wi 11 be issued 
without a good faith attempt by the department [of Justice] to 
reach a compromise acceptable to both parties prior to the is­
suance of the subpoena" (New York Times, Feb. 6, 1970, p. 1). 
The Times rather implausibly surmised that Mitchell "recog- 
nized he might not fare so well" in the courts if the rash of 
subpoenas were tested against the claimed privilege of repor­
ters. "But the issue has not been significantly tested in the 
courts because many news organizations have been equally unwil­
ling to risk defeat," the Times admitted. Government lawyers 
were quoted as saying that basic policy had always been the 
same; that reporters were always subpoenaed as a last resort: 
"If denied, they say, they have often retreated. If shown 
some cooperation, they have at times served subpoenas to dem­
onstrate that the reporter was testifying under duress."
The two-decade-old practice of reporters asking to be 
subpoenaed to disguise their collaboration with prosecutors 
against the citizenry is worthy of research much more exten­
sive than that presented here. But it began, the Times re­
vealed, as the press' idea:
". . . i n  recent years . . . notably in civil rights 
cases in the South and the case against Chicago policemen 
arising out of the riots at the 1968 Democratic National 
Convention, reporters are said to have agreed in informal 
discussion with Federal attorneys to supply unpublished 
film and notes under narrowly drawn subpoenas that pro­
tected the names of their sources and other confidential 
material."
The Times said Mitchell "contends that the recent round 
of subpoenas served on The New York Times, C.B.S., Time and 
Newsweek, were meant to be in that pattern;" the mistake as 
Mitchell saw it being the failure to "negotiate" for informa­
tion that the press traditionally would have' been willing to 
part with. The Times writer seemed to be relieved at the ap­
parent change of heart: before Mitchell's "retreat," the
Times reported, "some newsmen and executives suspected" the 
government of intentionally breaking tradition because it 
wished to isolate the Panthers from society by cutting off 
some of their publicity:
"Some Government officials, in turn, privately charged 
that some newsmen were departing from their own custom, 
having offered cooperation when it suited them in civil 
rights cases and resisting it now out of partial sympathy 
for the Panthers in their contest with the police.
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"There is now evident on both sides, however, a desire 
to avoid confrontation in the courts, to reaffirm the tra­
dition of special ad hoc handling of reporters and to leave 
unresolved some of the difficult questions of law" (Max 
Frankel, "Mitchell and Press Problems," New York Times,
Feb. 6, 1970 , p. 40).
The new guidelines were merely policy, directing U.S. 
Attorneys to negotiate subpoenas only when necessary and have 
them approved expressly by the Attorney General’s office. On 
Oct. 26, 1973, Attorney General Elliot Richardson added the 
requirement of personal approval by the Attorney General be­
fore any reporter could be questioned, subpoenaed, arrested 
or indicted by the federal government except under "exigent 
circumstances" ("Justice Department Announces New Press Sub­
poena Guidelines," Press Censorship Newsletter, no. Ill [No- 
vember-December 1973] , p. 21). It has never been clear 
whether all reporters, including freelancers and staff of 
underground newspapers, are entitled to the privilege; the 
guidelines don’t talk about it. In any case, in "emergencies 
and unusual situations," a prosecutor can bypass them.
During the 1972-*75 period that Congress considered re­
porters’ testimonial immunity in earnest, the efficacy of the 
guidelines was a point constantly in dispute, as was their 
propriety in theory. The guidelines could be adhered to or 
not, as the prosecutors saw fit, and in any case did not af­
fect the actions of officers of the judiciary or state offi­
cials. In 1973, the Administration told Congress that its law­
yers had
"requested issuance of subpoenas to newsmen in thirteen 
situations since the Guidelines went into effect in Au­
gust, 1970. In eleven of the thirteen situations the 
newsmen agreed to testify or to produce documents but pre­
ferred the formal issuance of a subpoena" (1973 House 
Hearings, p. 579).
In 197 5, the frequency had risen to fifty-four subpoenas ap­
proved under the guidelines since 1973, involving 109 journal­
ists. In forty-two of the fifty-four situations, newsmen had 
agreed to provide the requested information but had requested 
that a subpoena be issued first, apparently because it somehow 
looked better. The government spokesman said such requests 
were "becoming a common professional practice for newsmen who 
are willing to testify." Twenty-two subpoenas were issued 
without the Attorney General's approval, he added, by U.S. At­
torneys who did not "appreciate" the long-standing require­
ments ("Justice Dept Issues 76 Subpoenas to Press in Past Two 
Years: 29 Percent of Subpoenas Violate Guidelines," Press Cen­
sorship Newsletter, no. VIII [October-November 197 5], p. 35*77 
Between May 1975 and November 1976, forty-two more federal 
subpoenas were served, thirty-six requested in advance by the 
news organizations. Three were not approved in advance as re­
quired (Testimony of the Reporters Committee before the Subcom­
mittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, delivered
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tion against misuse of governmental subpoena power. ANPA 
president Stanford Smith emphasized that his organization 
"refrained from endorsing any of the numerous pending legis­
lative proposals" because "we now see that the complexities
of the matter are very great and must be examined with extreme
17care." He did not specify opposition to the Whalen bill.
The ACLU, which was observing the proceedings, was dis­
turbed about the record being assembled:
Ironically, however--and this may either be a reflec­
tion of the degree to which the media have been intimi­
dated, or a reflection of the actual willingness of the 
media to invest in vigorous (and expensive) investigative 
reporting--most of the media who have been heard from so 
far have opted for laws that would actually give them 
less latitude than they had before. Upcoming hearings, 
however, are expected to hear more from working repor­
ters, rather than the management types who characterized 
much of the first session.
One' of the working reporters who had been scheduled to 
testify that fall was New Jersey newsman Peter Bridge, who be­
came the first pos t-Branzburg reporter-celebrity by having to 
surrender himself to jail for contempt on the day he was to
by Jack C. Landau, June 1, 1977 [The Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Room 1112, 
Washington, D.C. 20006], p. 34). Currently, the guidlines are 
enforced by Attorney General Griffin Bell who has no plans to 
change them. They have been published as Department of Jus­
tice Order No. 544-73 and are posted in the Code of Federal 
Regulations 28: Sec. 50.10.
•^■-Schardt, p. 3.
17 . ."ANPA Statement on Newsman's Privilege," ANPA General
Bulletin, no. 50 (Sept. 28, 1972), p. 221.
-^Schardt, p. 3.
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testify in Congress.^ Earlier in 1972, Bridge was reporting 
for the soon-to-fold Newark' News. Filling in for another re­
porter, Bridge rather off-handedly interviewed Pearl Beatty, 
the mayor's appointee to the Newark Housing Authority. There 
was to be a crucial vote, and the mayor already had alleged 
that "organized criminal elements" were trying to influence 
the housing authority. Reporter Bridge quoted Mrs. Beatty:
"A man walked into my office and offered me $10,000 if I 
would vote for 'their' choice for executive director." She 
had notified the U.S. Attorney of the bribe attempt, Bridge 
reported. A special grand jury quizzed Mrs. Beatty about it, 
but she claimed that the news had been distorted. She also 
rebutted two other versions attributed to her. The prosecu­
tor subpoenaed Bridge; he complied, but then refused to answer
questions about unpublished information (besides, he had taken 
20no notes). When cited for contempt, Bridge invoked the Con­
stitution and the New Jersey shield law, which at that time 
gave newspaper workers "a privilege to refuse to disclose the 
source, author, means, agency or person from or through whom
any information published . . . was procured," except when
71"any part of the privileged matter" had been disclosed. A 
judge dismissed both arguments, saying Bridge had automati-
^■^"Demand for Absolute Privilege Marks-Final Hearings,"
p. 2126.
2 f)Details of the Bridge case are taken from "Who's Hob­
bling the Press?" in New Republic, Dec. 16, 1972, reprinted 
in 1973 Senate Hearings, pp. 650-52.
21Whalen, p. 99.
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cally waived his statutory immunity by naming Mrs. Beatty in 
? ?the story. The case--and Bridge's twenty.days in jail--re- 
ceived wide press coverage and prompted the New Jersey legis­
lature to amend the shield law to protect information as well
23as sources, and reporters even after they leave journalism.
A month after the Kastenmeier hearings, another repor­
ter, William T. Farr, also went to jail after a state court 
applied an existing shield law and found a loophole. While 
working for the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner in 1970, Farr ob­
tained and printed the bizarre contents of a witness* state­
ment to police in connection with the Charles Manson murder 
trial then in progress. It was evident to all that a court 
officer--possibly one of the lawyers--had leaked the informa­
tion to Farr contrary to the judge's orders, but Farr would 
not say and could not be forced to because of California's 
shield law. But the shield applied only to working reporters 
at the time, and after Farr left the paper the judge demanded 
to know who had leaked. Following his lawyer's advice, Farr 
conceded that it had been two of the six lawyers. But each 
of them when questioned by the judge denied it. The infuri­
ated judge vowed to find the perjurer and sentenced Farr to an 
indefinite jail term for civil contempt. After forty-six days 
in jail, he was released pending appeal, but not before the 
judge made it clear that if Farr lost the appeal he would be
22Ibid.
^Kaplan, p. 762.
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’’going back for years, not days.”^
Despite grumblings that Bridge and Farr had behaved 
irresponsibly and were not good cases to show Congress,^ 
these and other c a s e s ^ b  convinced many in the press to rally 
behind an absolute, unqualified federal statute. Resolutions 
calling for enactment of an absolute privilege were passed by 
the A S N E ^  and Sigma Delta Chi (both members of the Joint 
Media Committee) in November, and by the Radio-Television News
241973 House Hearings, p. 340. Other details of the 
Farr case are taken from 197 5 Senate Hearings, pp. 650-52.
In upholding the contempt citation against Farr, the Cali­
fornia Supreme Court not only rejected his arguments, but 
stated its opinion that to allow a statutory privilege in 
any such situation would constitute unconstitutional usurpa­
tion of the judicial function by the legislative branch (22 
Ca. App. 3d, at 69; 99 Cal. Rptre. at 343 [1972], cited in 
Ervin, p. 260n). The California legislature considerably 
strengthened the statutory immunity for reporters in the 
wake of the Farr case, but it couldn’t do much about what 
the state Supreme Court had said. In mid-1977, however, the 
state Assembly passed and sent to the Senate a proposed amend­
ment to the California constitution (ACA No. 4), to be refer­
red to a popular vote if it could clear the houses. The 
amendment essentially would incorporate the California shield 
law into the constitution to prevent the judiciary from over­
turning it in a Farr case or one like that of the "Fresno 
Four,” staff members of the Fresno Bee who revealed in a 1975 
story information in a grand jury transcript. California 
newspaper publishers refused to support the amendment, arguing 
that it was not necessary for most newspaper work, would never­
theless be vulnerable to challenge under the U.S. Constitu-' 
tion’s Fourteenth Amendment, and could fail and thereby weaken 
the existing statute (Telephone interview with Michael B. Dor- 
aise, legislative representative, California Newspaper Pub­
lishers Association, July 19, 1977).
^^1975 Senate Hearings, pp. 650-52.
^ S e e  Ervin, p. 258n.
^President Nixon on Nov. 4 sent a highly publicized 
letter to the ASNE announcing his opposition to a federal 
shield law "at this time" (ibid., p. 259).
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9 RDirectors Association and the ANPA in December. Editor § 
Publisher was alarmed. "The record of contempt cases against 
reporters for refusing to divulge their confidential sources 
is becoming frightening," it said. "Grand juries, judges, 
and legislative committees are using the contempt power reck­
lessly. "29 a  few weeks later, it was reported that a dozen
journalists were facing pressure to cooperate in investiga-
30tions around the country. Meanwhile, the Joint Media Com­
mittee found that the Mondale-Whalen qualified-privilege bill 
it had drafted no longer could command a majority vote of its 
members. On December 11, 1972, it declared:
[E]vents have added new emphasis to the need for legis­
lative relief. Peter Bridge of New Jersey and William 
Farr of California have been jailed for refusing to sub­
mit to questioning. Other cases have surfaced in recent 
months. Various journalism organizations have reacted 
strongly to the continuing abuse of the First Amendment.
Only a week earlier, a Gallup poll showed that 57 per­
cent of 1,462 persons interviewed thought reporters should 
not be forced to reveal confidential sources of news stories. 
Many explained their reasons in terms of the right to know; 
forced disclosure would impair the ability to gather informa-
28Ibid., p. 258n.
^ Editor § Publisher, Dec. 9, 1972, p. 6, cited in 
Kaplan, p. 754.
^ N e w  York Times, Dec. 21,’ 1972, p. 34, cited ibid., 
p. 755.
■^Ervin, pp. 258-59. But not until Jan. 30, 1973, did 
the Joint Media Committee announce its support for legislation 
to create an absolute reporters’ privilege (1975 House Hear­
ings , p. 567) .
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tion necessary for important news.^  In a poll of 3,737 
persons following a December 7 public television debate on 
"The Advocates," the vote was even stronger: 77 percent in
favor of a press privilege.33
Even before the Ninety-third Congress convened, bills 
were pouring in to create a testimonial privilege for repor­
ters. Thirty-two Senators and more than a hundred Congress­
men formally committed themselves by sponsoring sixty-five 
measures in the two houses. Some observers called the commit­
ment illusory, or at least "by no means overwhelming in light 
of the strong public interest which had been generated over 
the previous six months." Strategically, the plethora of 
bills itself was a bad sign, indicating disagreement on the 
basic approach.34
The hearings, held in February and March, revealed dis­
agreement not only on basic approaches but on. a host of impor­
tant details too. The collected testimony and statements for 
the record filled two thick books.^ Represented were the 
views of politicians, professors and private practitioners of 
law, public prosecutors, civil libertarians, publishers, repor­
ters, editors, columnists and journalism groups. Most of the
3^New York Times, Dec. 3, 1972, p. 48, cited in Kaplan, 
p. 762n.
33Ervin, p. 259n.
34Ibid., p. 261.
33Previously cited as 1973 Senate Hearings and 1973 
House Hearings .
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press groups favored an absolute testimonial privilege, but 
some hedged their bets or ridiculed those who would no t . ^  
Among those who wanted or would stand for a qualified bill, 
some advocated a privilege -which would apply only to investi­
gatory proceedings--grand juries and legislative committees-- 
but not to courts. Others thought the privilege might apply 
in all proceedings but be vulnerable to showings of "over­
riding national interest" or the "interests of justice."
Still others questioned the right of Congress to legislate
for the states and favored controlling subpoenas of the press
37only at the federal level.
Another disagreement was whether a journalist should 
be able to claim the privilege in a libel suit. Those who 
said yes cited the likelihood of suits filed solely to dis­
cover the identity of news sources. Those who said no said 
it seemed unfair to allow a libel defendant to plead privilege
70when the veracity or reliability of the source was an issue.
Another issue concerned who should be entitled to claim 
the testimonial privilege. Some bills would have protected 
only a "legitimate member of the professional news media" or a 
"professional newsman." These limitations seemed at odds with
^See, e.g., the arrogant testimony of John R. Finnegan, 
chairman of the Freedom of Information Committee of the Asso­
ciated Press Managing Editors Association, 1975 Senate Hear­
ings , pp. 373-77.
■^Ervin, p. 262.
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the common understanding that the First Amendment protects 
39everyone.
. An idea advanced during the hearings--that a new pro­
cedure be created to control the issuance of subpoenas against 
the press--also became an issue and caused considerable con­
fusion. The suggestion represented an untested legal innova­
tion essentially separate from the question of privilege it­
self, but it later was incorporated in some of the bills, in­
cluding one originally supported by the ANPA.^
In the Senate, the crucial issue seemed to be whether 
a reporter witnessing a crime should be vulnerable to sub­
poena for testimony. There wras wide agreement that most re­
porters would volunteer, especially in cases of violent 
crime, but the question was one of law--should reporters be 
vulnerable? To Sen. Sam Ervin, whose subcommittee was re­
viewing the privilege proposals for the Judiciary Committee, 
it was a question of propriety. Early in the hearings, he 
told newsman Fred P. Graham:
I am not sold on the wisdom of an absolute privilege.
I do have trouble with the proposition. I don't have 
trouble with the proposition that if the newsman receives 
information in confidence, that he ought not to be re­
quired to divulge the sources or the content of it. I 
have the same feeling about unpublished information. I 
do have trouble with where a newsman, even if he accumu­
lates this information in the course of his job, accumu^- 
lated personal knowledge of the commission of a crime.
I have difficulty in saying that he should not be re­
quired to bear the same burden of any other citizen and
■^Ibid. , pp. 262-63.
40Ibid., p. 263n.
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testify as to his personal knowledge.4^
Time after time, Sen. Ervin considered and rejected 
what he saw as an attempt to change an immutable law of evi­
dence: all persons must testify about events they personally
witness. To appreciate the Senator’s stubborn consistency 
on this important point, let us follow some of his remarks:
To columnist James J. Kilpatrick on the Branzburg de­
cision: ”1 thought they [the Supreme Court Justices] were
confused by the Branzburg case where the newspaper reporter 
had personal knowledge of violation of law.”42
To Sen. Charles H. Percy, on the proposed Senate legis­
lation: ”1 object to some of the proposals that have been
made because they really would exempt newsmen from testifying, 
even to facts that he acquired, not by communication from 
others, but by the exercise of his own senses."43
To William Cahn, of the National District Attorneys As­
sociation:
In the first place, we have the rule of evidence, normal­
ly speaking, that a person is not required to testify at 
all, at least before a court, unless he has personal know­
ledge xtfhich tends to prove or disprove some matter in is­
sue in the case. Most newspapermen do not see crimes com­
mitted. Most of the information they have in respect to 
crimes, for example, or any other event is obtained by 
them on the basis of information supplied by other people. 
Except for a few exceptions in the hearsay rule, they 
would not be competent witnesses if brought to court.
Now, is there any reason whatever for exempting a. news­
man, even if he is engaged in practicing his profession,
411975 Senate Hearings, p. 73.
42Ibid., p. 85.
43Ibid., p. 225.
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from testifying as to a crime which he sees committed?44
To Jack L. Bradley, president of the National Press 
Photographers Association: "people who have possession of
personal knowledge upon which . . . news is based should be 
required to testify just like any other citizen."4^
In announcing a third and final draft of his own bill 
for protecting reporters, Sen. Ervin pressed his audience to 
understand the "small qualification" he was insisting on:
The bill provides [un]qualified protection for a 
newsman's sources and for his unpublished materials. . . .
It is important to note that, despite these pro­
visions, the newsman is not excused from testifying to 
the identity of any persons who commits a crime in his 
presence. This provides a clear standard which puts 
both newsman and sources on notice that where the news­
man has viewed a criminal act, whether or not as a re­
sult of his pledge of confidentiality, he may later be 
compelled to identify the perpetrator of that act. This 
provision provides a small qualification to the general 
privilege conferred by the bill. But it is a necessary 
and reasonable exception. No newsman would lightly con­
ceal a crime from public authorities, and no newsman 
should have a right to keep this information from the 
police. Yet to conform to the exception will require 
little imposition on the part of the newsman. He need 
only tell his source: "The law will protect against my
having to disclose your name. But I cannot hide your 
identity if your are committing a crime." These terms 
are reasonable to any man, and will not interfere with 
the normal and necessary reporting and information func­
tion of the j o u r n a l i s t .46
Sen. Ervin explained his proposal further to Martin F. 
Richman, chairman of a New York Bar Association committee:
I put in the fact that this should not excuse a news­
man from testifying to the identity of people who commit-
44Ibid. , p . 233.
45Ibid., p. 249.
46Ibid., p. 315.
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ted crimes in his presence, I think that is essential 
to get a bill through Congress- I don't think a major­
ity of Congress will ever vote to say the newsman should 
not be compelled to testify just like everybody else to 
a crime he sees committed even though he comes in,.as in 
t îe Branzburg case, and gets the opportunity to see the 
crime committed only because of confidential relation­
ships between him and his sources. I would put it like 
this: If anybody invites a newsman in to see him commit
a crime, I don't think he ought to be exempted from pro­
secution, However, a jury might acquit him on the grounds 
that anybody who would do that is insane.47
Many witnesses told Sen. Ervin that the qualification 
he was insisting on was, like many others, unworkable in 
practice. Early in the hearings, lawyer-reporter Graham, 
speaking for the Reporters Committee, had this exchange with 
him:
Sen. ERVIN: Just one more observation. To me, I
think the newsman is entitled to be exempt from dis­
closing information he receives from other people but 
not the things he knows exactly himself.
Mr. GRAHAM: I sympathize with that, Senator . . .
. . . The thing that concerns me is making a repor­
ter repeat what he was told in confidence. I am afraid 
that under the bill you have proposed here, Earl Caldwell 
would clearly, have been required to testify because he al­
legedly was told that a man named David Hilliard had 
threatened the President's life.
Sen. ERVIN: Did David Hilliard tell him that?
Mr. GRAHAM: Yes, sir; that is what my understanding
is .48
Paul Branzburg himself was questioned on what came to 
known as Sen. Ervin's Branzburg Exception. Subcommittee law­
yer Lawrence M. Baskir had an illuminating debate about it 
with B r a n z b u r g 4 ^ that is worth quoting at length:
47Ibid., p. 388.
48Ibid., p. 64.
4^Paul Branzburg then was employed by the Detroit Free
Press.
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[Mr. BASKIR:] Now it appears to me that it is a ' 
small exception and a reasonable exception. In effect, 
all that the exception will do will be to require repor­
ters like yourself to change the way you gather news in 
those small areas, but won't affect the actual newsgather- 
ing itself. . . .
Mr. BRANZBURG: . . . 1  think it is dangerously de­
ceptive for a number of reasons. The reporters will have 
no access to people who are engaged in something which is 
considered illegal. If I want to talk to some people w h o  
are contemplating violent revolution, I won't be able to 
talk to them. If I can't talk to them, the public will
not know what they are up to.
I think the public benefits by my talking to people 
like that.
There are any number of criminal sorts who might talk 
to a reporter. There is no public benefit with that kind 
of exception. If they don't talk to reporters, they will 
be unable to have a voice in the press and the prosecutors 
will know less about them. If there is an absolute privi­
lege statute, at least the prosecutors and the public bene­
fit.
Mr. BASKIR: I would point out that this exception
doesn't exclude from protection the identity of somebody
who has committed a crime and tells you about it later.
What it does is to cover what Senator Tunney was talking 
about: eyewitness personal observation of the commission
of a crime.
Mr. BRANZBURG: If someone tells me they are involved
in a large-scale drug dealings, I will try to verify what 
he is telling me and see the drugs and watch him deal, I 
think that is responsible journalism. To accept it on his 
say-so, without attempting to check his assertions, is, I 
think, irresponsible. I think that kind of exception en­
courages irresponsible journalism.
Mr. BASKIR: I think when you come to that. Senator
Ervin's language does not excuse newsmen from identifying 
any persons who commit a crime in their presence. Quite 
clearly, in your case, you could not have seen the hash 
factory; you could only have interviewed the people out­
side the building.
Mr. BRANZBURG: I don't 'believe people unless I can
check up on what they say. I try to check as much as I 
can and I certainly wouldn't have taken their word unless 
I witnessed it.
Mr. BASKIR: This is the exception in news reporting.
Mr. BRANZBURG: I am not really all that interested
in the subject of drugs per se, but one of the reasons it 
fascinates me is because people who are involved in drugs 
are often able to give information about public officials 
who are taking graft, allowing drug traffic to go on. One 
of the ways reporters can find out about that is by talking 
to the dealers themselves, and there is no way to hang
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around with them without watching what they are doing. 
Otherwise, you are never going to get the opportunity 
to write a story exposing public officials. It just so 
happens there is heroin traffic partly because the police 
departments have a large number of police who are taking 
graft from dope dealers, and the only way to get the in­
formation is to deal with junkies and heroin dealers.
Mr. BASKIR: Suppose you are accompanying a drug
dealer around the city and you observe him negotiating 
with a police officer. You write a story. Even though 
you have that relationship with the dealer, you write 
that story. Under Senator Ervin’s bill, you would have 
to identify the policeman in order to 'identify - the'- goods.
Mr. BRANZBURG: I would have to identify him anyway.
The way it works, policemen don’t come to pick up the 
graft at a fixed time. They don't say, meet me at so 
and so corner. They say, I will be around. And then 
they show up at a certain location, usually at a place 
where drugs are being used or sold and just walk in un­
expected at 3 o'clock in the morning. How is a reporter 
supposed to be sitting around there posing as a heroin 
addict without witnessing a crime? It is impossible.
Mr. BASKIR: You say you would identify those police
officers?
Mr. BRANZBURG: Right. And I also said I would never 
reveal anything that I saw going on in a dope dealer's 
house in return for that opportunity to get that crooked 
police captain or sergeant. I would say that such an ar­
rangement is an ethical one. In fact, police do it all 
the time. They make arrangements to look away from an in­
formant's crimes so they can get other criminals. . . .
[Asst. Counsel BRITT SNIDER:] The State legislature 
has obviously made a judgment that the criminal activity 
they are prohibiting is not in the interest of society. 
What would give the reporter the right to supersede that 
judgment and determine that it is more important that so­
ciety be informed that a law is being broken than to re­
veal what he knows?
Mr. BRANZBURG: It seems to me that the first amend­
ment was written because the Founding Fathers recognized 
that you could not have a democracy unless the people were 
informed. In this country, theoretically, the people are 
supposed to be the governors and the ones they elect are 
supposed to be the representatives and the people cannot 
govern unless they are informed. That is why the publica­
tion and gathering of news has to be given protection.
There is no way to get certain kinds of stories unless 
reporters have that kind of protection. It really fright­
ens me an exception like that in Sam Ervin's bill would 
cut off reporters from certain kinds of sources. I think 
if Thomas Jefferson and George Washington were out there 
today cooking up a revolution, I couldn't talk with them 
under this bill.
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Mr. BASKIR: You could talk with them but not witness
their activity. . . .
Mr. BRANZBURG: I recently wrote a story about the
mayor of a town near Detroit. He had entered into a si­
lent partnership with a group of businessmen. They bought 
a piece of land and the mayor of this town never revealed 
to his constituents he was in the silent partnership. He 
voted to rezone that property and without telling anyone 
he was involved in it. As a result of that rezoning, he 
and the other businessmen made a killing. Somebody had 
to give me a- copy-of tlrab-silent1 partnership . Silent 
partnerships aren't things you go to the. county .buildings_ 
and public files to get.
When he gave me that piece of paper, he committed a 
felony or a misdemeanor right on the spot. I can't 
identify the source. I witnessed a crime because his 
handing me a piece of paper was a crime. But . . . [t]he 
public learned of this mayor’s activities and he admit­
ted that he had been involved in a conflict of interest.
It also seems to me that it is bad to write legisla­
tion worrying about these little fine exceptions. There 
are always possibilities for abuse in any kind of statute. 
For example, if any of you gentlemen right now libeled 
somebody, say, libeled one of the editors of the Detroit 
Free Press, he could not sue any of you for libel because 
anything you say before this committee is immune from a 
libel suit. I think this is generally good that you have 
this privilege, but it can be abused, as Senator McCarthy 
did all the time. He libeled people and hid behind his 
immunity.
There might be times when a reporter will abuse an 
absolute privilege statute, but it nevertheless is a bill 
we need.
"You have convinced me," said the lighthearted junior 
Democrat on the subcommittee, Sen. John Y. Tunney, after 
Branzburg had spoken. Indeed, Paul Branzburg's impromptu 
remarks on the fifth day of the hearings had been probably 
the clearest expression ever, anywhere, of the issues in­
volved. It is too bad Sen. Ervin was away from the hearings 
chamber during his counsel's debate with Branzburg.^ Perhaps
S0Ibid., pp. 364-67.
^ I b i d . , p . 363.
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he read the transcript.
Other witnesses also advised the Senators to see the 
larger interest and not worry about "these little fine ex­
ceptions." Rep. Jerome R. Waldie, a proponent of absolute 
privilege, testified that "anything slightly less than ab­
solute being left to the tender mercy of the Judicial system
would be totally less than absolute when they finally con-
c 2eluded their deliberations."
Reminded that Sen. Ervin and his counterpart in the 
House, Rep. Kastenmeier, doubted the possibility of passing 
such a bill, Waldie said:
I think it is impossible . . .  if you start out with 
the premise of both of those gentlemen. If you start 
out with the premise it is absolutely certain we will 
get an absolute privilege bill through Congress, the 
chances are good, and I would much prefer starting out 
with that premise and if I found that my judgment was 
in error in that instance . . . I would then simply 
drop the matter. To start out with the assumption that 
Congress is timid may be warranted, but it seems to me 
to the extent that it is not warranted you reinforce that 
possibility. 3
Charles S. Perlik Jr., representing the Newspaper Guild 
and its 40,000 news workers, urged passage of an absolute 
privilege. He announced that the guild had "negotiated 
guaranteed wage payments to employees jailed under these 
circumstances and employer-paid but employee-chosen legal 
counsel and will continue to do so, law or no law."34 Perlik
52Ibid., p. 245.
53Ibid. , p. 255.
54Ibid., p. 306.
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continued:
If Congress cannot do it, then the trade union which 
represents people in this dilemma feels it must pro­
vide the protections a man’s family is certainly going 
to need if he is going to face the pain of jail and long 
and indeterminate jail sentences while the legalisms, 
while the protections, are being resolved either before 
the judiciary or here in the legislative halls of Con­
gress.
. . .  We can document occasions when employers 
without knowledge, let alone consent, of their employees 
have turned over files, published and unpublished photos, 
verified and unverified information, names and sources, 
et cetera, to Government agencies. . . .  We believe such 
end runs must be stopped . . .  to prevent anyone other 
than the originating news gatherer from disclosing infor­
mation, material, or sources which the originator could 
not be required to disclose unless this auxiliary party 
has the unrevoked consent of the originator to do so.
We don’t expect a welcome to this proposal with open 
arms at bargaining tables across the land, but it is our 
members and their peers who are going to jail. I admit 
my admiration for publishers who have said recently the 
publisher should go to jail, too, though, to my knowledge 
only two have said that. However attractive the prospect 
might be to some to have bosses behind bars, instead of 
their employees, it hardly presents a solution to the 
problem.*5
Rep. Ogden R. Reid, Marie Torre's former publisher, 
admitted he once favored a qualified-privilege statute for 
reporters but had changed his mind after courts "found ways 
to emasculate these laws and to strip away the protection."56 
Reid urged protection not only for unpublished information 
but for testimonial privilege.concerning published informa­
tion as well. "Compelling journalists to testify as to what 
they have witnessed and written about inevitably leads to de­
mands for notes, out-takes, and the like in order to test the
55Ibid., pp. 306-7.
56Ibid., p. 322.
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S7accuracy o£ what was reported.”
Other witnesses urged caution, at least, and some sug­
gested outright dismissal of the press' claims. Robert G. 
Dixon, an assistant attorney general, said the Justice De­
partment's subpoena guidelines were sufficient to protect 
"the legitimate, .'i-nter.es.ts. of... the press...” Any press privilege 
could become a shibboleth, Dixon warned, frustrating the 
rights of defendants and obstructing proof of recklessness 
in libel suits.
James J. Kilpatrick, Washington Star columnist, op­
posed a statutory privilege for its potential conflicts with 
defendants' rights but also for its unreliability:
We will find outselves mousetrapped one of these days.
We ought not to realy upon a statute, which may prove 
as ephemeral as the winds. We ought instead to rely 
upon the Constitution itself, which is a rock. . . .
Since Caldwell, we fettered watchdogs have raised a 
fearful howl, and judges are not deaf. I believe that 
as time passes, the courts will acquire a much better 
understanding of the problem as we newsmen see it.
You have been regaled, I know, or you will be, with- 
accounts of judges who refuse to understand. The most 
spectacular of these accounts has to do with the case of 
William Farr. I venture this observation, that when my 
colleagues stand upon this case, they stand upon quick­
sand. From what I know of this case, Mr. Farr was not 
engaged in serious investigative journalism; he was en­
gaged in sensationalism. If I may borrow from another 
field of first amendment law, his story was utterly with­
out redeeming social importance. Mr. Farr is now in the 
untenable position of a man who first conspired in con­
tempt and now condones perjury. His conduct, in the midst 
of the Manson trial, impresses me as a flagrant violation 
of ethical journalism. To defend that conduct in the name 
of "the people’s right to know" is to make a mockery of 
that concept.
57Ibid., p. 325.
58Ibid., pp. 330-31.
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l£ we leave these decisions in the hands of the ju­
diciary, we of the press will win some and lose some.
We will lose some we ought to win, and we will win some 
we probably ought not to win, but we will be in a far 
healthier position than we should occupy if we put our 
first reliance in a statute, and not in the Constitution 
itself.59
Sen. Alan Cranston, whose absolute-privilege b i l l ^  
was introduced on behalf of the ANPA, doubted "that the 
best way to get the Government and the courts to back down 
is for more reporters to choose jail rather than violate a 
confidence":
Most newsmen would agree . . .  that the sight of a 
newsman being carted off to jail is more likely to shake 
up a news source than reassure him. And it’s less than 
a sure bet that Government prosecutors are going to be 
deterred even by a succession of sacrificial lions behind 
bars. . . .
Most people won’t read the law, of course. But they 
will read of reporters and their information caught in its 
web. When silence is so much safer, few potential infor­
mants will be willing to take their chances of emerging 
unscathed from the vague and uncertain legal maze created 
by a qualified protection.61
Sen. Cranston also had answers for lawyer Dixon and for 
columnist Kilpatrick regarding their concerns for defendants* 
rights and the effective pursuit of redress for libel. On 
defendants' rights, he said:
I believe that the constitutional provisions for due 
process and a fair trial provide adequate protections in
59Ibid., p. 81 .
^9The bill Sen. Cranston introduced on behalf of the 
ANPA is not the S. 158 in the Senate hearings record. That 
is a rewritten version. For a view of the bill as intro­
duced, see H.R. 2200 (reproduced in the Appendix as Exhibit 
A) in T973 House Hearings, pp. 614-17. It is identical to 
the original Cranston bill.
^ 1 9 7 3  Senate Hearings, p. 47.
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criminal cases. If it is found that a defendant in a 
case will be denied those constitutional rights under 
circumstances where to [uphold a confidence a reporter 
would] avoid revealing a source, a court would, I believe, 
decide in that case that the law to provide unqualified 
protection was unconstitutional, as applied to the set of 
facts in that particular case. In that event, if there 
was a new trial, the newsman would have to testify or go 
to j ail.
On proving recklessness-- to -recover damages for libels 
ing a public figure, Cranston said:
I personally feel that one who enters public life 
should not have the protections of a libel law. I feel 
that those who wish to criticize you, whether in cam­
paigns, your opponents or in the media, should have that 
freedom and they should be free to make whatever charges 
they choose to make and if they can't make them stick in 
the public arena of political debate, I think it will be­
come apparent they were ill-founded.62
Appearing in support of the Cranston proposal was Stan­
ford Smith, ANPA president. He explained that the ANPA had 
seized "the leadership role" in trying to created a united 
front for the press on the issue of newsmen's privilege:
The language of the Supreme Court decision played an im­
portant part in our deliberations. This enabled us to 
get past the argument that we should not seek legislation 
but instead rely on the courts or on the protection of 
public opinion. It is far too late for that. The lan­
guage of the court also helped lead us to the conclusion 
that an unqualified privilege law is a p p r o p r i a t e .63
Although the Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee convened at ANPA's 
request failed ter discover "consensus among media executives 
on just what qualifications would be appropriate in a quali­
fied bill," Smith said, as a group its members had drafted 
the absolute-privilege bill introduced by Sen. Cranston. "The
62Ibid., pp. 55-56.
63Ibid., p. 129.
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ANPA specifically endorses and urges approval of that bill," 
Smith said.^ "When we ask for an absolute privilege," he 
added in a statement, "what we are truly seeking is a reaf­
firmation of the already established right of the American 
people to be informed, that right being embodied in the First 
Amendment.
In their testimony, spokesmen for other members of the 
Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee were not uniformly sure that 
the absolute-privilege approach was a necessary condition 
for the "reaffirmation" sought by ANPA. It will be instruc­
tive to examine their testimony one by one:
American Society of Newspaper Editors. Robert G. Fich- 
enberg, chairman of the freedom of information committee, an­
nounced that the editors had reconsidered their position of 
the previous fall. "We now feel that anything less than an 
absolute immunity bill would be meaningless and ineffective," 
Fichenberg wrote in a statement submitted f o r  t h e  r e c o r d . ^ 6  
He said the ASNE also had resolved to "urge editors and pub­
lishers to support their reporters and take the brunt of the 
attack on themselves in every way possible as this fight for 
the public's constitutional rights is continued."
64 Ibid., p. 134. Smith also said the ANPA had approved 
the endorsement at a board of directors’ meeting Dec. 1, 1972, 
when it voted "to support Federal legislation which wrould-af­
ford unqualified privilege from subpoena of reporters and un­
published news media materials in both Federal and state pro­
ceedings" (ibid., p. 133).
65Ibid., p. 135.
66Ibid., p. 251.
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Sigma Delta Chi. William C. Payette, president, told 
the Senate that his journalism organization had set its goal 
as "the enactment of absolute privilege laws in all 50 states 
and at the federal level." Meanwhile, the organization was 
working "for the strongest possible shield legislation in 
the 93d C o n g r e s s . W h e n  pressed, Payette would not rule 
out support of a qualified-privilege law. "I couldn’t give 
you a valid answer to that," he told Sen. Tunney, "without 
seeing how much is lost. Conceivably there could be a qual­
ification which would not put a newsman at that much h a z a r d . "^8
National Association of Broadcasters. A statement sub­
mitted for the record noted that NAB represented 3,600 AM and 
FM radio stations, 530 television stations and all national 
radio and television networks. It announced support of the 
Cranston bill and said its earlier support of qualified-priv- 
ilege legislation was wrong. "At first blush," said counsel 
John Summers,-"it appeared to many in broadcasting that some 
kind of qualified statutory privilege would provide adequate 
protection to insure the free flow of information to the pub­
lic." But any qualification, Summers continued, "would bear 
the seeds of . . . governmental interference or intimidation" 
as it was subjected to "varying interpretations" by authori-. 
ties. Summers agreed with ANPA counsel Arthur Hanson that 
the proper legislative order should be absolute privilege
67Ibid., p. 301.
68Ibid., p. 305.
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first, qualifications if necessary to correct abuses, later:
The newsmen serving this nation’s communications media 
must, at the very least, be accorded an initial absolute 
privilege if the public [interest in preserving the free 
flow of information] is to be so served. Should experi­
ence under such an absolute privilege result in serious 
abuses of that right, then Congress would be. free to con­
sider remedial legislation.69
National Broadcasting Company. Richard C. Wald, pres­
ident of' NBC News, told the subcommittee that "completely 
aside from any rights of an informant, the fundamental public 
right to the information should not have to rest on newsmen’s 
individual choices to hold to principle and be punished as a 
result." Wald said NBC had concluded that "preference should 
be given" to absolute legislation for reporters’ protection. 
Later he said it would be "preferable not to have any" quali­
fications; still later, he said absolute privilege is "almost 
mandatory." He continued in this exchange with Sen. Tunney:
[Mr. WALD:] I think that there may be in some way 
that I have not yet seen a qualification that would be 
acceptable to u s . I haven’t seen one yet. It is just 
you have to assume that maybe somebody has one.
Sen. TUNNEY: Are there any circumstances where your
network would agree to the release of unpublished tapes 
where they had a direct bearing upon the solution of a 
serious crime or upon a serious threat to national secu­
rity?
Mr. WALD: Yes; I think there are such circumstances
where, if we were the only holders of such information 
and such information was required and there was a showing 
that it wasn’t meant to harass or invade our files, or 
something like that, I think we would cooperate with an 
investigative agency.70
69Ibid., pp. 587-88.
70Ibid., pp. 295-98.
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Columbia Broadcasting System. Frank Stanton, vice- 
chairman, said the network "believes that the free flow of 
information to the public will be best assured by an absolute 
privilege--such as is provided for in S. 158. . . . W e  know, 
that reasonable arguments can be made for a qualified priv­
ilege.
Radio-Television News Directors Association. In testi­
mony submitted for the record, Charles F. Harrison, president 
of the one thousand news directors, said they once thought 
"that a moderate approach would be sufficient. But thereafter 
the jailings of several newsmen made it clear that anything 
less than absolute legislation would not fully correct the 
situation." He continued:
While we wish to emphasize our support for an absolute 
testimonial privilege for these persons--such as that em­
bodied in S. 158--we urge you to consider nothing less 
than a highly protective qualified privilege bill, one 
which places the burden of the proceedings and a heavy 
burden of proof on the person seeking to divest the priv­
ilege. At the very least, the testimonial privilege 
should apply in all circumstances except when there is a
Ibid., pp. 169-72. American Broadcasting Company’s 
role in the Congressional debate was muted. It supported the 
Joint Media Committee (favoring qualified privilege) in 1972 
"in the belief that . . . would suffice." ABC News president 
Elmer W. Lower told the Senate, "we in the news profession do 
not fancy ourselves as a privileged class entitled to immunity 
as a matter of personal right” (ibid., p. 575). ABC’s prac­
tice under Lower was
"to evaluate each subpoena request on its merits. In cer­
tain circumstances, such as film of the attempted assassin­
ation of Governor Wallace, we turned over unpublished infor­
mation with no hesitation. In that instance, the request 
was for specific probative evidence of a major crime unob­
tainable from non-press sources, and we were convinced we 
were not being used as a convenient substitute for the gov­
ernment’s own investigation" (1975 House Hearings, p. 298).
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’’compelling and overriding national interest in the in­
formation" (to use the standard of the Joint Media Com­
mittee . . .), or where there is "an imminent danger of 
foreign aggression, of espionage, or of threat to human 
life, which cannot be prevented without disclosure of 
information or the source of i n f o r m a t i o n ."72
The Newspaper Guild. Charles S. Perlik, Jr., president, 
agreed "with Justice- Douglas- that there has to be either an 
absolute privilege or none at all."73
The Association of American Publishers. Edward M. Kor- 
-ry, president, said the group represented those "responsible 
for approximately 7 5 percent of the publication of books in 
this country." Korry continued:
It would be patently absurd to say you can have a law 
which affords protection to people and then leave naked 
those same people when they were using the same sources 
of information, dealing with the same kinds of informa­
tion, but put their work into a book. . . .
In short . . . publishers believe that the First 
Amendment, in its absolute language, applies to the entire 
press--books very much included--under all circumstances 
and at all governmental levels--and that the liberties it 
guarantees cannot and must not be negotiated or d i v i d e d . 74
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. Speaking 
for the "working press," Fred Graham of CBS said the basis of 
the committee’s position in favor of an absolute privilege was 
"that all unpublished information, all information gathered by 
newspapers, .if it. was published, anyone in the world is free 
to see it and if it is unpublished it belongs to the press." 
The committee’s statement urged Congress to "tell all govern-
721973 Senate Hearings, p. 354.
73Ibid., p. 309.
74Ibid., pp. 161-67.
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ments forcefully and clearly that the press is not a coopera­
tive fourth branch of government.M It continued:
What would happen if all newsmen had the privilege to re­
fuse to disclose confidential sources and unpublished in­
formation? In those few states which have broad shield 
laws, there has been no reported adverse reaction either 
by law enforcement agencies or the courts. In fact, the 
federal government operated quite effectively until re­
cently without forcing news reporters to disclose informa­
tion.
In addition-, - the Bureau-of Labor Statistics reports 
that there are currently about 350,000 attorneys in the 
nation, about 320,000 physicians and about 280,000 clergy­
men who, of course, have the privilege. Thus, about
900.000 citizens already have the privilege of confidenti­
ality in almost every state and in federal proceedings.
The Bureau estimates a total of 112,000 working news edi­
tors and reporters in the country--and one, could hardly 
argue that the Republic is going to crumble if these
900.000 persons are raised to a million.
Furthermore, we note that nowhere in the Constitution
is there a specific protection accorded to attorneys, phy­
sicians and clergymen. By contrast, the First Amendment 
specifically mentions the press.7^
American Civil Liberties Union. Joel M. Cora, spoke for 
the ACLU: "Everyone starts out with the understanding that
the first amendment is there not for the benefit of journal­
ists, not to protect them, but so that the public will be ful­
ly informed." If a qualified bill were drafted, "I think cer­
tainly there must be an exception for the criminal defendant 
in a felony case, when the reporter has highly exculpatory in­
formation." He continued:
I think that exception is necessary, because in that sit­
uation you have a clash between two sets of constitutional 
values, those protected by the first amendment and the 
defendant asserting his specific textual right in the 
sixth amendment for compulsory process to obtain witnesses.
75Ibid., pp. 71-78.
76Ibid., pp. 111-13.
Later Gora cautioned: ”1 am not sure the evidence shows that
[that] situation comes up often enough [that we should have] 
to allow written exception into the statute."^7 According 
to Gora a qualified privilege could be acceptable to the 
ACLU:
If a bill provides that no subpoena may be issued except 
after a court order and hearings, given that procedure, 
protection would result even if you had’relatively mild 
substantive provisions. I think a bill like that would 
be worthwhile. However, if the bill provides only mod­
erate procedural protections and moderate substantive 
definitions, then I would rather take my chances with 
the courts. I think it depends on what kind of bill, 
what procedures, what substance.78
Caldwell's Lawyer. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Stanford Law 
School professor, said he was going to skirt M,free press* 
generalities" because legislation should deal with real prob­
lems. "The most important harm, surely, is the effect of com 
pelling disclosure of newsmen’s confidential sources." Gov­
ernmental subpoenas also impair the independence of the press, 
cause divisive disagreements between reporters and editors, 
drain time and monetary resources away from newspapering and 
encourage self-censorship, he said. What, he asked, does a 
subpoena mean to an editor?:
What it means at the very least is loss of time, legal 
fees, possibly an internal fight within his own news­
paper as to what position to take, and then perhaps a 
knock-down, drag-out court fight, which is not going to 
do him any good with some of his advertisers who believe 
the news media should not obstruct the Government.
I think that kind of pressure, extraneous to the news 
worthiness of items, operating 24 hours a day on the
^Ibid. , p. 121.
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thousands of news desks around this country, has the 
potential to destroy the freedom of the press upon which
we all depend.^9
As for qualifications, Amsterdam said, the important 
distinction is whether the information comes from sources who 
would be affected by a compelled disclosure:
It seems to me that one might distinguish between 
what,a reporter sees when he is out in a place where 
everybody can see, and what he sees where he has been 
admitted to some private place in a relationship of con­
fidence. If a qualification is put on the bill which 
exempts from the scope of its protection eyeball testimony 
of a reporter, that will constitute, I think, a grave in­
cursion in some instances where protection is needed.
Under such a qualification, for example, Paul Branzburg 
would not have been protected because he saw opium being 
produced.^0
Testifying on February 22, Amsterdam submitted a long 
paper for the record developing "the theory that a privilege 
alone will be pathetically inadequate protection for the news 
media." It was, as Sen. Ervin would say later, "a new, com­
plicated, and untested legal innovation, which reduced its
O *]political acceptability in Congress."ox Without some way to 
screen "improvident subpoenas in the first place," Amsterdam 
said, harried judges would often make mistakes ruling against 
the claimed privilege and reporters still would end up in 
jail, at least until the appeals courts could act.
Because the Supreme Court in Branzburg had denied the 
First Amendment claim of privilege, Amsterdam said, Congress
^ I b i d ., p . 177. 
80Ibid., p. 178. 
8^Ervin, p. 263.
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should simply forget about book publishers; they were not
involved in "the free flow of information" anyway:
What you ought to focus on--this is the most important 
reason for giving the protection-- is to protect the flow 
of information to the public and to the media. Is this 
person a participant in the regular flow of news? The 
limitation I would impose is whether the person is some­
one who disseminates news to the public on a periodic, 
regular basis.82
Amsterdam’s legal paper also said:
. . . any degree of protection which is given news­
men’s sources will result in some net gain of information 
flowing to newsmen and thence to the public. Even a qual­
ified protection will decrease the number of press sub­
poenas that are issued, and probably also the visibility 
of the press-subpoena threat to sources. This is the real 
lesson to be drawn from the history of the days before 
Branzburg.83
As for his new theory on the need for procedural safe­
guards , Amsterdam said, "I would go so far as to say that the 
establishment of such procedures is far more important than 
the question of the precise shape of a newsman's testimonial 
privilege.
That was ANPA’s Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee. Those 
Joint Media Committee members who had not joined with the 
ANPA since the 1972 hearings further confused the Senate sub­
committee by showing up separately and demonstrating a con­
certed willingness to compromise. A prime example was John 
R. Finnegan, executive editor of the St. Paul Dispatch and 
spokesman for the Associated Press Managing Editors Associa­
8 2 1973 Senate Hearings, pp. 181-84* 
83Ibid., p. 200.
84Ibid., p. 203,
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tion. He urged the Senate to adopt "the strongest possible 
legislation which will guarantee the free flow of informa­
tion to the public, unhampered by unbridled subpoena power."
As if built-in equivocations were not enough, Finnegan volun­
teered another:
I do not believe as some newsmen do that only an absolute 
bill will suffice. It is ridiculous to hold that no law 
is better than a good qualified shield law. A tight, 
qualified law can eliminate most of the harassing, intim­
idation-type subpoenas that plague the press today.®8
Finnegan also revealed that the AP managing editors had
drafted for Minnesota Sen. Walter Mondale what Mondale was
calling "the Finnegan Bill."8  ̂ Mondale said of Finnegan,
"the proposals that have come from him are slowly emerging
as the consensus position here [in the Senate]," a consensus
favoring "a very tightly drawn but qualified protection bill."
Another member of the Joint Media Committee to testify 
was Jack L. Bradley, president of the National Press Photog­
raphers Association. It was not very clear from his state-
85Ibid., pp. 373-75.
8^Sen. Mondale’s bill, S. 637, had been introduced at 
the end of January. Cosponsors included Sens. Burdick, Has­
kell, Humphrey, McGovern, Mansfield, Pell, Proxmire, and Wil­
liams. It would have provided protection in state and federal 
proceedings for unpublished sources and information developed 
by a broad range of media including book publishers. A sep­
arate state or federal court order would be required before a 
subpoena could be issued. The court could order the disclo­
sure if a hearing clearly demonstrated that the reporter or 
publisher had information relevant to "a specific probable 
violation of law" over which the court had jurisdiction; that 
the information was unavailable elsewhere, and that the infor­
mation would be necessary to prevent "imminent danger of for­
eign aggression, of espionage, or of threat to human life" 
(ibid. , pp. 435-40) .
161
ment that his association once supported qualified privilege:
Last September 21, at a House Subcommittee on the Ju­
diciary hearing on proposed legislation to create a news­
man’s shield bill, Assistant Attorney General Roger C. 
Cramton said there was no need for "shield'' legislation 
for professional journalists. Since that appearance, 
more than a dozen cases can be cited to show,.why we do 
need legislation to make it clear that the first amend­
ment is an "absolute" and not a "qualified" guarantee 
that newsmen can protect the sources of the information 
they gather.
The National Press Photographers Association joins' 
the members of the Joint Media Committee on Free Flow of 
Information in support of this absolute right as outlined 
in the first amendment.87
According to Sen. Ervin, when the hearings adjourned on 
March 14, the only thing established was that "a persuasive 
case had been made that, indeed, newsmen did have a problem." 
The senator saw the legislative inaction that followed as a 
failure of the press to coalesce behind one approach. "It 
did seem clear," Sen. Ervin offered, "that unless the press 
groups themselves could achieve some unanimity on the issue, 
it was likely to fail without any effort from its oppo­
nents . "88
Of course, this was sophistry. The most formidable 
Senate opponent of absolute privilege for reporters x̂ as Sen. 
Ervin himself, and his stubborn refusal to yield on the 
Branzburg Exception. And he saw to it that the final draft 
of his own bill, S. 1128,8  ̂ support of important Senate
leaders and liberals, among them Senate Democratic Leader
87Ibid., p. 248.
^8Ervin, p. 270.
89Reprinted in 1973 Senate Hearings, pp. 456-62.
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Mike Mansfield and Sens. Lee Metcalf, William Proxmire, and 
William Fulbright. The Ervin bill they supported generally 
would have protected all unpublished information a reporter 
might receive in confidence except the "identity of any per­
son who commits a crime in his presence." Sen. Ervin and 
the majority he could, command-i.n_the- subcomnvi.11ee believed 
that S. 1128 "met all of the important press interests and 
stood the best chance of surviving debate in the full commit­
tee and on the f l o o r . O n  another occasion, Sen. Ervin 
said his bill "gives to the media precisely that protection 
to which they are entitled."^1 The bill apparently was op­
posed even by the Joint Media Committee and never came to a 
subcommittee vote.®^
Believing as he did that the Branzburg Exception was 
not an "important press interest," Sen. Ervin looked else­
where to place the blame for Senate inaction. He did not 
have to look far. The lack of unity among press groups \̂ as 
important, of course, but their sudden strategic disarray in 
mid-hearing probably was even more important. Sen. Ervin 
pointedly noted the most important cause of the disarray: 
Caldwell lawyer Anthony Amsterdam’s insistence on a pre-sub­
poena screening process (a legally irrelevant issue), which
^^Ervin, p. 271.
Q1Howard Fields, "Shield Bills Languish One Year After 
Court Ruling," Richmond (Va.) Times-Dispatch, July 15, 1973, 
p . 4.
^Ervin, p. 271.
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took important Senate privilege proponents on a wild ride. 
Sen. Cranston, for example, redrafted in mid-March the leg­
islation he had introduced in January for the ANPA. In doing 
so, he instantly made politically irrelevant the February 
testimony of the ANPA and simultaneously left it supporting
q *7a bill without a Senate spansq x .̂
In his review of Congress' treatment of the issue, Sen. 
Ervin also cited the appearance of a few court rulings favor­
able to the press94 and apparent restraint by prosecutors (no 
new jailings of reporters) as major factors easing pressure 
for Senate action. In addition, faced with Sen. Ervin's 
stern warnings that an absolute privilege never would get 
out of his subcommittee, newsmen began, he said coyly, "to 
reconsider the legislative alternative"--especially, we 
might add, as those alternatives were constrained by men like 
Sen. Ervin.
In the face of the embarrassing disaster of the Senate 
hearings, Sen. Cranston (among others) was willing to seize
^Ibid. , p. 263n.
94 Ibid., p. 272. Cited were Baker v. F § F Investment 
Co. (19-72) and Cervantes v. Time, Inc. (197 2ji Ervin could 
have cited Bursey v. United States (1972), in which the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld two staff members of the 
Black Panther Party newspaper when they refused to answer 
some, but not all, of the questions of a grand jury. Earlier, 
they had lost an appeal (In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. 
Supp. 573 N.D. Calif. [1970], discussed in Supreme-Court Re­
ports , Book 408, pp. 703n-4n) of an order that they at least 
appear and face the questions (see discussion in Kaplan, pp. 
756-58). Bursey seemed to place the burden of justifying the 
propriety of the questions on the government.
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any excuse and, as luck would have it, a very appealing one 
appeared: Watergate. Writing for the New York Times on July
1, Martin Arnold quoted the California Democrat: "Watergate,
I think, improved the general attitude toward the press, but, 
on the other hand, it was all done without a shield law, so 
why do we need one?" Sen. Cranston also said: "There are
still Senators who don't want to pass laws protecting 'those.
guys.' Everybody in public office is always claiming he's 
misquoted, you know."95
^Martin Arnold, "Efforts to Protect Sources of Jour­
nalists Stalled by Watergate Revelations," New York Times, 
July 1, 1973, p. 22.
CHAPTER VIII
IN CONGRESS: THE LONDON COMPROMISE-.
Hearings in the House of Representatives progressed 
like those in the Senate, covering many of the same issues, 
witnesses and positions, but with historically much more sig­
nificant results. What emerged in the House never has been 
given a proper name to match its historical importance; here 
it will be called the London Compromise. To understand its 
origins, let us return to February and March, 1973.
Unlike the Senate hearings, those in the House were 
graced by a spokesman representing the New York Times manag- 
ment: A. M. Rosenthal, managing editor. Rosenthal was re­
luctant to appear, calling himself a "professional non-advo­
cate" and a believer that "people who gather or edit news 
should not take part in political action or become the cham­
pions of causes, publicly or privately."
However, Rosenthal said he was driven by fear that the
First Amendment was being eroded; specifically, confidential
sources, "absolutely vital to a free press," were being
threatened. He continued:
There has been a lot of talk about confidentiality and a 
certain amount of doubletalk and playacting.
For one thing, as we all know, all levels of govern­
ment quite happily and regularly employ the technique of 
confidentiality to their own ends. Every day in the year
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in Washington and every other major city in the country, 
appointed officials and elected political figures hold 
briefings at which they give out information or opinions 
but refuse to allow themselves to be identified. Some­
times the motivations are important; a government be­
lieves a piece of information should be known, but feels 
an official imprimatur would give it too much weight or 
distort its significance.
But much more often the press and officials do allow 
this sort of confidentiality to be used as a convenient 
way of masking the source, manipulating news or sending 
up trial balloons. On the New York Times we do not have 
a blanket rule against accepting this kind of information, 
but more and more we try to move away from it and ask for 
as close an identification as possible. The movement is 
away from pseudo-confidentiality, but it is still just a 
movement.1
But there exist vital confidential sources, Rosenthal 
added, "men and women, or even institutions, that have in­
formation they feel should be made public but are afraid to 
allow their names to be attached to it." Without them, he 
said, a free press would not be the same:
The most dramatic examples, of course, come from the 
area of investigative reporting, and I say flatly that 
without the guarantee of confidentiality, investigative 
reporting will disappear. The erosion of confidentiality 
will mean the end of the exposure of corruption insofar 
as the press is concerned.2
The political connection formed a big part of Rosen­
thal's argument, and he pursued it eloquently:
Very often confidential sources are among dissidents. 
Dissidents need not be demonstrators with placards. • A 
lieutenant general can be a dissident or an executive 
vice-president of a steel company, or an official of a 
trade union. They think something they know should be 
known to the public, but they don't feel strong enough 
to put their name tag on it. The question is: Should
this information be denied to the public? Need the 
price of disclosure be martyrdom? . . .
11973 House Hearings, pp. 238-39
2Ibid., pp. 239-40.
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Sometimes the need for confidentiality is the result 
of different backgrounds and social attitudes. I dare 
say there is nobody in this room who is really afraid of 
dealing with authority, Government authority or police 
authority or business authority. We regard them as part 
of our own lives, in a sense arms of ourselves, our own 
servants.
But there are millions of people in this, country who 
do not have that sense of confidence, who regard author­
ity as menacing, who do not trust it. They will some­
times talk of even the most innocuous matters only if
they are no-f-named. The question; here is : Are they to
be denied access to the public through the press, is ac­
cess to the press to be permitted only to the confident 
and powerful?3
The conditions for a free press are what are important, 
Rosenthal said, not the words we praise in the Constitution. 
"The very process of subpoenaing reporters, trying to get 
them to testify, attempting to use them as branches of gov­
ernment investigation," is endangering essential conditions, 
he said. There was but one best solution:
I am urging passage of legislation prohibiting the 
use of subpoena power in all matters relating to the free 
press provisions of the first amendment. I realize that 
absolutism is any kind goes against the grain of many 
people; as a matter of fact, generally speaking it goes 
against my own grain and my own position on this has 
evolved over the past couple of years, and the last year 
as a result of what 1 see as an increasing danger. But I 
think that to introduce qualifications would be to intro­
duce the concept of varying degrees of information free­
dom depending on the kind of information, and I do not 
really think that was the intent of the first amendment.4
After Rosenthal’s speech,~subcommittee chairman Robert 
W. Kastenmeier decided to get right to the point riding in 
the subcommittee's collective mind: could the Times1 Mr. Ro­
senthal, "in the event that something emerges short of ab-
^Ibid., p . 240.
4 Ibid., p. 241.
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solute privilege," support it? His answer:
I have thought a lot about that one, too. I do be­
lieve that absolute legislation is terribly important.
I am afraid of qualifications, however well intended, 
however well designed. One man's qualification is 
another man's restriction. I do fear the precedent of 
writing qualifications into the first amendment. I 
think that would be my answer.5
Other subcommittee questions revealed that subtle pres­
sures were acting in the House committee. The pre-subpoena 
screening process brought up only a week or so earlier in the 
Senate is alluded to in'this exchange between Rosenthal and 
Rep. Edward Mezvinsky:
[Mr. MEZVINSKY:] I think when you use the word "ab­
solute” the position I would hope we would come to would 
be that we would simply reaffirm the first amendment.
That may be a clarification. I am interested in your 
comments concerning being called into court and the sub­
poena issuances that are taking place.
Aren't you equally concerned that with any legisla­
tion you pass that you still may have to come into court 
and still may have to fight the battle?
Mr. ROSENTHAL: Well, sir, I believe that we may have
to come to court, but I believe with a reaffirmation of 
the first amendment, as you put it, we would be on much 
stronger ground. I think that is why it is necessary.
I also think that if Congress spoke in "reaffirma­
tion" of the first amendment--and I prefer that word, 
too--that it would deter a great many people who now feel 
they have a license to go after reporters and edi-. 
tors. . . .
[Mr. MEZVINSKY:] Would your position be that if we 
come out with qualifications that we are better off with 
no law at all, or would you then try to accept the posi­
tion that comes out of the subcommittee?
Mr. ROSENTHAL: I would hope that the Congress would
come out with a piece of legislation that would totally 
reaffirm the first amendment. If it did not, I think 
that I, as an individual--and speaking for the Times-- 
would continue to urge total reaffirmation. . . .
. . .  I think that if Congress comes out with no law 
at all, or a qualified law . . . this will be taken by 
prosecutors and other enforcement agents on all levels of
5Ibid.
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government . . .  as an indication that they have a right 
to go ahead and continue as they are. I think you will 
see more and more of this kind of action; more and more 
restrictions built into reporting of all kinds.6
Stanford Smith, ANPA president, was next. "We are here 
to support unqualified legislation," he told the-subcommit­
tee. "I might say that nothing in this world is absolutely 
'absolute.'" He explained further that the ANPA supported 
H.R. 2200 introduced at its request by Rep. Charles Wilson. 
•It differed only slightly from four other bills, the five to­
gether signed only by their sponsors. In contrast, the lead­
ing qualified bills (eight of them), introduced by Rep.
Charles W. Whalen, Jr., together had a total of seventy-pne 
Congressional cosponsors. The two most popular Whalen bills, 
cosigned by a total of forty-eight representatives, were 
nearly identical.8 They would apply only to proceedings in 
"Congress or any Federal court, grand jury, or administrative 
entity" and protect sources and unpublished information with 
exceptions. The exceptions were, "the source of any allegedly 
defamatory information" in libel cases where "the defen­
dant . . . asserts a defense based on the source;" and infor­
mation a court determined was necessary to investigate a 
"specific, probable violation of law" in which there was "a 
compelling and overriding national interest."
The ANPA's testimony was much the same as it was in the
^Ibid., pp. 249-51.
7Reproduced in the Appendix as Exhibit A.
8H.R. 2232 and H.R. 2233, ibid., pp. 622-25.
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Senate, except that, as lawyer Arthur Hanson explained, the 
absolute privilege desired by ANPA should be supplemented by 
"procedural safeguards." "This language," he said, "would 
then serve as a bar to the free issuance of subpoenas which 
I know Mr. Mezvinsky, for instance, fears if you merely use 
the generalized reaffirmation of the firstamendment."9
To the Wilson bill (reproduced in the Appendix as Ex­
hibit A ) , ANPA would have added this provision:
No subpoena or other legal process to compel the 
testimony of a newsman or a production of. any document, 
paper, recording, film, object or thing by a newsman 
shall be issued under the authority of the United States 
or of any State except in accord with the requirements 
of the issuance of subpoenas under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and after determination by the issuing 
authority that section 2 herein [the prohibition against 
forced disclosure] is not abrogated by the issuance of 
said subpoena.1°
The purpose of the new language, said Hanson, would be 
to "put a requirement of a showing" to burden prosecutors suf­
ficiently so that subpoenas in conflict with the privilege 
law would not be issued maliciously or mistakenly.
It had become usual for the subcommittee to test each 
press representative for equivocation; this time there was an 
unusual chewing out to which Smith and Hanson respectfully 
nodded:
Mr. MEZVINSKY: If you were sitting up here having to
face a qualified bill in the form of the Whalen bill . . . 
and the choice would be the Whalen bill or no bill at all 
is it my understanding that your position would be that i 
is better to wait and hope a later Congress maybe will re-
9Ibid., p. 322.
r+ 
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spond? . . .
[Mr. SMITH:] We feel so strongly that legislation 
substantially in the form of H.R. 2200 and the others 
is the proper legislation that I am extremely reluctant 
to choose between the Whalen bill or any other bill and 
no legislation at all.
I realize that is not a clear-cut response to your 
question, but it is about as far as I am able to go as 
a policy matter set by our board of directors. . . .
[Mr. HANSON:] We again want to emphasize that the 
language of that [H.R. 2200] embodies the ideas and con­
cerns, but it could develop, after the hearings that you 
gentlemen have had and the testimony you have before you, 
it can probably be improved.
The subpoena problems that I mentioned a few minutes 
ago is one method . . .
Mr. MEZVINSKY: I personally appreciate that addition.
I might say, and I think it follows, that I think a case 
has been given very strongly that we need to reaffirm the 
first amendment. I think we realize in testimony given by 
Mr. Rosenthal as well as the qualified argument you have 
given that the real loser with either position [no bill or 
a qualified bill] will be the public.
So I think you have a job as well as members of the 
committee to make certain that this view is brought out 
in the open in a much more striking fashion than it has 
been today, because I am concerned that a qualified bill 
could come out of the subcommittee.
Mr. SMITH: We have failed utterly to get that message
over up until now.
Mr. MEZVINSKY: I keep hearing about the power of the
press or the voice of the press, so maybe we can hear it 
between now and the time we go into the markup session.
Mr. SMITH: This has not been underscored and it is 
the first order of business in my opinion for all of u s . H
Congressman Mezvinsky1s appeal for a stronger press 
voice in support of an unqualified-privilege bill cannot have 
had the impact he wanted. The pressure for compromise seemed 
more intense in the lower house, ostensibly on the matter of 
making a rule of law that would apply to the states. The Re­
publican minority had adopted the Nixon Administration posi­
tion- -that preemptive (federal-state) legislation was perhaps
■^Ibid. , pp. 324-25.
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unconstitutional--though Constitutional-law wizards like Sen. 
Ervin had by that time abandoned that view.^ (Sen. Ervin's 
bill was federal-state.) While the minority view was unten­
able legal scholarship, it was politically effective. Rank­
ing subcommittee Republican Thomas F. Railsback announced 
that he opposed any bill that would apply to the states, but 
would not try to defeat such a measure if he agreed with its 
other provisions. 15 Behind him stood the likelihood of a 
Presidential veto of any bill that would preempt state law 
and a more nearly certain veto of any that would create sweep­
ing immunity without exception.
The first day of the subcommittee deliberations set the 
stage for the birth of the London Compromise when Rep. Kasten- 
meier was greeted with virtual silence when he asked who 
agreed with the bills supported by ANPA.15 The Republican 
minority already had drafted and was seeking support for a 
compromise measure, the so-called Cohen bill. Designated H.R. 
5928, the bill was introduced by Rep. William S. Cohen of 
Maine.^ It designed a two-tier framework of privilege, one 
absolute and one highly qualified. The general purpose was to
•^David K. Shinier, "House Panel Disagrees on Shield 
Bill," New York Times, April 18, 1973, p. 32.
14 Ibid.
Ibid.
"^Reprinted in 1973 House Hearings, pp. 734-37. Co­
sponsors were Reps. Henry P. Smith III, Charles W. Sandman, 
Jr., Tom Railsback and Lawrence Coughlin.
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cut down on press vulnerability to investigative subpoenas-- 
those tools of fishing expeditions conducted by grand juries, 
executive and legislative agencies. Retained were the govern­
ment's power to use, when necessary, the press' unpublished 
information to convict at trials and the court's power to 
order production of press information for the defense at trial. 
To defeat the privilege in a civil or criminal trial, the 
court would have to agree 1) that the information was "indis­
pensable to the establishment" of the offense charged or ac­
tion pleaded, or the defense pleaded (as in a libel suit) and 
2) that the information was unobtainable elsewhere and 3) that 
there was "compelling and overriding public interest" in the 
information.^
In short, the Cohen bill would cut down the use of the 
press for law enforcement by prohibiting the use of unpub­
lished information for indictments. At the same time, the 
bill would affirm the propriety of using the press to obtain 
convictions and to help one side or another in civil disputes. 
Because the Cohen system would guard against grand jury "fish­
ing expeditions" at the press' expense and protect informants 
up to the trial stage, it had received the important endorse­
ment of Common Cause chairman John W. Gardner on April 16.-^
■^"House Judiciary Group Approves 'Qualified' Source 
Protection Bill," ANPA General Bulletin, no. 29 (June 22,
1973), p. 148.
•^John W. Gardner, "The Right That Guards All Other 
Rights," April 16, 1973 (news release distributed by Common 
Cause, 2030 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).
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The complete story of how the Cohen bill came to be sup­
ported by a majority of influential press organizations may 
never be known. The extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations 
and deliberations of the giants in the press world were not 
followed in the press, although conditions governing the 
"people’s right to know" were being defined by a small, self- 
appointed group of men and women. In particular, crucial 
meetings were ignored or obscured, and the most important of 
these took place outside the United States.
The countdown to the London Compromise can begin June 
13, 1973, in Rep. Kastenmeier’s subcommittee, which was tired 
of talking and decided to put competing privilege measures to 
a vote. The absolute bills were defeated on a four-to-four 
vote that specifically considered H.R. 2187, virtually iden­
tical to H.R. 2200 supported by the ANPA. The subcommittee 
then approved for full Judiciary Committee consideration the
Cohen bill, by a vote of five to three; chairman Kastenmeier
/
voted with the four Republicans.̂  Later he was to say, "I 
start off accepting the situation that a purely absolute bill 
is not realizable at this time, so that a committee-designated 
bill .is [meant] to move the issue off [dead] center and is not 
meant to be final."20 Rather than send it to the full Judi­
ciary Committee, though, Rep. Kastenmeier decided to first so­
licit comments from the press.
19"House Group Approves," p. 147.
20Arnold, p. 22.
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The ANPA announced almost immediately its strong op­
position to the Cohen bill and wrote to the House that it
' preferred no legislation rather than the enactment being con- 
91sidered. x Specifically, according to a legal analysis it 
p r e p a r e d , t h e  ANPA objected to the bill's definition of 
"newsman," which appeared to exclude publishers and other 
executives from protection. "This is among the [bill's] most 
serious defects," it said.
The House's entire approach to the problem was defec­
tive, the ANPA said:
This version of H.R. 5928 still suffers from the same 
fatal defect as earlier versions in that separate stan­
dards for different types of proceedings will negate the 
effectiveness of any bill designed to protect the free 
flow of information. While Section 3 provides an ab­
solute privilege for any federal or state proceedings, 
including a grand jury (except civil or criminal actions 
in a federal or state court), the benefits of this sec­
tion would be greatly emasculated by Section 4. Section 
4 sets forth a qualified privilege where there would be 
a number of circumstances under which a newsman could be 
required to reveal the identity of a confidential source 
or confidential information received from that source.
As long as this qualification to the privilege exists, a 
source of information can never be totally confident that 
his identity will not be disclosed. A prospective source 
of information could not predict the likelihood of a news­
man being able to successfully assert a privilege against 
disclosing the source's name. How can a source predict 
whether information which he provides to a newsman could 
be the subject of a Congressional hearing,,criminal trial 
or civil trial? The Watergate case would be an example 
of this situation. How can a source predict whether the 
information which he provides or the disclosure of his 
identity could be obtained by alternative means or would 
be indispensable to one of the parties in litigation?
21 "House Group Approves," p. 147.
^ A N P A  Analysis of H.R. 5928, June 25, 1973 (American 
Newspaper Publishers Association, P.O. Box 17407, Dulles In­
ternational Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041).
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Even more so, how can one expect a source to determine 
whether a judge will determine disclosure of his iden­
tity to be required on the grounds of a "compelling 
and overriding public interest','? As long as a potential 
source of information knows that there are circumstances 
under which his identity may be disclosed, then the ab­
solute privilege in Section 3 has no meaningful effect 
because the source will be deterred from providing in­
formation. There are just too many variables . ..23
The Cohen bill's exception for libel cases, denying the 
privilege "with respect to the source of any allegedly defam­
atory information in any case where the defendant in a civil 
action for defamation asserts a defense based on the source," 
also appeared dangerous to the ANPA. It commented:
Aside from the fact that . . . [it] imposes an addi­
tional qualification to the privilege which would deter 
a potential source of information from communicating . . . 
[it] appears to open all newsmen to potential subpoena 
in libel cases in which they or their publications were 
not the defendants.24
Here the ANPA was concerned about any case like Marie Torre’s, 
whose newspaper was made vulnerable to subpoena for unpub­
lished information though it was not a party to the libel 
suit. The ANPA also was concerned with libel suits in gen­
eral. During the Congressional hearings, news media lawyers 
had made a good case that "an exception to the privilege 
could not be a meaningful enough aid to plaintiffs in libel
cases so as to justify its likely detrimental effects on the
23Ibid., pp. 1-2.
24Ibid., p. 2.
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flow of news."*25 The core of their argument was in two 
parts. In most cases, the defendant publisher has the bur­
den of proving truth in the offending statement. If the con­
fidential source is needed to prove the truthfulness of the 
defamation, the defendant publisher can either bring forth 
the source or remain silent and risk loss of the case by 
failure to establish a proper defense. Thus, the common 
man’s redress for libel remained sound. In cases of alleged 
libel of a public figure, to collect damages the defamed must 
show that the publisher in fact had serious doubts about the 
truth of the statements published, aside from his knowledge 
of the source's reliability. Thus, the media arguments ran, 
neither the identity of the source nor his testimony could 
serve to prove that the publisher’s mind had been afflicted 
with doubt. The conclusion of the argument had been phrased 
as follows:
In view of the high improbability that an exception 
to the privilege would be of legitimate usefulness to 
libel plaintiffs, the opportunities which such an excep­
tion would provide for displeased public figures to ha­
rass the news media, and to smoke out their confidential 
sources for non-judicial purposes, should be foreclosed. 
Moreover, the mere existence of such an exception would 
often create grave doubt in the minds of potential sources 
of information about whether their identities could be 
kept secret.26
2^"Memorandum of Law Concerning a Newsman's Testimonial 
Privilege in Defamation Cases," prepared by Pierson, Ball § 
Dowd for the Radio-Television News Directors Association, 
March 5, 1973 (reprinted in 1975 House Hearings, pp. 575-76).
26Ibid., p. 576. • In Gertz v. Welch, Inc. (1974) and 
later revised, the Supreme Court said "a plaintiff who is 
not a public officer or a public figure may recover damages 
in an action for libel by proof of negligence in the publish-
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So complete was the ANPA's objection to the Cohen bill 
that it urged Rep. Kastenmeier and the subcommittee to "re­
scind its approval . . . and retain jurisdiction■of the issue 
. . . for further study." Stanford Smith also rather child­
ishly reminded the subcommittee that ANPA represented "the 
owners of more than 1,000 daily newspapers having more than
ing of the libel . . . even though the libel occurred in the 
reporting of an event of public or general concern" ("Mass 
Supreme Court Adopts Gertz Negligence Rule but Bans Punitive 
Damage Claim for Published Libel," Press Censorship Newslet­
ter , no. VIII [October-November 1975] , p. rO’6) . It has been 
pointed out that, in setting standards that must be met by 
the plaintiff in libel cases, ostensibly to allow for pub­
lication of defamatory falsehoods through honest error, the 
courts have opened up new territory:
. . the level of care exercised by a newspaper, mag­
azine, or television station in preparing, writing, and 
presenting a story is the critical factor in determining 
whether it can be held liable for defamatory statements it 
publishes. Once that is recognized, the conflict is ob­
vious: On the one side, reporters and editors want to pro­
tect confidential sources, to withhold notes and methods of 
operation, and to maintain the privacy of the editorial pro­
cess; on the other, judges perceive a need to examine the 
editorial process to determine the level of care used in 
working on .a particular story. How else can judges deter­
mine whether the Times-Sullivan standard of constitutional 
malice or the Gertz standard of negligence has been satis­
fied? For these standards, the judges point out, have 
nothing to do with the intent of editors, reporters, or 
publishers; they have everything to do with the state of 
the journalists’ knowledge about the truth or falsity of 
the statement written about a particular plaintiff. Thus, 
the argument continues, judges must examine in depth the 
editorial processes of newspapers in order to assess their 
potential liability" (Simons and Califano, p. 18).
The situation seems to invite conflict, but only when the pub­
lication cannot defend on the basis of truth without revealing 
the source. Courts could adopt rules so that source protec­
tion presents no unfair advantage to either side.
7 7901 of total . . . circulation," so its opinion should 
count.
Rep. Kastenmeier was not discouraged; he asked the 
ANPA to reconvene the Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee to re­
veal the "contemporary c o n s e n s u s . A p p a r e n t l y ,  he knew 
something Stanford Smith did not, and'it became obvious on 
July 6 when the media committee met in private at ̂ Washing­
ton's International Club. Ad Hoc Committee chairman Arthur 
B. Hanson posed the question immediately: "whether the or­
ganization would prefer no bill rather than the Cohen bill 
and also whether the organization had any suggestions" for 
improving the Cohen bill.29
Surprisingly, Hanson found himself almost outvoted.
Of the original Ad Hoc Committee members, Sigma Delta Chi,
NBC and the ACLU were not represented in the informal tally. 
Voting for the Cohen bill were representatives of the Nation­
al Association of Broadcasters, CBS, the Radio-Television 
News Directors Association and the Association of American 
Publishers. No votes also numbered four: ANPA, ASNE, the
Newspaper Guild, and the Reporters Committee. Given their 
equivocal stands during the congressional hearings, it would
22"ANPA Opposes Privilege Bill in Letter to Rep. Kasten 
meier," ANPA General Bulletin, no. 30 (June 28, 1973), p. 152
2 8Letter from Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier to Stanford 
Smith, June 27, 1973 (copy furnished by ANPA).
29Memorandum by Arthur B. Hanson on July 6, 197 3 Meet­
ing of Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee, July 11, 1973 (copy fur 
nished by ANPA).
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be likely that NBC and the ACLU would side with the yes 
votes.
Jack Landau, of the Reporters Committee, questioned 
"whether as a matter of tactics it would be damaging to start 
making concessions at this point . . .  in the legislative 
process.”
The CBS network had joined the Ad Hoc Coordinating Com­
mittee, but apparently William Small had been busy behind the 
scenes for the Joint Media Committee, which, for the second 
time in six months, had reversed course and decided to favor 
a qualified bill. According to Hanson, the Joint Media Com­
mittee representative (presumably Small) "has indicated to 
Congressman Kastenmeier that they could give only minimal sup­
port to the Cohen bill in its present form but that they could 
enthusiastically support the bill" with certain changes.
The committee wanted photographs and film specifically 
mentioned as being in the class of protected information; it 
suggested the bill’s title be changed to "Free Flow of Infor­
mation Act" (from "Newsmen’s Privilege Act"); it wanted as­
surance that the qualifications in the bill would not apply 
to pre-trial proceedings; it suggested deletion of the excep­
tion for libel cases, and it insisted that reporters be exempt 
from testimony even if the source revealed his own identity. 
Hanson wrote of the meeting: "It was determined that each of
the organizations would make their views on the Cohen bill 
known to Congressman Kastenmeier as soon as possible."
Rep. Kastenmeier was delighted. As Congress returned
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from its summer recess, he was reported as "buoyed by sup­
port from the news media" and happy with "indications the 
media have shifted from general opposition to the bill to a 
willingness to support it."^®
A few weeks later, Rep. Kastenmeier wrote Arthur Han­
son that the subcommittee had agree to five changes in the 
bill to meet press objections: a change in title; including
publishers in the definition of "newsman;" guaranteeing re­
porters' immunity at pre-trial proceedings; requiring testi­
mony in defamation cases only when the newsman himself is 
named as defendant; and deleting any explicit waiver-by-source 
provision. Only the libel provision was anything more than 
cosmetic change, and even it was only half of the ANPA concern 
with libel.
Rep. Kastenmeier added in his letter that some members
of the subcommittee opposed any bill and others still favored
only absolute legislation. "It is important," he told Hanson,
"that there be substantial support from the media itself if
this legislation is to move successfully through both Houses
31of Congress and be signed by the President." He asked the 
ANPA to reconsider its opposition in view of the changes.
That was September 19. Less than a week earlier, the 
New York Times had reported that "there is a growing feeling
30"News Shield Bill Given Momentum," Atlanta (Ga.) Jour­
nal, Sept. 6, 1973, p. 17-B.
Letter from Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier to Arthur B. 
Hanson, Sept. 19, 1973 (copy furnished by ANPA).
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in the news-gathering industry that a Federal ’shield law' is
all but dead in Congress":
If ‘this is so, it was not the Nixon Administration's . 
opposition that has killed the possibility of a newsmen’s 
privilege law, but rather the press itself.
The industry is schizophrenic on the issue, and to 
get an acceptable bill it has to be totally united, the 
people involved in the Congressional fight for the bill 
agree.
The Times story also reported that the Joint Media Committee 
membership then included Sigma Delta Chi, the Radio-Television 
News Directors, the AP Managing Editors, the National Press 
Association [sic] , and the ASNE. Media committee chairman 
William Small reportedly was urging widespread industry sup­
port for the Cohen bill as "an extremely strong bill and, re­
alistically, as far as we can expect the House of Representa­
tives to go." He added: "It has become fashionable for some
in our profession to say that no bill is needed, that failing 
an absolute bill we ought simply to fall back on the First 
Amendment." Small said those who make such a claim are "fool­
ing themselves," and noted that the Supreme Court already had 
ruled that the First Amendment does not give reporters any
—  Otestimonial privileges. ^
Between September 19 and October 3, a complete reversal 
of position occurred in the ANPA, reportedly because of what 
the ANPA later described as the "substantial modifications"
3?Martin Arnold, "News Shield Law Stalls in Capital,"
New York Times, Sept. 13, 1973, p. 25.
1 8 3
Rep. Kastenmeier had proposed for the Cohen bill.-53 Reports 
are sketchy, but the decision-making began with the ANPA Com­
mittee on Government Relations (voting two to one) and its 
support of "a modified version of the bill if specific amend­
ments" were made as promised by Rep. Kastenmeier and if "a 
consensus could be reached of media organizations with which 
the ANPA had coordinated."34 Then came the London Compromise:
At a duly constituted Board meeting held in London, En­
gland, the first week of October [October 3], the ANPA 
Board had gone on record unanimously among those members 
present as favoring the position of the ANPA Government 
Relations Committee.35
Found only in Editor § Publisher on October 6, 197 3, 
here is the entire United States news coverage of that meet­
ing:
The board of directors of the American Newspaper Pub­
lishers Association began a four-day meeting in London, 
England, on Oct. 1 to discuss issues affecting the organ­
ization’s member daily newspapers in the United States
and Canada.36
33"ANPA Board of Directors Votes Support of iModified 
Shield Legislation," ANPA General Bulletin, no. 51 (Oct. 19, 
1973), p. 247.
34Ibid., pp. 247-48.
3 5Letter from Arthur B. Hanson to members and interested 
persons connected with the Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee, Oct. 
19, 1973 (copy furnished by ANPA).
■^Editor § Publisher, Oct. 6, 1973, p. 9. All informa­
tion supplied by ANPA on the London meeting follows:
"The Board of Directors of the American Newspaper Pub­
lishers Association met at the Savoy Hotel, London, En­
gland at 9:30 a.m. Monday and Tuesday October 1 and 2, and 
at 9:00 a.m. Wednesday, October 3. There were present 
Chairman David Taylor, Vice-Chairman Harold W. Andersen, 
Treasurer Len H. Small and Directors Richard H. Blacklidge, 
Lyell B. Clay, John M. Jones, Allen H. Neubarth, Dolph C. 
Simons, Jr., Joe D. Smith, Jr., and Richard C. Steele.
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The day after the London Compromise, October 4, 1973, 
was a big day for big-name newspaper people and publishers 
in the United States. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew was un­
der investigation for corruption and his lawyers wanted to 
prove a new kind of pre-trial prejudicial publicity in his 
case--publicity so intense that the grand jury deliberations 
then under way to secure an indictment against him were being 
prejudiced unconstitutionally. Federal Judge Walter E. Hoff­
man in Baltimore was sufficiently impressed by the argument 
to grant unprecedented authority for Agnew's lawyers to con­
duct their own investigation into alleged leaks by the Jus­
tice Department. The judge authorized subpoenas to news­
men, who were to be questioned in secret under oath about 
the sources of published information. The journalists were 
to bring with them "all writings and other forms of record 
(including drafts) reflecting or related to direct or indi­
rect communications" with employees of the government whose
Also present by invitation were former Directors J. How­
ard Wood and Charles H. Peters."
According to Who * s Who in America, 37th ed., Neuharth 
was a national regional director of Sigma Delta Chi and 
president of Gannett Co., Inc.; Simons was publisher of the 
Lawrence (Ks.) Journal-World; Steele was publisher of the 
Worcester (Mass.) Telegram-Gazette; Andersen was publisher 
of the Omaha Wor1d-Hera1d ; Taylor was publisher of the Bos­
ton Globe; Blacklidge was publisher of the Kokomo (Ind.') 
Tribune; Wood formerly was board chairman and publisher of 
the Chicago Tribune and Peters was president of the Gazette 
Printing Co., Ltd., Montreal.
^7Clifton Daniel, "Agnew Case: A Classic Battle on
Fair Trials and Freedom of Press," New York Times, Oct. 6, 
1973, p. 9.
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38work related to the Agnew investigation; in other words, 
their notes.
The subpoenas were served on reporters of the New York '
Times, the New York Daily News, the Washington Post, Newsweek,
Time, the Washington Star-News, and C B S . ^
Agnew's resignation October 11 ended the legal force of
the subpoenas, but the New York Times indulged' itself in a
fantasy of what might have been had the controversy continued:
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, publisher of The Times and Kath­
arine Graham, publisher of The Post, had been prepared 
to go to jail. So had been A. M. Rosenthal, managing ed­
itor of The Times; Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor 
of The Post; and Osborn Elliott, editor of Newsweek, 
which is owne.d by the Washington Post Company.40
The Times story continued:
The publishers and the reporters involved had decided 
that they would stand on the journalistic principle of 
refusing to disclose their sources, and Mr. Sulzberger 
and Mrs. Graham were prepared to go to jail with the re­
porters involved rather than disclose the sources and 
give up the reporters’ notes and records. . . .
The case involving Mr. Agnew and the reporters was 
different [from the Caldwell case] , and part of the news 
organizations’ strategy was to force the issue once again 
to the Supreme Court in the hope of at least further nar­
rowing the Caldwell ruling.
One difference was that the Agnew case was a pure case 
of newsmen's sources. There was no contention that the 
journalists involved might have witnessed the commission 
of a crime. . . .
The strategy of Mr. Sulzberger and Mrs. Graham was 
that, as chief executives of their corporations, they 
would say that the corporations, not the individual repor­
ters, owned the information, and that they were, there-
3% e w  York Times, Oct. 9, 1973, p. 1.
^Martin Arnold, "Resignation Ends a Court Test on Dis­
closure of News Sources," New York Times, Oct. 12, 1973, p. 
29.
40Ibid.
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fore, ordering the reporters not to turn it over to Mr. 
Agnew's lawyers or to the courts. They would, in essence, 
intervene between the court and their employees.
Among other things, it was hoped that the sheer drama 
of the publishers of two of the most influential news- 
gathering organizations possibly going to jail would have 
some subtle effect on the Supreme Court's deliberations, 
and at the same time perhaps force Congress and the public 
to consider more seriously any attacks on the First Amend­
ment. 41
Between the London Compromise and October 19 (the exact 
date is not clear), the ANPA'a Arthur Hanson reconvened the Ad 
Hoc Coordinating Committee as the ANPA board of directors had 
expected. The purpose was to see whether "any sort of consen­
sus could be developed amongst the media to support the 'Cohen 
Bill' as a m e n d e d . H a n s o n  was careful to note in his memo­
randum on the meeting that the decision was not all that im­
portant, for "irrespective of what bill might or might not be 
passed by the House of Representatives, there still had to be 
a bill passed by the Senate and a conference held on the re­
sults of the work of the two legislative bodies."
Hanson informed the media representatives of the ANPA 
decision in London, then took a poll of the group, which in­
cluded lawyers from the New York Times, Newsweek, NBC, CBS, 
ASNE, Association of American Publishers, National Newspaper 
Association, The Newspaper Guild, the Reporters Committee, 
the Joint Media Committee, and the Scripps-Howard chain. Ac­
cording to Hanson, the poll found
strong support for the position now being espoused by the
41Ibid.
42 Letter from Arthur Hanson to Ad Hoc Committee.
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ANPA on the House bill amongst all the electronic media 
represented as well as by the Joint Media Committee-, 
Scripps-Howard and the National Association.of Broad­
casters. The Reporters Committee took the position that 
it would not oppose the "Cohen Bill" as to be amended.
The ASNE Board is meeting to consider these develop­
ments on October 26. The American Association of Pub­
lishers (book publishers) is having . . . meetings . . . 
to consider these matters but they are favorably impres­
sed by developments. The National Newspaper Association 
still favors an absolute bill or not at all but will not 
actively oppose the "Cohen Bill” as amended. The New 
York Times maintains a similar position although not dis­
favoring a qualified bill. Newsweek was not prepared to 
state a position, . . . The Newspaper Guild would prefer 
an absolute bill but will undertake a re-examination ofthat posit ion.43
According to Hanson, the group agreed to ask the Kastenmeier 
subcommittee to draft a bill in final form for consideration 
by the Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee.
The ANPA board met again in December to ratify the 
course of events it had set in motion in London and to re­
view in detail the latest versions of the amendments pro­
posed for the Cohen bill. It drafted a few additional 
changes, but nothing substantial. The.ANPA board, announc­
ing agreement to support Rep. Cohen's two-tiered, qualified 
privilege, said that
any qualification will inevitably result in deterring 
potential sources of information from communicating with 
newsmen. Nevertheless, we believe that this hindrance 
to the free flow of information will be outweighed-by 
the overall benefits of H.R. 5928.44
As for agreeing with court powers to subpoena the source in
43Ibid.
44"Most News Media, House Subcommittee Now in Agree­
ment on Shield Legislation," ANPA General Bulletin, no. 4 
(Jan. 25, 1974), p. 20.
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a libel case, the ANPA offered a similar explanation:
Our view [is] that any qualification will deter potential 
sources of information from communicating with the news 
media. Nevertheless, we believe that the overall advan­
tages of the bill will outweigh the adverse effect of thedefamation qualification.^
With the new year, the New York Times announced re­
sults of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering since its mid- 
September report that a shield law was "all but dead."
Months of discussions, "conducted informally through meetings, 
letters and telephone calls" had borne fruit. "A majority 
of news media organizations and a House Judiciary subcommittee 
have reached general agreement on a bill to protect newsmen 
against forced disclosure of confidential information," it 
said. The January 4 report went on to describe the Cohen bill 
as amended, noting that the new version "provides slightly 
more protection than the one approved . . . last summer . . . 
but still falls short of the absolute protection against dis­
closure originally s o u g h t . "^6 If the deal was only "slight­
ly" better, why the sudden switch? The Times had an answer:
A key factor in the media’s decision to support the 
new version was a Federal court ruling last September 
that permitted lawyers for former Vice President Spiro 
T, Agnew to subpoena newsmen . . .
. . . the incident sharpened the media's realization
that some protection might b’e better than none. The Ag-
^*>Ibid.
^"News Shield Bill Spurred in House," New Yor k Times, 
Jan. 4, 1974, p. 41. A story on the same page reiterated 
the results of a November 1973 Gallup poll reporting that a 
total of 62 percent of 1,585 persons interviewed said news­
paper reporters should not be required to reveal confidential 
sources in court about information published, up from 57 per­
cent the year before.
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new subpoenas could not have been issued under the pro­
posed bill.
It sounds reasonable, but the Times had the month 
wrong. The Agnew subpoenas were in October, too late for 
them to have influenced the crucial decision. The London 
Compromise beat the wave of subpoenas by at least one day, 
probably more.48 por the other members of the Ad Hoc Coor­
dinating Committee, obviously, the Agnew incident could have 
been influential. But it seems unlikely that the subpoenas, 
which were issued, celebrated and killed in exactly one week, 
had more to do with the media majority's decision than the 
London Compromise. And the Times failed to penetrate the 
important mystery: what really changed the publishers'
minds?
Perhaps they were afraid of any more close calls. The
closest in history had occurred about the time the original
Cohen bill was drafted, in March 1973. Federal District 
Judge Charles R. Richey, presiding over civil suits between 
the Democrats and the Republicans concerning the Watergate 
break-in,49 quashed ten subpoenas for notes and testimony^
47jbid.
4^The Agnew subpoenas were not served until Oct. 6 
(see "Reporters' Counsel Meet on Strategy for Agnew In­
quiry," New York Times, Oct. 9, 1973, p. 25).
49Dembcratic National Committee v. McCord-(D.D.C.
1973), reprinted in 1973 Senate Hearings, pp. 537-40.
•^According to the court, the ten subpoenas 
"summoned members of the press to appear for depositions 
and bring-with them all documents, papers, letters, photo­
graphs, audio and video tapes relating in any way to the
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pending against newsmen and news organizations, among them 
Carl Bernstein, Robert Woodward and others working for or 
managing the Wrashington Post, the New York Times, Washington 
Star-News and Time magazine. The subpoenas were authorized 
at the request of the Committee for the Re-election of the 
President (CRP) and others in the President's camp who were 
being sued by the Democrats. According to United Press In­
ternational, the subpoenas were "widely considered to be an 
effort to learn the sources of leaks about the White House 
cover-up [of the break-in] so they could be stopped."51
Judge Richey's opinion on the order to quash the sub­
poenas was a significant but unique ruling granting a qual­
ified privilege under the First Amendment based on a weigh­
ing of merits between the public harm that might be done by 
the disclosures and the benefit to the private civil defen­
dants. The opinion wras an illustration in microcosm of the 
status of newsmen's privilege in 1973:
The Court is well aware that other courts in "civil" 
and "criminal" cases,9 and the Supreme Court of the Unit-
Watergate 'break-in' or other political espionage opera­
tions against the DNC [Democratic National Committee] and 
associated organizations and individuals; all manuscripts, 
notes, or tape recordings of communications during the 
period June 17, 197 2, through November 7, 197 2, with a 
broad range of DNC officials and. employees, persons con­
nected with the McGovern-Shriver campaign, the FBI, the 
Metropolitan Police Department, or the United States At­
torney's office for the District of Columbia; and all 
drafts, copies, and final drafts of news material relat­
ing in any way to the Watergate break-in or other politi­
cal espionage operations against the DNC or connected en­
tities and individuals" (ibid., p. 537).
^Fields , p . 4 .
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ed States in a landmark case involving a newsman's testi­
mony before a grand jury,10 have been reluctant in the 
absence of a statute to recognize even a qualified news­
man's privilege from disclosure of confidential news 
sources. In view of the decisions and circumstances pre­
sent in the above-cited cases, it is instructive to note 
what is not present in the instant cases. These cases 
are not "criminal" cases, and even though they are pri­
marily actions for money damages, their importance trans­
cends anything yet encountered in the annals of American 
judicial history. Moreover, Movants [the subpoenaed news­
men] are not parties to the actions, but have merely been 
called to testify and produce documents at deposition.
The parties on whose behalf the subpoenas were issued 
[CRP] have not demonstrated that the testimony and mater­
ials sought go to the "heart of [their] claim," as was 
found to be true in the case of Garland v. Torre.H  What 
is ultimately involved in these cases betxvein the major 
political parties is the very integrity of the judicial 
and executive branches of our government and our political 
processes, for without information concerning the workings 
of the government, the public's confidence in that integ­
rity will inevitably suffer.12 This is expecially true 
where, as here, strong allegations have been made of cor­
ruption within the highest circles of government, and in 
a campaign for the Presidency itself. This Court cannot 
blind itself to the possible "chilling effect" the en­
forcement of these broad subpoenas would have on the flow 
of information to the press, and so to the public.15 This 
Court stands convinced that if it allows the discourage­
ment of investigative reporting into the highest levels of 
government, no amount of legal theorizing could allay the 
public suspicions engendered by its actions and by the mat­
ters alleged in these lawsuits. . . .
. . . The Court in no way wishes to imply that today’s 
ruling constitutes the implicit recognition of an absolute 
privilege for newsmen. Such would clearly be improper un­
der the Branzburg decision. It may be that at some future 
date, the parties will be able to demonstrate to the Court 
that they are unable to obtain the same information from 
sources other, than Movants, and that they have a compel- ' 
ling and overriding interest in the information thus 
sought. Until that time, however, the Court will not re­
quire Movants to testify . . .  or to make any of the re­
quested materials available.52
^See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F. 2d 545 (C.A. 2), 
cert denied, 358 U.S'. 910 (1958) ; Murphy v. Colorado, 
(Colo. Sup. Ct., unreported opinion), cert, denied, 365
^ 1973 Senate Hearings, pp. 539-40.
U.S. 843 (1961); In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.
2d 472 (1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.
2d 729, cert, denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
^0Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
12259 F. 2d at 550.
1 ?Of equal importance is the necessity of a well-in­
formed public which is fully able to participate in the 
political process. This has long been recognized by the 
Supreme Court to be a basic concern underlying the First 
Amendment’s protection of freedom of the press. See, . 
e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233: (1936).
^ S e e  Baker v. F § F Investment, 470 F. 2d 778, 782 
(C.A. 2 1972).
Judge Richey’s decision to strike a balance in the 
press' favor was, nevertheless, a close call for the biggest 
of the big-name publishing concerns. His expressed willing­
ness to reconsider the balance in different circumstances 
must have sent a chill into the press’ collective heart.
The decision of the publishers to embrace a statute less than 
”reaffirmative” of the First Amendment, one guaranteeing con­
fidentiality at least in pre-trial proceedings, is understand 
able under the circumstances, perhaps even patriotic in the 
atmosphere of the Watergate crisis. The next question, why 
publishers were less than forthright about their reasons for 
compromising, seems less important than the reasons them- . 
selves, and will be abandoned here.
CHAPTER IX
IN CONGRESS: IMPASSE
Apparently,, the ASNE. board and the American Association 
of Publishers decided against lending their support to the 
Cohen bill then pending in the House Judiciary Committee of 
the Ninety-third Congress.
Just before the New York Times announced in early 1974 
that "a majority of news media organizations" supported the 
bill for qualified newsmen's privilege, another report listed 
the supporters as CBS, NBC, the National Association of Broad­
casters, the Associated Press Managing Editors, Sigma Delta 
Chi, the ANPA, Scripps-Howard chain, the Radio-Television News 
Directors Association and the National Press Photographers As­
sociation- - -^-essentially the original Joint Media Committee 
with ASNE swapping positions with ANPA.
The first round of debate on March 26, 1974, revealed 
strong opposition to the Cohen bill in the Judiciary Commit­
tee. . Liberal representatives opposed it for what it failed 
to protect, and conservatives opposed it for what it would
l"The Kastenmeier Bill Gets Major Media Backing," Press 
Censorship Newsletter, no. Ill (November-December 1 9 7 3 ) p.
16.
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2protect. Rep. Kastenmeier became pessimistic. Soon, the 
hearings on the articles of impeachment against Richard Nixon 
would bury the issue for the remainder of the Ninety-third 
Congress.^
The Ninety-fourth Congress in 1975 saw the immediate 
introduction of three new privilege bills in the H o u s e ; ^  two 
others came later. The Senate had given up. The leading 
House measure was H.R. 215, very similar to the old Cohen bill 
and sponsored by Democrat Kastenmeier and Republicans Rails- 
back and Cohen. It is reproduced in the Appendix as Exhibit 
B.
On short notice, Rep. Kastenmeier decided to hold hear­
ings on his bill and, as we learned in Chapter I, to "observe 
where we are on this issue at this particular time in his­
tory .
The leadoff witness on April 23, 1973, for the new Ford 
Administration was Antonin Scalia, an assistant Attorney Gen­
eral, who opposed the Kastenmeier bill because it ^^ould hinder
^"Amended Newsmen’s Shield Bill Stalled in Full House 
Judiciary Committee," Press Censorship Newsletter, no. IV 
(April-May 1974), p. 27.
7 -"Federal Shield Bills Stalled by Impeachment Inquiry," 
Press Censorship Newsletter, no. V (August-September 1974), 
p. 38; "Federal Shield Laws Die in Congress," Press Censor­
ship Newsletter, no. VI (December 1974-January 1975), p. 35.
^"Three Newsman’s Shield Law Bills in House; No Bills 
Intro in the Senate," Press Censorship Newsletter, no. VII 
(April-May 1975), pp. 16-17.
**197 5 House Hearings, p . 6.
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law enforcement and, he said, stimulate disrespect for the
law. The latter point was a new one in the Congressional
debate. Here is how Scalia explained it:
If . . . the present bill is passed, it would be entire­
ly possible for you to watch on your television screens 
in the near future a face-to-face interview wdth Patricia 
Hearst and other allged members of the SLA now fugitives 
from justice and under indictment in connection with sev­
eral crimes. Law enforcement officers would in no way be 
able to learn from the newsman the location at which the 
interview was taped, nor would they be able to obtain a 
copy of the tape itself for the purpose of identifying 
the location from intrinsic evidence, or even for the pur­
pose of circulating the most recent photograph of the fu­
gitives.
In my view, even the possibility of such a situation 
. . . would make a mockery of the criminal justice pro­
cess. It would be bad not merely because it would pre­
vent the apprehension of the fugitives in question, but 
more importantly, because it would demonstrate in stark 
fashion our lack of earnestness in the matter of law en­
forcement. The public would in effect be told: Estab­
lishing the conditions which make such a program possible 
is more important than the relatively inconsequential in­
terest of capturing individuals who may have violated our 
laws and who may injure our citizens again in the future.
The Government cannot display an attitude of this 
sort towards the enforcement of its laws without soon 
causing all of its citizens to take those laws and their 
enforcement less seriously. The freedom of the press is 
important, but it must be protected in a way that does 
not bring the law enforcement process into contempt.6
Interestingly, Scalia opposed the new Kastenmeier bill 
for two of the same reasons the ANPA originally opposed the 
Cohen bill--for its creation of a two-tiered system of priv­
ilege and for its casting of a substantial doubt on the cer­
tainty of the immunity and making the public benefit of it 
practically xvorthless.
6Ibid., p. 14.
''ibid. , pp. 7-8.
196
Because the Kastenmeier bill would extend the priv­
ilege to anyone engaged in public communications, it was 
at once dangerously discriminating and impracticably in­
clusive, Scalia told the subcommittee. He said ’’freedom of 
the press” in the Constitution
does not use the term ’’press” in the institutional sense. 
It does not mean freedom for newspapers and publishing 
houses, but rather freedom to publish. . . . But in thus 
extending the sweep of this legislation to all of those 
whom the first amendment is designed to protect, the im- 
practicality of what is sought to be achieved becomes all 
the more strikingly a p p a r e n t . ^
He also revived some old objections, namely that crim­
inal types would set up newspapers to hide behind the immu­
nity; that the privilege would frustrate Sixth Amendment com­
pulsory process and lead to mandatory dismissal of prosecu­
tions; that it would hinder redress for libel; and that, 
while not unconstitutional, the federal-state application of 
the bill was inconsistent with "the spirit of federalism."9 
The best protection for the free press consistent with the 
government’s righteous claims, Scalia said, is "constant ad­
vertence to the particular sensitivity of this area by law 
enforcement agencies themselves. At the Federal level, this 
has been assured by Justice Department guidelines,"^.
The next witnesses were Jack Nelson and Fred Graham of 
the Reporters Committee, which by then had abandoned its 1973
®Ibid., p . 8.
^Ibid., pp. 6-12.
lOlbid., p. 12.
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pledge to the ANPA to stand aside if the publishers wanted
to compromise in Congress. Urging passage of an absolute
and preemptive privilege statute, the reporters stood by
their previous arguments:
Courts have tended to stretch qualifications that have 
been written into State shield laws, and we fear that a 
qualified Federal law would weaken the rights of jour­
nalists to protect their sources, and could encourage 
prosecutors and-others to subpoena reporters.
We believe that the first amendment protects jour­
nalists from being compelled to testify under circum­
stances that impair their capacity to collect and pub­
lish news. Despite the Supreme Court's adverse decision 
in Branzburg v. Hayes, lower courts have quashed sub­
poenas against journalists in a number of cases since 
Branzburg. Also, journalists have generally demonstrated 
a determination to resist compelled testimony that seems 
to have discouraged some efforts to subpoena reporters.
In short, the Branzburg case has not proved to be the 
disaster that some feared it xvould be, and we fear that 
reporters might be inviting a worse result if they sup­
ported a qualified shield bill simply to get a law on the 
books.
Subpoenas nevertheless are a problem, they added, "unpleas­
ant, distracting and expensive." Small publications, under­
ground and student newspapers especially are burdened even 
by the threat, they said. A good solution \rould be "an un­
qualified, airtight shield law that would preclude subpoena­
ing in the first place."
Under questioning, the reporters said they would sup­
port the Kastenmeier bill without its qualifications and even 
would support limiting the privilege to information "re­
ceived or obtained . . .  in express or implied confi­
dence," as the bill required. Fred Graham remarked, "I do
-^Ibid, , pp. 94-95.
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not believe that most journalists would say that they think 
a privilege should extend beyond information that is ob­
tained, either expressed or implied, under a situation of 
confidentiality.
Wouldn’t any bill be as likely (or unlikely) to be 
amended by future Congresses, they were asked. Jack Nelson 
answered:
I think you make a good point, and that is one reason 
a number of reporters have hesitated to support any bill,, 
and quite a few reporters and news organizations feel 
there should be no bill. But I think, after careful study 
of the situation, that the Reporters Committee has unani­
mously reached the decision that an unqualified bill, with 
the sense of Congress being that it should not be quali­
fied, would not be likely to be amended.
April 24, 197 5, was the second and final day of the 
hearing on H.R. 215. Len H. Small, ANPA board member and 
chairman of the Government Relations Committee, was there, 
as was ANPA lawyer Arthur Hanson. The grilling they received 
from at least one member of the subcommittee concentrated on 
the London Compromise, or more accurately, the reasoning be­
hind it. Knowing it was coming, Len Small made a complex (if 
not confusing) argument that "absolute" and "qualified" had 
become meaningless:
In truth and in fact, there is no constitutional con­
cept of an "absolute privilege." Nor is there any con­
cept of a "qualified privilege" under the law in the pure 
philosophical sense.
What is meant by these terms under the law is that 
certain factual circumstances evolve which meet qualifi­
cations dictating that source or subject matter should be 
privileged as a matter of right . . .
Under certain circumstances conditions dictate that
12Ibid., p. 101.
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the source of the subject matter should be revealed . . . 
and this has come to be known as a "qualified privilege." 
Notwithstanding this terminology, such a privilege, from 
a court standpoint, is absolute within the qualification.
It appears to us that . . . H.R. 215 . . .  is the es­
tablishment of those qualifying factual situations where­
in a newsman does not have to disclose his confidential 
sources. . . .  -
It appears to us that it is nonproductive to take the 
position that it would be better to have no bill than a 
"qualified bill." Our reasons . . . are pragmatic.
The Supreme' Court decision^in' Branzburg was actually 
established by a 8 to 1 vote . . .  in terms of the posi­
tion of "all or nothing" under the first amendment. . . .
Justice Stewart and his two supporters in Branzburg 
accepted the qualifications advanced by Professor Amster­
dam, the attorney for Caldwell. . . .
We believe that H.R. 215 does better than the dissent 
and comes closer to the libertarian position than did 
Justice Stewart . . .
We would remind the committee that, whether we like 
it or not, the preferred constitutional viewpoint as ac­
cepted by most constitutional authorities and by the ma­
jority of the Supreme Court as now constituted, and as 
constituted in the past throughout history, is that 
every amendment to the Constitution is subject to the in­
terplay of the social and political forces which exist at 
the time that a given fact situation arises for the 
Court's determination.
In some instances, first amendment considerations :‘ 
will prevail. In other instances, sixth amendment con­
siderations will prevail. And, still in others, fifth 
amendment considerations will prevail.
The Constitution of the United States is not a doc­
ument of fixed absolutes. It is a document of compromise 
as the mores of the people dictate in the times, and in 
accordance with the views of the nine Justices interpre­
ting the Constitution in light of those mores at that 
time. This is one of the reasons that the Constitution 
is referred to as a "living document."
We are pleased to support H.R. 215 as being . . .  an 
effective adjustment.13
Hanson and Small discounted the precedent that pas­
sage of a qualified shield law would set:
. . . it is true that what Congress gives Congress 
can take away. But, if we have nothing and we get some­
thing and it is taken away, we are no worse off than we
1:>Ibid. , pp. 105-6.
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are today. There is always the question of testing any­
thing the Congress does in the courts [anyway]. 4
Congressman Robert Drinan was very upset with the 
ANPA's accommodation to the Kastenmeier bill's chief qual­
ification (disclosure of unpublished information, at trial) 
which, he said, had never been justified by evidence. No
facts had been offered-that., in civil or,criminal cases, it.-.
was essential to "pierce the shield of journalists." He de- 
. manded to know why the ANPA had given up the. fight for an un­
qualified privilege. Arthur Hanson was squirming. He indi­
cated what the 197 3 hearings showed, namely that resistance 
to unqualified privilege had been at least as great within 
the press as it had been among the lawmakers:
Mr. HANSON: We have gone through this bill very tho­
roughly, as you know, and the ANPA has gone through it 
thoroughly, and we spent not just "a" meeting, but as Mr. 
Small knows, and you gentlemen know, we had many meetings 
of a conglomerate of the media groups and the media repre­
sentatives, and it was not very easy to get the conclusion 
that came out when we presented a bill to both this commit­
tee and the Senate side, which was an absolute bill.
What I would suggest to you is that no matter how ab­
solute you make a bill, the courts are going to test it in 
light of the Supreme Court’s views of the first amendment. 
And I would be just as satisfied if this compromise was
enacted to let the courts take a look at it, as we said in
our testimony, to let the courts take a look at it and
then come back in 5 to 10 years from now, if it needed
some further work on it.
. . .  I submit there is no constitutional absolute.
Mr. DRINAN: . . . The right of a journalist not to
be subpoenaed is obviously not a personal right. It is 
the right of the public to know, of which the newsman is 
a trustee. The essential question, therefore, comes to 
this:
Who, if anyone, can waive the right of the public to 
have media that cannot be made into a part of the law en­
forcement agencies of the Nation?
It is my conviction that no Federal or State statute
14Ibid., p. 113.
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should try to set forth those circumstances which would 
permit the Government to set aside the right of the 
public to know.
Mr. HANSON: I only submit that the Constitution it­
self is a statute adopted by the people, adopted by the 
necessary majority of the State houses of the original 
States. . . .
So, basically, the first amendment itself is subject 
to amendment if someone wants to start down that road.
It is not an absolute Constitution, really, so I would 
disagree with your statement on that, sir.
Mr. DRINAN: One last question. How recently, and
how intensely, have all of the media caucused among ' 
themselves on this? The testimony you are giving now, 
you gave in effect 3 years ago, after the media got to­
gether and said, well, this is the best thing we can get.
But have you come together, prior to these hearings, 
and said, "what shall we say in the year 1975, that is 
new?"
Mr. SMALL: No, we have not. 5
The final witnesses that day were Richard Jencks and 
William Small, executives of CBS. They said they were glad 
for the "opportunity to renew CBS’ commitment to the prompt 
enactment of legislation which will protect journalists 
against the compulsory disclosure of their unpublished 
sources and information." The Kastenmeier bill would, they 
said, "advance the ability of journalists to carry out their 
responsibilities . . . .  We enthusiastically support its 
passage." Jencks continued:
Under this bill, no longer will a reporter face jail 
if he refuses to testify before a grand jury about his 
undisclosed sources or his unpublished notes. Nor' will 
a broadcast news organization have to risk being held in 
contempt for refusing to turn over its unpublished film 
or outtakes in connection with a congressional in­
quiry. . . .
While the bill is not absolute at the trial stage, 
it realistically requires that an adequate showing be 
made for disclosure--with the right of the journalist to 
promptly appeal an adverse ruling.
15Ibid., pp. 116-17.
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Finally, the bill is applicable to the States, which 
should make it possible for journalists to know their 
basic rights wherever they may gather news, publish or 
broadcast .16
Congressman Drinan also pressed an attack on the CBS 
position. Small was satisfied that the Kastenmeier bill 
would ’’solve fully all but the rarest of cases involving 
newsmen.” Jencks was satisfied that all "frivolous” gov­
ernmental inquiries would be stopped by the requirements 
laid out in the bill, which would occasion only inquiries 
he rated as matters "of consequence.”
In a statement for the record, NBC's Richard Wald es­
sentially agreed with CBS. "We believe,” he said, "that all 
of us seeking to reach this objective--legislators, press, 
and others-- should now stop exploring alternative means and 
get behind this bill.” Without a statute, Wald said, polit­
ical tensions that erupt from time to time would "put at 
risk the ability of the press to perform its traditional 
function as a conduit to the general public of information 
and views without fear or favor of any individual group or 
institution." He concluded:
I would be less than candid if I, as a newsman, ad­
vocated H.R. 215 as my ideal.. It falls short of provid­
ing the protection that an expansive view of the Consti­
tution \\rould afford. Some no doubt believe the press 
needs and is entitled to that larger measure under the 
Constitution. That goal, however right in. theory, has 
proved to be unattainable in practice. H.R. 5928, the 
predecessor of H.R. 215, had after much debate and com­
promise been accepted by a consensus of those active in 
this field. The basis of that conclusion, in which we 
concur, is that the bill will afford a substantial mea-
16Ibid., p. 120.
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sure of protection* it is workable, and it can be 
passed. We believe this conclusion applies equally 
to H.R. 215 and for this reason . . . NBC News supports 
its enactment into .law.
When the hearing adjourned at 11:45 a.m. that April 
24, it marked the end of an era in the debate. None of the 
newsmen's privilege bills in the House came to a vote, and 
the fading interest"in the subject in the Ninety-fourth Con­
gress was a bright light compared with the action in the 
- Ninety-fifth Congress. As late as mid-July 1977, there was 
no Congressional action on the subject.^ One Congressman 
knowledgeable on the subject commented, "It appears that no 
further action will be taken until the news media reach a 
consensus with respect to which form [absolute or qualified] 
of legislation they prefer. a  spokesman for the ANPA in­
dicated that, were the same hearing held in 1977, the pub­
lishers' position xvould be the same:
ANPA would still prefer to have an absolute, unqualified 
bill. But, absent congressional support for that type 
of legislation, ANPA supports a qualified bill which at 
least offers some very substantial protection for re­
porters.
The qualified newsman's shield bill in the 94th Con­
gress, HR 215, never moved out of the House subcommittee 
because there was then and remains now a difference of - 
views on this subject among many in the news business. 
Some support a qualified shield bill; some are willing 
to accept a qualified shield with the understanding that 
an absolute shield bill cannot be passed by Congress;
^Ibid. , pp. 129-30.
X 8Telephone intervie\>r with Kevin Allen, legal intern, 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, July 18, 1977.
1 QLetter to author from Rep. Charles W. Whalen, Jr., 
May 12, 1977.
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others want only an absolute shield bill or no legisla­
tion whatsoever; and still others want no legislation 
at all, preferring to rely on the First Amendment des­
pite the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg.
The government’s position in 1977 also resembled that 
of the Ford Administration in 1975 and the Nixon Administra­
tion in 1973. A spokesman for Attorney General Griffin Bell 
in May 1977 revealed that Bell-had- no plans to modify.. the 
Justice Department's 1973 administrative rules with respect 
..to subpoenas and arrests of newsmen. The spokesman declined 
to comment on the Attorney General's views on reporters' priv­
ilege, preferring to wait until Congress presents another bill 
for comment.^
In August 1977 a spokesman for President Jimmy Carter 
said the President was cautious, but negative, on the de­
sirability of protective legislation for journalists:
I can advise you that the Administration is studying the 
issue of statutory protection of newsmen’s information 
and will continue the review. As of now, the President's 
inclination is not in favor of statutory protection. He 
has indicated concern about unresolved questions such as 
national security considerations and the sanctity of
grand jury proceedings.22
One case that could have generated renewed Congressional 
action was that of CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr, who was 
subpoenaed by the House Ethics Committee and ordered to testi-
^Letter to author from James E. Donahue, Manager, Gov­
ernment Affairs, American Newspaper Publishers Association, 
July 21, 1977.
^Letter to author from Leon Ulman, Deputy Assistant At­
torney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 16, 1977.
? 7Letter to author from Jim Purks, Special Assistant, 
Media Liaison, The White House, Aug. 24, 1977.
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fy in September 1976. The committee wanted to know who had 
leaked a House report on CIA intelligence activities to 
Schorr in January, 1976. Nearly four hundred persons were 
questioned before the Ethics Committee turned to Schorr.23 
The correspondent appeared before the committee, but pro­
tested the subpoena itself as a blow against the free press.
He also objected to the terms of the subpoena, which de­
manded his notes relating "in any way” to the investigation.^ 
In a statement, parts of which were reported in news broad­
casts nationwide, Schorr said:
I take the same position that Dr. Frank Stanton, the 
President of CBS Inc. took in 1971. He refused to comply 
with the House Commerce Committee subpoena demanding the 
scripts and the so-called "out-takes" of interviews 
filmed in preparation for the CBS television documentary, 
"The Selling of the Pentagon." His position then and 
mine today is that the internal process of preparing news 
for publication or for broadcast cannot be subjected to 
the compulsory process of subpoena without subverting the 
purposes of the First Amendment. . . .  My role in the pub- 
. lication of the report and my right to withhold the 
source are protected by the Constitution. . . .
For some of us--doctors, lawyers, clergymen, and jour- 
nalists--it is an article of faith that we must keep con­
fidential those matters entrusted to use only because of 
the assurance that they would remain confidential.
For a journalist, the most crucial kind of confidence 
is the identity of a source of information. To betray a 
confidential source would mean to dry up many future 
sources for many future reporters. . . .
But, beyond all that, to betray a source would be to 
betray myself', my career, my life. I cannot do it. To
7 x "Ethics Committee Subpoenas Schorr Seeking Source of 
Intelligence Report on CIA Foreign Tactics," Press Censor­
ship Newsletter, no. X (September-October 1976), pp. 54-55.
24"Text of Opening Statement by Daniel Schorr Before 
House Committee," New York Times, Sept. 16, 1976, p. 69.
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say I refuse to do it is not saying it right. I cannot 
do it.25
The committee apparently was persuaded not to cite 
Schorr for contempt of Congress. New York Times columnist 
Anthony Lewis commented that, had the Schorr case made it to 
the courts, Congress' broad investigatory powers could have 
been tested against those of the grand jury upheld in Branz- 
burg. He said Congress' decision to let the Schorr case rest 
may have illustrated what to do with the debate surrounding 
press subpoenas in general:
Curiously, that result might be regarded by Justice 
White and the Supreme Court majority as support for their 
view that the issue should be left largely to the give 
and take of society. Instead of writing a journalist's 
privilege rigidly into the Constitution, they might say, 
we should let the outcome be influenced by such factors 
as the strength of the reporter's convictions, because 
that instructs our d e m o c r a c y . 26
Indeed, Schorr's focus on the integrity of the edi­
torial process may have been instructive-- sharpening under­
standing of the subpoena debate within'the press more, per­
haps, than any other case in the 197 0s. Two months after 
Schorr's testimony, the New York Times published one of its 
periodic reviews of the outstanding subpoena cases. This 
review was the first, it seems, to recognize that there is 
more to the subpoena debate than the "right to know." Times 
news analyst Deirdre Carmody wrote:
Reporters' notes are jealously guarded-- even when
25ibid.
Anthony Lewis, "The Press and Its Right to Silence: 
Not Yet Clarified," New York Times, Sept. 19, 1976, p. IV-1.
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they do not contain confidential informat ion--because 
they contain raw material that may be unverified or even 
irrelevant. They are a vital part of a newspaper's de­
cision-making or its editorial process because they are 
the first step in producing the finished story that ap­
pears in the paper.
Most newspapers would agree that under the First 
Amendment, the editorial process is not to be inter­
fered with by anyone, particularly government. But, 
they argue, if a reporter turns over his notes in court, 
he opens himself to questions such as, "If this appeared 
in your notes why didn't it appear in the story you 
wrote?"
Newspapers contend that the decision of what to in­
clude in a story is an inherent part of the editorial 
process and should not be subjected to any outside scru­
tiny.
It is at this point in the argument that many skeptics 
simply throw up their hands and ask why all this should- 
be so fiercely guarded by newspapers. Why should news­
papers not be subjected to the same kind of scrutiny they 
impose on others?
The First Amendment specialists ansiver this by saying 
that the First Amendment, which prohibits abridgement of 
freedom of the press, is based on the assumption that a 
high potential for evil-doing exists in government. They 
point out that a special mandate was given to the-press 
by those who drew up the Constitution to monitor the pro­
cesses of government and to report to the people, through 
the newspapers, any governmental abuses.
It is why the press, in order to carry out its man­
date effectively, must maintain absolute separation from 
government. It also explains why so much importance is 
attached to protecting confidential sources--such as 
people who work in government --because it is often the 
information from these sources that is the first step in 
exposing governmental wrongdoing.27
Attempts beginning in 1976 to reform the federal grand- 
jury system have involved some of the same press groups that 
fought for newsmen’s privilege legislation, with the same or 
similar goal: ending governmental use of the press for law
enforcement.
o 7 ̂ Deirdre Carmody, "Reporters and the Subpoena," New 
York Times, Dec. 15, 1976, p. 11-10.
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The Reporters Committee, testifying for procedural re­
forms that would ease grand-jury pressure on newsmen, asked 
Congress to counter the trend in the courts and recognize 
some validity in the First Amendment protection of confiden­
tial sources. "Federal courts may feel themselves free to 
completely ignore a First Amendment claim if Congress is si­
lent," it said.28 explained:
We continue to believe that news reporters have an 
absolute privilege under the First Amendment to withhold 
from government the identity of their news sources and 
the content of unpublished information. We think that 
the press is independent and that the public must have 
the confidence to feel that when it talks to a news re­
porter, it is not talking to the FBI or to a grand jury, 
based on the whim of a government prosecutor. When one 
considers the resources of the federal government--18,000 
FBI agents, 94 U.S. district courts with the power to 
convene grand juries and 94 U.S. Attorneys offices plus 
thousands of marshals and other law enforcement agents 
in the Department of Treasury and the Secret Service, 
etc.--we think there is virtually no instance where the 
government, with its wiretapping, subpoena and search 
and seizure powers, cannot find the same information 
from non-press persons it wishes to discover from a news 
reporter if it wants to.29
The Newspaper Guild also testified for grand-jury re­
form, supporting a suggested limit on jail sentences for con­
tempt of the grand jury and restrictions on judges' powers:
We think the six-month limit on contempt con­
finements . . .  is a badly needed reform; as matters 
stand, news gatherers and others can be put behind bars 
for the length of the grand-jury term--as long as 18 
months. But, in the case of news gatherers, at least, 
we think the provision should go farther. Whatever 
justification there can be for jailing reporters in or­
der to compel their testimony, there can be none for 
jailing them as punishment. A news gatherer who refused
2 8Testimony of Landau, p. 41.
29 •Ibid., p. 35.
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to answer questions before a grand jury is doing so in 
accordance with the highest standards of his profession; 
to punish him or her for doing so is unconscionable. The 
v e r y  least we feel should be enacted is a provision ex­
empting from criminal contempt any person who refuses to 
give information obtained in the course of gathering, re­
ceiving, or processing information for any communications 
medium-^0
Governmental powers to grant compulsory immunity to re­
porters who might plead the Fifth Amendment to questions from
a grand jury also should be revoked, said the Newspaper
'Guild:
Reporters, quite candidly, are more reluctant than 
most to plead the Fifth Amendment; they are much happier 
--if less successful--pleading the First. In the case of 
a news gatherer, pleading the Fifth is not only regarded, 
however wrongly, as implying guilt but seems to suggest 
an involvement not in accord with the news gatherer's 
role as a detached observer. But reporters have occa­
sionally made such pleas when asked to reveal confiden­
tial information or sources. . . .
Forcing reporters to disclose such information or 
sources may be requiring them to testify to their own 
disadvantage [despite the grant of immunity], seriously 
damaging their ability to perform their job. If, in the 
words of a federal judge many years ago, compulsory im­
munity enables the government to "probe the secrets of 
every conversation, or society, by extending compulsory 
pardon to one of its participants," in the case of news
gatherers, it makes the government a potential party to
every confidence given a reporter by a source of news.
As long as absolute privilege for news gatherers does not 
exist, they should not be denied this avenue of protec­
tion. 31
30Statement of Charles A. Perlik, Jr., president, The 
Newspaper Guild (AFL-CIO) on H.R. 94 and other grand jury re­
form bills, prepared for delivery to the Subcommittee on Im­
migration, Citizenship and International Law, House Commit­
tee on the Judiciary, June 1, 1977 (The Newspaper Guild,
1125 Fifteenth St., N.W., Washington, B.C. 20005), pp. 5-6.
■^Ibid, p. 6.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
The history. o.f debate surrounding governmental sub-' 
poenas of the press suggests a coherent and potentially ef­
fective theory that could be used to reopen political con­
sideration of a ban on subpoenas for unpublished information.
The theory assumes, that anonymous speech is among the 
forms of free speech protected by the First Amendment, and 
that it can assume many forms, all of them having a connec­
tion to publishing. The purest form is the publishing of a 
work which has been assigned a pseudonym. Another includes 
the passive or active provision of documents or information 
to supplement the written work of an identified author.
Other forms might include the admittance or presence of an 
author observing the activities of persons, with or without 
their knowledge, where the objective is to communicate news 
and views (in this case "actions” are symbolic speech).
The theory argues that anonymous speech, in view of its 
significant political history, deserves the protection af­
forded in law to the act of publishing itself and therefore 
cannot be restrained or intimidated (as through subpoenas for 
sources and information) except to prevent "direct, immediate 
or irreparable damage to our Nation" (New York Times Co. v.
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U . S . [1971]).
Because anonymous speech must have a highly protected 
status to guarantee it as a political liberty, its use and 
protection must be regarded as an institutional prerogative 
of publishing. As such, the control of anonymous speech is 
the responsibility of publishers, not those employed or con­
tracted by them. (This point greatly enhances the political 
value of the theory because it reduces the number of persons 
who would claim immunity from subpoena.)
In summary, the theory of anonymous speech holds that 
governmental subpoena power over unpublished information 
should be abolished because it threatens two fundamental 
political liberties: a freedom from subpoena that guarantees
the effectiveness of publishing anonymous speech (and which 
is available to anyone who owns a press),^ and the right to 
speak anonymously without the fear of governmental intimida­
tion represented in subpoenas for unpublished information. 
Obviously, these two rights merge in the limiting case of a 
single individual who, for example, wishes to publish his own 
work anonymously using his own press.
The Supreme Court agrees that freedom of the press is a 
’’fundamental personal right,” but it has not recognized in it
-‘-"Freedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal right' 
which 'is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It nec­
essarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. . . . The press in 
its historical connotation comprehends every sort of publica­
tion which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.* 
Lovell v. Griffen, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938)” (quoted in 
Supreme Court Reports, Book 408, pp. 703-4).
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the freedom from subpoenas necessary for the press to preserve 
the constructive purposes of anonymous speech that it applaud- 
ec* *n Talley v. Califoi~nia (1960) .
Even if the Court were to receive an appropriate case to 
test the right to anonymity as affected by the subpoena power, 
the Court likely1 would rule against ft if it involved the gov­
ernment's power to investigate or prosecute crime. This can 
be inferred from the majority opinion in Talley, where the 
Justices indicated that laws "aimed at providing a way to 
identify those responsible” for crime could defeat the right 
to anonymity, providing that there was no alternative. In 
Branzburg v. Hayes (1972), an eight-man majority supported the 
notion that the press is a legitimate tool for law enforce­
ment (through access to unpublished information), although 
they disagreed whether prosecutors should be required to show 
"compelling need." In that case, the Court majority clearly 
indicated that the judiciary is not in the position to judge 
the political value of failure to uphold criminal laws by 
every means within its disposal. Hoi^ever, it said Congress’ 
power includes the right to make the judgment by creating a 
testimonial privilege "as narrow or broad as deemed neces-•: 
sary." But Congress has not been persuaded by press argu­
ments so far.
Congress needs convincing evidence that the press is 
serious and united--at least as united as it was in support 
of newspapers defending the Pentagon Papers case. A basic 
strategy for increasing pressure on Congress has been con-
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conceived by those two influential publishers, Katharine
Graham and Arthur 0. Sulzberger. We recall that as chief
executives of their corporations
they would say that the corporations, not the individ­
ual reporters, owned the information, and that they 
were, therefore, ordering the reporters not to turn it 
over . . .  to the courts. They would, in essence, in­
tervene between the court and their employees.
Mr. Sulzberger and Mrs. Graham recognized the potential im-r
pact of the strategy on political and judicial thought. They
hoped it would have "soie subtle effect" on the Supreme
Court and, "perhaps force Congress and the public to consider
more seriously" the First Amendment claim involved. This
study will not dispute their assumption.^
The timidity, vacillation and faithless complaisancy of
publishers have been serious handicaps in efforts to end the
government's power over unpublished information. Well into
the 1930s, we recall, publishers seemed content to decry the.
oppression of reporters with expressions of sympathy for
those "brave young spirits" who faced "judicial torture" on
their behalf. In 1959, after all the arguments were over in
the Marie Torre case, Editor § Publisher had to reach deeply
The Reporters Committee reacted to the Times story on 
the Sulzberger-Graham strategy with irony:
"It was noted by several eminent legal authorities 
that jailing publishers and editors is an unknown tactic 
so that it is difficult to assess its impact. Some ex­
perts argue that one jailed publisher is worth a dozen 
jailed reporters --while other experts argue just the op­
posite" ("Publishers, Editors Seek Jail to Protect 
Sources," Press Censorship Newsletter, no. Ill [November- 
December 1973] , p. 39).
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for an answer to the question whether the dispute over the 
Judy Garland subpoena (or any subpoena) was a free-press 
issue. "Perhaps it is," said the voice of publishing.
When the press offered arguments to the Supreme Court 
on behalf of Caldwell, Pappas and Branzburg, the publishers' 
views had advanced considerably, but by then-they were out­
numbered (and politically out-shouted) by influential press 
representatives who disagreed with them fundamentally. The 
contradiction, we recall, occurred on the most basic ques­
tion of all--the need for unqualified immunity. The most 
politically influential voices represented in friend-of-the- 
court arguments disagreed with the ANPA when it said, "this 
privilege to honor confidentiality must be absolute if it is 
to possess any value at all to society." After such a good 
start, the publishers' record of vacillation in Congress be­
tween 1972 and 1975 is disappointing, to say the least.
Compliance with subpoena demands for unpublished infor­
mation is now commonplace. According to the government, in 
fact, there is a trend toward news media requests for sub­
poenas so that an appearance of duress may b e .maintained 
while news media lawyers collaborate with prosecutors. The 
apparent willingness of publishers and broadcasters to 
be satisfied with a political impasse, rather than to recon­
cile their disagreement with the Reporters Committee and 
others insisting on absolute privilege, is cause for even 
greater alarm. Whatever the reasons for publishers' acqui­
escence in the legal and political situation, they cannot es­
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cape accusations of impropriety. Fred Graham and Jack Landau 
have pointed out how reprehensible the publishers* behavior 
seems in view of their industry’s vigorous and successful 
campaign to secure the special privileges against antitrust 
action contained in the Newspaper Preservation Act. The re­
porters observed:
The conclusion is quite simple: what the media owners
want from Congress, the media owners get from Congress.
. . . The only question that remains is whether the 
First Amendment is of as much concern to the media own­
ers as was the exemption from the anti-trust laws.3
Mr. Sulzberger and Mrs. Graham apparently overlooked 
several difficulties inherent in their plans to re-educate 
the public, Congress and the Supreme Court on the serious­
ness of their opposition to the subpoena power.
The first problem is that reporters have been fighting 
the publishers' battles for so long that many of them seem 
to think it is their fight alone. Consider the view of the 
Reporters Committee, which cooked up this objection to the 
Sulzberger-Graham strategy after it was announced:
Ever since the subpoena controversy first arose in 
the summer of 1969, it has been clear that eventually 
the working press and management would be in conflict 
over the question of who has control over a reporter’s 
notes and tape recordings.
The issue arises in a duces tecum subpoena because 
the subpoena generally applies to those who have pos­
session and ownership of materials.
Most news media management takes the position that 
notes and tape recordings are its property and that 
management has the sole authority to decide whether to 
turn notes over to a court--even if the action will dis­
close a reporter's confidential source.
They argue a strict "property” theory: that the
3"Press Covers Government: The Nixon Years," p. 19467.
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notebooks and the tape recordings are management pro­
perty because the information contained therein was ob­
tained during the course of employment for the publish­
ers. This is traditional doctrine developed in copy­
right law.
A few news media owners--and the Reporters Commit­
tee- -believe that the reporter has either an exclusive 
or joint property right in his notes. This is because 
the decision on whether to take notes--in what form and 
how detailed--is a decision left up to the individual 
reporter. Furthermore, there is at least one decision 
whi ch comp ares a 'report err s n o t  es~ to the per sonaT work­
ing papers of an attorney.
The Reporters Committee suggests that--at a mini­
mum- -disclosure of confidential sources should be a 
joint privilege like the husband-wife p r i v i l e g e . ^
The Newspaper Guild, representing 40,000 newspaper 
workers, was so exercised by the thought of publishers be­
traying reporters’ confidences that it seriously asked Con­
gress to create a new felony: the disclosure of unpublished
information without the written "and unrevoked" consent of 
the journalist who originally acquired it. The Guild pro­
posal also would have authorized injunctions against publish­
ers and any other "news custodian" who would violate a jour­
nalist's wishes in these matters.'’
The idea that publishers are mere "news custodians" in 
a great war of reporters protecting the First Amendment 
against the intrusions of government may have a kind of ju­
venile appeal to some, but it should be rejected. In the 
scheme suggested here, really the opposite is true: when a
reporter's unpublished information is subpoenaed by govern-
4"Who Owns a Reporter’s Notes?" Press Censorship News­
letter, no. Ill (November-December 1973), p. 38.
^1973 House Hearings, pp. 574-75.
217
ment, the rights threatened belong not to the reporter but 
to his publisher and the public. In practice, of course, 
reporters are entrusted with the task of collecting and 
storing confidential information, but they cannot reason­
ably expect to turn their borrowed prerogatives against 
the wishes of puM'ishers . -A--publisher-, -therefore, always--• 
remains free to dispose of unpublished information as he 
sees fit. On the other hand, the reporter also remains free 
to dispose of unpublished information, because the publisher's 
rights in the matter relate to freedom from the pressure of 
subpoena, a governmental action. Publishers cannot interfere 
with the decisions of authors, sources, reporters or editors 
who wish to reveal unpublished information. In other words, 
the right to protect unpublished information as presented 
here is not a property right at all. It is a carefully de­
fined political freedom attached to publishers on behalf of 
a special political right belonging to every person. The 
chief principle of the rights and duties of publishing with 
regard to press subpoenas, therefore, it that preservation of 
the prerogatives of publishing needed to maintain the security 
of the right to comment on public affairs anonymously is not 
the responsibility of reporters, but of publishers.
A second hitch in the Sulzberger-Graham strategy is 
slightly more profound than the precociousness of reporters. 
Reporters might be willing to shift the burden of a subpoena 
to trusted publishers, but the government may not be willing 
to oblige. Once the government knows who has the information
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it wants, it need not subpoena any other person to obtain it. 
It would be easy enough, as Carl Bernstein did when the CRP 
subpoenas threatened, to pass files, notes and other docu­
ments to the publisher for her protection. But a reporter 
caught in the Branzburg Exception possesses knowledge that 
cannot be passed away. When that reporter was faced with 
conflicting orders--a publisher's directive not to testify 
and a court’s demand backed up by the power to punish con­
tempt- -the Sulzberger-Graham strategy would break down. 
Caldwell, Pappas and Branzburg certainly would have been 
vulnerable. In fact, today it appears that in most cases 
the government can safely ignore publishers when it seeks 
unpublished information. This situation must be changed.
The problem seems insurmountable unless publishers re­
solve to shield the identity of their reporters, say be re­
moving by-lines or assigning pseudonyms when necessary and 
wherever possible. (Members of the Newspaper Guild have the 
contractual right to insist on anonymity in their writing.) 
The point of this exercise, obviously, would be to compel the 
government to approach the publisher first. He in turn would 
have .a choice: actively betray the reporter and his sources
or actively shield them. What is important is even a mild 
trend toward anonymity would increase the probability that, 
when a subpoena was issued, it would have to go first to the 
publisher to pry out of him the identity of the reporter.
Meanwhile, much the same effect could be achieved by 
reporters who cannot remain anonymous (television reporters,
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for example) if their public reasons for refusal to cooper­
ate with the subpoena were altered slightly. The explana­
tion to the court might be something like, "I cannot answer 
(or provide the document or film or tape demanded) because 
I would be cooperating in an attempt to violate the pub­
lisher ’s constitutional rights" under the -First-Amendment to 
protect the anonymity of the source from governmental sub­
poena. By the way, he (or she) has the information you are 
seeking, because I have shared it with the publisher.”
The last point is crucial. A reporter who refuses to 
share unpublished information with the publisher obviously 
does not trust him. But a reporter has no right to ask his 
sources to place any more trust in him than he has placed in 
the publisher. After all, an institutional protection for 
the right to anonymity dictates that it is the publisher’s 
duty to resist the subpoena and the publisher’s right to re­
lease unpublished information voluntarily if he wishes. To 
reiterate: it is the subpoena for unpublished information
that violates the First Amendment, not the release of the in­
formation. There must be occasions when the request repre­
sents a legitimate societal interest in knowing unpublished 
facts. In such a case, the government has the option to pre­
sent its case in the court of public opinion, where the pub­
lisher wTould have to justify his actions, not only to the out­
side community, but to his fellow publishers and to the repor­
ters, editors, authors and sources whose lives might be af­
fected. Any societal interest offering proof of imminent
22 0
harm to the nation could, of course, defeat the claim of 
publisher's immunity.
Publishers', decisions for or against voluntary disclo­
sure of unpublished information would tend to isolate for 
searching community scrutiny those publishers who would un­
reasonably cooperate with governmental .investigations....against 
the citizenry. Similarly isolated would be those publishers 
who would not support promises of confidentiality made by 
their reporters under their express authority. Reporters who 
worked long for publishers of the weak-willed persuasion 
would lose their confidential sources. Strong publishers 
would benefit with highly competitive news stories (in the 
case of daily newspapers) and the chance to hire reporters 
willing to trust their publishers in the important duty of 
protecting anonymous speech.
The question, from a reporter's point of view, is 
whether there exist enough courageous publishers willing 
to embrace their responsibilities, force the issue whenever 
necessary and possible, and be jailed. (It should be pointed 
out that any appeal of a publisher's contempt conviction be­
fore the legislature can be persuaded to act favorably would 
risk prejudicing the legislative outcome.) Upon that number 
rests whatever chance remains for a proper political solution 
to this most political problem of press subpoenas. If the 
political battle were won, publishers collectively would hold 
a protected right to unpublished information and be forever 
publicly accountable for its preservation. Publishers also
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would be publicly accountable for the occasional voluntary 
disclosure of unpublished information necessary to defend 
themselves in libel actions and to aid law enforcement and 
governmental investigations in general to the extent their 
moral philosophies dictate.
r
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1st Session tr~a r r ^
IJX THE HOUSE OE REPRESENTATIVES
J a n u a r y  15,1973
Mr. C h a k i . e s  H .  W ii.sox o f  California ( b y  request) introduced t h e  follow ing  
bill; which was referred to t h e  Committee on t h e  Judiciary
To insure a free flow of information.
1 B e  i t  enacted b'j the S en a te  an d  H ouse o f Iteprcsen ta -
2 tivcs  o f  the U n ited  S la tes  o f A m erica  in  C ongress assembled,
3 That this Act may be titled “The Free Flow of Information
4 A ct”.
5 Sec tio n  1. Congress declares that—
6 (1) the purpose of this Act is to insure the free flow
7 of news and other information to the public; those who
8 gather, write, or edit information for the public or dis-
9 seminate information to the public can perform these
10 vital functions only in a free and unfettered atmosphere;
11 (2) such persons must not be inhibited, directly or
12 indirectly, by governmental restraint or sanction imposed
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1 by governmental process; rather they must be encour-
2 aged to gather, write, edit, or disseminate news or other
3 information vigorously so that the public c a n .b e -fully
4 informed;
5 (3 ) compelling such persons to disclose a source of
6 information or disclose unpublished information is con-
7 trary to the public interest and inhibits the free flow of in-
8 formation to the public;
9 (4 ) there is an urgent need to provide effective
10 measures to halt and prevent this inhibition;
11 (5 ) the obstruction of the free flow of information
12 through any medium of communication to the public-
13 affects interstate commerce;
14 (6 ) this xlct is necessary to insure the free flow ot
15 information and to implement the first and fourteenth
16 amendments and article I , section 8 of the Constitution.
17 . Sec . 2. ]STo person shall be required to disclose in any
18 [Federal or State proceeding either—
19 (1 ) the source of any published or unpublished in-
20 formation obtained in the gathering, receiving, or p’roc-
21 essing of information for any medium of communication
22 to the public, or -
23 1 (2 ) any unpublished information obtained or pre-
24 pared in gathering, receiving, or processing of informa-
'25 tion for any medium of communication to the public.
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1 S ec . 3. For the purpose of this A ct, the term—
2 (1) “Federal or State proceeding” includes any
3 proceeding or investigation before or by any Federal or
4 State judicial, legislative, executive, or administrative
5 body;
G (2 )  “medium of communication” includes, but is
7 not limited to, any newspaper-, magazine, other peri-
8 odical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire sendee,
9 news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or network,
10 or cable television;
11 (3) “information” includes any written, oral, or
12 pictorial news or other material;
13 (4) “published information” means any informa-
14  tion disseminated to the public by the person from
15 whom disclosure is sought;
16 (5)' “unpublished information” includes informa-
17 tion not disseminated to the public by the person from
18 whom disclosure is sought, whether or not related in-
19 formation has been disseminated and includes, but is not
20 limited to, all notes, outtakcs, photographs, tapes, or
21 other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the
22 public through a medium of communication, whether or
23 not published inhumation based upon or related to such
24  material has been disseminated;
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1 (6) “processing” includes Compiling, storing, and
2 editing of information;
3 (7) “person” means any individual, and any part-
4 nership, corporation, association, or otlier legal entity
5 existing under or authorized by the law of the United
6 States, any State or possession of the United States, the
7 District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
8 Rico, or any foreign country.
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1st S kssion
IX THE h o u s e  OF e k f k e s e x t a t i v e s
.Tasi'ahy 14. iorr.
M r. K a s t k n m k i w i  (fo r himself. Mr. I ’ a i i -s iia c k , find M r. C o h e n )  introduced the 
following h ill; which wns referred to flip Committee on the Jtid irin ry
To protect news sources and information from compulsory dis­
closure l>y newsmen.
1 l ie  it enacted by the Senate and House of Jtepresenla-
2 tire* of the United Stales of America in Congress assembled,
3 TIint this A ct may be cited as the “Xews Source and Infor-
4 mation Protection Act of 197;"}”.
"> S ec . 2 . A s used in this A ct—
G (1 }  the term “ newsman*’ means an y  man or
7 woman who is a reporter, photographer, editor, com -
8 inent;it«r. journalist, correspondent, announcer, or other
9 individual (including partnership, corporation, nssocla-
10 tion, or other legal entity existing under or authorized
11 by the laws of the United States or any State) engaged
Ill
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1 in obtaining, writing, reviewing, editing, or otherwise
2 preparing information in any form for any medium of
3 communication to the public;
4 . (2) the term “State” means any of the several
5 States, territories, or possessions of the United States,
6 the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of
7 Puerto Rico.
8 S e c .  3. Except as qualified by sections 4  and 7 of this
9 Act, in any Eederal or State proceeding (including n grand
10 jury or pretrial proceeding, no individual called to testify
11 or provide other information (by subpena or otherwise)
12 shall be required to disclose information or the identity of
13 o source of information received or obtained by him in his
14 capacity as a newsman.
33 S kc. 4 . At the trial of any civil or criminal action in
1G any court of the United States (as-defined in section fit >01 
17 (4 )  of title 1R, United States Code) or of any State, a
38 newsman may be required to disclose th e  identity of a source
39 of information or any other information if—
20 (1 )  the identity or information was not received
21 or obtained by him in express or implied confidence in
22 his capacity as a newsman, or
23 (2 ) the court finds that the party seeking the
24 identity or information has established by clear and
25 convincing evidence—
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1 (A ) that disclosure of such identity or infor-
2 mation is indispensable to the establishment of the
3 offense charged, the cause of the action pleaded,
4 or the defense interposed in such action;
5 (B ) that such identity or information cannot
6 be obtained by alternative means; and
7 (C) that there is a compelling and overriding
8 public interest in requiring disclosure of the identity
9 or the information.
10 Sue. 5  (a) Any order of a court of the United States
11 or of any State granting, modifying, or refusing a claim of
12 privilege on the part of a newsman shall he subject to judicial
13 review and shall be stayed by the issuing court for a rea-
14 sonable time to permit judicial review.
15 (b) Section 1292 (a) of title 28 of the United States
16 Code (relating to appeal of interlocutory decisions) is
17 amended by striking out the period at the end-of paragraph
18 (4 ) and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and by
19 adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
20 “ (5) Orders of such district courts or the judges
21 thereof granting, modifying, or refusing a claim of a
22 newsman’s privilege of nondisclosure. Such appeals shall
23 be given preference and expedited and shall be heard at
24 the earliest practicable date.” .
25 S e c . G. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to impair
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1 or preempt the enactment or application of any State law
2 which secures the minimum privileges established b}’ this
3 Act.
4 S e c . 7. Sections 3 and 4  of this Act shall not be avail-
5 able to a defendant in a defamation suit with respect to the
6 source of any allegedly defamatory information when such
7 defendant asserts n defense based on such source. Such de-
*
8 fendant need testify only if plaintiff demonstrates that iden-
9 tification of the source will lead to persuasive evidence on
10 the issue of malice.
11 S e c . 8 . This A ct shall apply only to individuals re-
12 quired, after the date of the enactment of this A ct, to testify
13 or provide other evidence.
^  S e c . 9. If any provision of this A ct or the application
thereof to. any person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
remainder of the A ct and the application of the provision 
H  to other persons not similarly situated or to other circum- 
stances shall not he affected thereby.
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